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New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential
implications of the removal of the Claiborne Expressway
segment of Interstate 10 (I-10), a proposal that has gained
traction since Hurricane Katrina. This study complements
previous analyses of the impacts of removing the elevated
expressway. It considers case studies of best practices in
highway removal, the history of the study area, and the
proposal in terms of its local and regional context -- in
particular the transportation system, land-use patterns, the
economy, and the community of the affected area.
Stakeholder interviews and surveys were conducted to
assist with drawing conclusions and recommendations
about the proposed removal of the I-10 highway segment
and redevelopment of the Claiborne corridor.
Interviews were conducted with 25 stakeholders, including
representatives of adjacent neighborhoods, the business
community, real estate interests, city and state elected

officials, commuters, and urban planners. Moreover, an
online survey was completed by more than 800 residents
from across the city. Each of these efforts informed
conclusions
and
recommendations
about
the
redevelopment of the Claiborne corridor.
While the study revealed substantial support for removing
the highway, many participants expressed a desire for
more information about the specifics of any removal
project and its likely ramifications. Some interviewees in
particular posited that removing the expressway alone
would not fully address the problems plaguing the corridor
and additional economic and community interventions
would be needed.
Of the survey respondents, 58% supported removal and
16% were opposed. Twenty-one percent of respondents
said they were uncertain of their stance on removal, while
the remainder indicated indifference toward the proposal.

Other key findings:


The vast majority of respondents (82%) predicted that removing the expressway would positively impact the area by
fostering economic and community revitalization.



Only 28% of drivers who use the expressway four or more days a week oppose the removal.



Respondents rated the following elements as “very important” to the successful revitalization of the corridor:
sidewalks (87%), bike lanes (67%), a tree-planted neutral ground (63%), and light rail/streetcar (56%).



Interviews revealed concern that gentrification could occur from the removal of the Expressway and revitalization of
the corridor; however, only 31% of survey respondents “Agreed” or “Somewhat Agreed” that the removal of the
Expressway would result in fewer housing options for lower income residents.



Respondents “Agreed” or “Somewhat Agreed” that the removal of the Expressway would revitalize the following
neighborhoods: Tremé (75%), the 7th Ward (70%), Tulane-Gravier (67%), the Central Business District (64%),
Iberville Public Housing (63%), and the French Quarter (51%).



Unknown impacts on travel patterns during and after removal were a significant concern of survey respondents.

Based on these concerns we recommend the following:


Incorporate transit and bikeable/walkable infrastructure into any redevelopment designs.



Consider providing convenient interchanges from I-10 to I-610 to facilitate additional capacity for motorists as part of
a follow-up traffic study.



Educate the public concerning transportation alternatives.



Address fears of housing and gentrification within the redevelopment of the Claiborne corridor as part of the ongoing
planning process.



Reach out to residents of the Claiborne corridor to better gauge resident stakeholder opinion.

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
1 - Introduction

highway (see Figure 1.2). Chapter 3 investigates the
history of the neighborhoods that make up the Claiborne
corridor and the previous and current plans for revitalizing
the area. These studies provide extensive groundwork for
the removal of the Claiborne Expressway and
redevelopment of the corridor. To better understand the
needs of the residents of the corridor, we next present an
overview of the local and regional context - the existing
conditions - to provide background for our analysis.

This study will examine the potential redevelopment of the
Claiborne Avenue corridor (see Figure 1.1). Since Katrina,
several plans for the future redevelopment of New Orleans
call for the removal of the Claiborne Expressway portion
of I-10 as a catalyst for redeveloping several
neighborhoods, including the Tremé, Lafitte, and other
neighborhoods within the core of New Orleans. Many of
these neighborhoods within the Claiborne corridor
currently suffer from high rates of crime, blight, and
poverty. This area also includes some of the highest
vacancy rates in the city and a stagnant local economy.

Chapter 4 details current conditions along the corridor.
Economic and demographic data for the neighborhoods
show how the area has declined from historic conditions.
Traffic data provides information on current usage patterns
on and around the Claiborne Expressway. Land use and
zoning are also presented as vital components of
understanding the larger perspective. The Claiborne
corridor clearly lacks economic and social advantages of
other areas of New Orleans. Any plans for removing the
Claiborne Expressway will need to include significant
investment in the surrounding area to overcome the current
conditions.

The report will examine case studies and best practices in
highway removal. It will also address the history of the
study area, the local and regional context, in particular the
transportation system, land use patterns, the local
economy, and the local community, including
demographics. Stakeholder interviews and public opinion
surveys were conducted to assist with drawing conclusions
and recommendations about the proposed removal of the I10 highway segment and redevelopment of the Claiborne
corridor.

Many of the previous
plans discussed in
chapter 3 included
resident
advisory
groups. In order for
this report to better
understand stakeholder
views, we interviewed
individuals including
community, non-profit,
and business leaders as
well as local residents.
These
interviews Figure 1.1: Claiborne-adjacent
revealed several social neighborhoods outlined in red. Base
and
cultural, map source: GNOCDC (2004)
economic,
and
transportation concerns about the Expressway removal.
These themes informed the generation of a broader survey.

Chapter 2 includes a series of case studies of removal
projects similar to the one proposed for Claiborne Avenue.
Cities who decided to remove such expressways include
Boston, Milwaukee, Portland, Oakland, two in San
Francisco, and Seoul, South Korea. The cases in this
chapter provide examples of how freeway removal impacts
the travel patterns, environment, community, and

Surveys further investigated public opinion throughout
Greater New Orleans. Both local residents and nonresidents support removal of the Expressway. Most
supported redevelopment of the area and thought social
and economic conditions would improve. Many expressed
concerns about traffic and were worried about increased
commute time or more congestion on surface streets.
Figure 1.2: North Claiborne Avenue, at Dumaine Street, looking
towards Elysian Fields. "Oak Tree Conservation." Undated. City
Archives New Orleans Public Library

This report encompasses the history and present conditions
of
the
Claiborne
Expressway
and
provides
recommendations for its future. Removing the freeway
would impact transportation and the economy of both the
corridor and the region and have dramatic effects on the
surrounding communities. We hope this research
contributes to the literature and provides useful information
to the community as it considers the future of the Claiborne
Avenue corridor.

economic vitality of the surrounding area. By examining
the policies and methods used in these cases, we can learn
from their successes and failures when evaluating the
removal of the Claiborne Expressway.
Built in the late 1960s, the Claiborne Expressway replaced
a tree-lined boulevard with a section of elevated interstate
1
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2.1 Introduction
Highway removal projects have been successful in many other cities in the past two decades. After the post-World War II
period of highway building, new transportation paradigms began to change communities’ approach to infrastructure. Urban
freeways were often a contentious issue, and some cities elected to remove parts or entire roads. To gain a better understanding
of best practices in highway overpass removal, we studied cases from Boston, Milwaukee, Oakland, Portland, two from San
Francisco, and Seoul, South Korea. These case studies illustrate the process and impacts resulting from highway removal. We
identified and summarized several themes from these case studies, which can be found in a chart at the conclusion of this
chapter. For the sake of brevity, summaries of the complete case studies are presented in this chapter. More in-depth accounts,
including references, may be found in Appendix A.

2.2 Boston: Central Artery
History
Boston, Massachusetts had one of the most congested
highway systems in the United States, causing enormous
traffic delays and car accidents. Traffic was expected to
get critically worse over time due to the natural increase of
people driving. In order to solve Boston’s traffic problem,
a plan was created in the 1980s to replace the Central
Artery Highway with a new mostly underground
infrastructure that was capable of handling the expected
traffic flow. The project later became known as the “Big
Dig”, spanning over two decades and costing billions.

Travel Behavior
The Big Dig was highly successful in terms of travel
impact. Traffic congestion was practically eliminated
according to an assessment study showing that travel time
in the project area was reduced on average by 62 percent,
depending on the route and time of day. Indirectly, the
project advocated public transit, along with cycling, by
creating provisions for cyclists and extending light rail
service. Along with reducing travel time and increasing
mobility, the project connected neighborhoods that were
severed by the elevated highway.

Figure 2.1: Boston Artery Before and After. Source:
HFBoards.com

received Spectacle Island, which was once a dump, from
the Big Dig. Spectacle Island was transformed using the
dirt removed during construction of the underground
expressway. It is now a popular destination that provides a
scenic place to hike and relax.
Many residents were wary of the project, fearing that a rise
in surrounding property taxes would price out the locals.
Others criticized the project for going severely over budget
and surpassing all project duration estimates. Lastly, critics
have found fault with design components. The American
Planning Association protested the Greenway as a massive
open space with little to attract residents.

Environment
Boston’s environment was affected both positively and
negatively by the project. Large amounts of CO2 were
released during the construction process, yet after
completion, the project lowered the amount of CO2
emissions coming from idling cars stuck in traffic.

Economy
The Big Dig was estimated to cost $22 billion - accounting
for interest payments on bonds, and it will not be paid off
until 2038. The good news is that the project has created
numerous economic benefits, such as new development
investments, wages from constructions, property price
increases, and tax revenue from real estate. Other economic
benefits are less obvious such as time saved commuting,
and less fuel consumed.

Community
This project designated lots of land to the residents of
Boston in the form of public parks, fountains, recreational
facilities, etc. The former space that was occupied by the
elevated highway was utilized for the infamous Rose
Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway, which is an open strip of
grass spanning four city blocks. Boston residents also

2
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2.3 Milwaukee: Park East Freeway
History
In 1960, Milwaukee hatched the grand scheme to create a
loop of freeways surrounding their entire downtown. Park
East freeway, the first freeway making up the loop was
built and opened, but due to strong opposition, especially
from the Mayor, the remaining freeways were not built.
With the cancellation of the other proposed freeways that
would have completed the loop, the remaining Park East
Freeway had little purpose, making it a less controversial
issue when the discussion came to tear it down. With the
hopes of replacing the freeway with something more
pedestrian friendly, demolition commenced June 2002 and
was completed in April 2003. Connecting ground level
roads have been reinstated, and currently construction is
underway for new developments within the area.

Figure 2.2: Park East Freeway. Source: Marketplace.com

Environment & Travel Behavior

and promoted cycling or walking habits. These
improvements have definitely made the area more
appealing. Not just the project area, but all surrounding
areas downtown have seen improvements since the
removal project.

The environmental assessment of the removal project,
conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation,
indicated no major environmental impacts occurred during
the construction process for the removal of the Park East
Freeway. Similarly, a 1998 evaluation of current and
future traffic impacts concluded very minimal traffic
effects or increased congestion were to be expected. The
full environmental impacts have not been realized yet, since
the redevelopment portion is not fully complete. There was
no taking of commercial or residential property during the
removal process, thus there are no negative social impacts
anticipated. It is hoped that the freeway removal will pave
the way for future sustainable transportation.

Economy
The cost for the project came to $ 37 million with separate
plans for redevelopment costing an additional $8 million
dollars. It is expected that the tear down project will bring
in between $58 and $800 million in investment to the
Freeway footprint, depending on whether the source is
local planners or political leaders. Redevelopment of the
area has increased property values along with tax revenue
for the city. Between 2001 and 2006, the average assessed
land values in the Park East Tax Increment District grew
by 45%. Opportunity for new growth has lead to a decent
amount of private investment and will hopefully continue
to be an economic asset to the city and downtown.

In 1999, the Park East freeway carried approximately 54
thousand vehicles on an average weekday. The Park East
freeway was 0.8 miles long; therefore, its removal
accounts for a reduction of 43,000 vehicle miles traveled
each day. This also translates into 41,000 fewer pounds of
CO2 per day emitted from freeway travelers.

The actual building of new development has been a slow
process because many projects had trouble obtaining
adequate financing. Pleas for financial assistance from the
city were met with mixed emotions, and in 2007 the city
declared that it would not help developments that were
overly speculative.

Community
Redevelopment was focused on residential homes, but it
also included retail shops, office spaces, and the opening
of a public waterfront. These new developments and
ground-level roads connect downtown Milwaukee to
surrounding neighborhoods. The absence of a freeway has
created a lot of positive improvements for residents
including reduced crime rates, lowered CO2 emissions,

3
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2.4 Oakland: Cypress Freeway
History
As a result of the Loma Prieta earthquake that was 7.1 on
the Richter scale, the Cyprus viaduct collapsed, killing 42
people and injuring 108. Although only 1.5 miles of the
freeway collapsed, 160,000 cars were forced to disperse
amongst the already heavily used Oakland highways and
streets. The removal of this section of I-880 had serious
implications on the local shipping industry and other local
employment centers throughout the city. Community
leaders opposed the rebuilding of the viaduct as it blighted
and divided the community of West Oakland. Blight,
noise, and pollution caused by the Cypress freeway were
an eyesore and drove away businesses leaving behind
gangs and violence. The main community revitalization
proposal was the connection of I-80 to I-880; Caltrans
believed that this would alleviate the majority of
congestion running through the adjacent arterial streets.

Environment
Adverse impacts of the freeway collapse included
containment exposure, noise pollution, and visual
pollution. The most detrimental impact was the reconstruction process, which mostly took place in an
industrial corridor. Thirty-two contaminated sites were
identified in the footprint of the new freeway. This
contamination was found in both the soil and groundwater.
These containments consisted of asbestos, lead, petroleum
hydrocarbon, polynuclear aromatics, and VOC’s.

Figure 2.3: Cypress Freeway. Source: Federal
Highway Administration

rebuilding their community. The community experienced
reductions in freight trucks traveling through residential
neighborhoods thanks to the construction of an interchange
that services the Port of Oakland. From 1990 to 2000, the
community residents also experienced 36.3% growth in
average income and a 3.7% decrease in poverty. Attempts
to bring in higher income housing developments have been
rejected as gentrification. A focus on job placement
services and community outreach led to an 82% success
rate with finding community members employment.

Travel Behavior
Immediately following the freeway collapse, travelers rerouted their travel patterns by detouring through nearby
I-580 and I-980. In the days immediately following the
earthquake, there was a significant spike in transit use.
Daily rail ridership figures increased by over 50%, from
218,000 to 342,000. Once the connection to the Bay
Bridge was completed, it was estimated that not having the
connection would create a loss of $2.5 million per month in
travel time to the public.

Economy
Immediately after the earthquake and shutdown of the
freeway, added travel times for motorists, shipment delays,
and higher vehicle operating costs amounted to $22.5
million in lost revenue. Additionally in the short term, the
demolition of the freeway cost the San Francisco
Metropolitan area $5,287,716. Federal relief funds
totaling $1.106 billion contributed to the repair of the I880 freeway. Meanwhile, the San Francisco retail sector
was not greatly affected.

Community
The removal of the freeway led to community
reunification and cultural wealth. The Community
Emergency Relief Team (CERT) was formed and gave
citizens an unprecedented voice in the decisions regarding

4
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2.5 Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway
Background

Harbor Drive Freeway was a ground-level four-lane
highway following the western side of the Willamette
River. Upon completion in 1942, the three-mile long route
carried 25,000 vehicles per day.
In the 1950s, with the approval of the Federal Highway
Act in 1956, many more highways were planned for
Portland. By 1964, Interstate 5 was completed and spanned
the east bank of the Willamette, running in the same
direction as Harbor Drive.
By 1968, in anticipation of rapid growth, Oregon further
attempted to boost their infrastructure. During this process,
the State Department of Transportation proposed widening
the existing Harbor Drive Expressway from four lanes to six.
That same year, groups of citizens began calling for closing
down Harbor Drive and developing the land as a park
instead.
Governor Tom McCall was the primary proponent of
getting the road removed and sided with a citizen alliance
as they argued against traffic engineers of the time. The
alliance argued that the overflow traffic from shutting
down the highway would find spillover lanes or follow I-5
in order to move north and south within the city. In 1974,
Harbor Drive closed, and other roads handled spillover.
Drivers were able to find manageable alternate routes.

Figure 2.4: Tom McCall Waterfront Park, 2009. Source:
Event.com

development of Fremont Bridge, which improved the
connectivity between the two freeways.
The most significant change in travel patterns was the
increase in the number of commuters choosing to use
public transit services rather than drive private
automobiles. The development of Portland’s sophisticated
transit system, Tri-Met, has caused gradual decline in
automobile trips near the former Harbor Drive Freeway.
Citizens were able to divert funds allocated for other
highway projects in Portland for the creation of the city’s
first light-rail line, which now consists of four different
lines with 85 total miles.

Community

The Harbor Drive Freeway was not taken down due to
safety concerns or an estimated high cost of expansion
versus demolition. The public’s interest to make
downtown Portland a more inviting place for all people
fueled the success of this project.

Environment and Travel Behavior

Reducing roadway capacity reduces the overall number of
auto trips. In fact, Robert Cervero found before and after
comparisons for Harbor Drive showing 9.6% fewer vehicle
trips on surrounding roads. Such reduction certainly goes a
long way in lessening the health problems associated with
exhaust-based air pollution.

Additionally, Portland has seen a 65% decrease in crime in
the area surrounding the former freeway. The community
also saw a new sense of empowerment against the current
model of highway expansion.

The creative urban design of downtown streets, the
successful diversion of traffic to alternative freeways,
bridges, and roadways, and the development of an
extensive intermodal public transit system have
contributed to the alleviation of congestion, environmental
degradation, and automobile dependency surrounding the
former Harbor Drive Freeway. Affordable fares, efficient
service, and easy access to multiple routes from various
locations have perpetuated continued growth of transit
ridership.

The 36.59 acre Tom McCall Waterfront Park allows its
visitors to take advantage of views of the Willamette River
and recreational opportunities all seasons of the year.
Among its bicycle and pedestrian paths and green space,
the park hosts many different festivals and public events.

Economy

The removal has lead to a substantial increase in property
tax revenue for the city. Since its development, roughly 62
development projects (retail, mixed use housing, office
space) have been successfully implemented. Some of the
most profitable projects include the development of the
Pioneer Place commercial building, RiverPlace retail and
housing development, and The Yards at Union Station.
There is continued interest in development within the
district such as the revitalization of Old Town/ Chinatown,
Ankeny/ Burnside, and the Portland Saturday Market.

Planners redesigned downtown streets to be one-way,
altered traffic signals to allow for more fluid flow of
traffic, and reduced speed limits as a means of increasing
safety for pedestrians and bicyclists. Additionally, there
was a substantial increase in the number of drivers on I-5
and I-405. Some of this congestion was minimized by the
5
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2.6 San Francisco: Central Freeway
History
Mid-century California freeway designers envisioned a
San Francisco with highway connections both through and
outside the city. Soon after construction, one of the internal
San Francisco highways, the Central Freeway, experienced
a freeway revolt regarding its placement through the
neighborhoods along Division and Octavia Boulevards.
After the 1989 Loma Pieta earthquake, community support
to remove the freeway strengthened again. While the
damaged northern portion of the freeway could not be
rebuilt, community leaders could get a full removal. A
compromise was struck – part of the freeway would be
removed, and part would be rebuilt. City leaders and
citizen activists worked to replace the ruined elevated
portion with housing and residential amenities in 1992.
The boulevard portion replacing the structure measures
133 feet in width and contains four lanes for traffic, a
grassy median, and two bicycle and pedestrian lanes.
Construction of a new portion of freeway was completed
in 2006.

Figure 2.5: After Removal. Source: Infrastructurist.com

cycle to work. The remaining 26% of residents chose to
drive to work.

Community
Once the central freeway was removed, the community
experienced a reduction in crime rates and higher land
values in the communities of Hayes Valley, Market and
Octavia. An increase in green space also improved the
quality of life for residents of Octavia Boulevard. The
community benefits of having a more sustainable
transportation system are perhaps the greatest of all. No
longer are streets congested, and residents have the option
to utilize public transit or bicycling if they so choose. The
removal of the Central Freeway led to an enhanced quality
of life for all residents in its vicinity. The Central Freeway
removal helped pave the way for urban revitalization. Now
affected areas, such as the Haynes Valley neighborhood,
are filled with fashionable stores, restaurants, and galleries.

Environment
Due to the fact that Octavia Boulevard consisted of
sustainable transportation choices, the environmental
impacts were positive. Green transportation results in
lower emissions as a result of less people choosing to
drive, which was the case for the original Central Freeway.
Noise barriers were also incorporated into portions of the
new central freeway, thus reducing noise pollution. The
designation of more green space within the project area
proved to be very beneficial to the health of the
community and provided more of a habitat for urban
wildlife.

Economy

Travel Behavior
As anticipated, the removal of the freeway led to the
reduction of roadway capacity in the short term. However,
through studies, traffic was found to have diverted and
spread amongst other roadways in the long term. 76% of
the 8,000 drivers that had previously used the freeway
shifted their route to another freeway, 11% used city
streets for their entire trips, 2.2% switched to public
transit, and 2.8% said they no longer made the trip
previously made on the highway. With the completion of
Octavia Boulevard in 2005, residents’ travel behaviors
changed. With the complete streets design of the
boulevard, traffic is much more dispersed. The design of
the Octavia Boulevard was intended to be pedestrian and
bicycle friendly. After completion, 47% of residents chose
public transportation, and 16.5% of residents chose to
6

The impacted area greatly benefited from the freeway
removal. Restaurants and shops appeared following the
project, which attracted those who worked in the civic
center. Octavia Boulevard was given the freeway
project of the year award by the California Transportation
Foundation. Prior to the reconstruction of the Highway
after the earthquake, the highway contributed to low land
values and a high crime rate, as well as urban decay. The
restored highway provided neighborhood access to a
regional freeway, created an aesthetically appealing public
space, and raised land values. Since the removal of the
highway, from 1996 to 2006, the average sales price of a
Hayes Valley condo rose from $203,000 to $ 760,000
(City of Seattle: 2008). The City of San Francisco also
profited with $35 million from the sale of the lots that the
previous central Freeway was placed upon. The revenue
from these sales was invested into transportation and
affordable housing.

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
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2.7 San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway
History
The Embarcadero Expressway was a 1.2-mile highway
spur completed in 1959 and demolished in 1991.
Originally part of a plan to crisscross San Francisco with
highways, the Embarcadero was intended to connect the
Bay Bridge with the Golden Gate Bridge along the
waterfront. The system was never completed, due in part to
resistance from the community. In 1989, the Loma Prieta
earthquake exposed problems in the elevated highway’s
construction, leading to the decision to remove the
Embarcadero section. In 2000, a six lane surface
boulevard, streetcar route, bicycle lanes, and pedestrian
promenade opened in place of the expressway. The area
has become a key public space for the citizens of San
Francisco, and the character and value of the surrounding
land uses has improved dramatically.

Environment and Travel Behavior
At one time, the Embarcadero carried over 60,000 cars per
day (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008). When
the freeway suddenly closed due to the earthquake, traffic
found other routes, surface streets were not overwhelmed,
and transit use increased (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007;
Marquez, 1989). Currently, the six lane boulevard carries
26,000 cars per day and the streetcar carries 18,000 daily
riders. The earthquake brought a perceived distrust of
elevated highways, and the aftermath was made possible
by a citywide increase in transit ridership. Combined with
bicycling and walking, the transportation options along the
Embarcadero are much more sustainable with the removal
of the highway.

Figure 2.6: Before and After. Source: Flickr.com

Economy
San Francisco’s traditionally industrial waterfront had
been losing business before the removal, so the
transformation to a commercial and residential area was a
positive change. Chinatown merchants worried about a
large drop in tourism, but the area remains one of the top
attractions in the city. In the immediate vicinity, quantities
of housing increased by over 50%, and property values
grew up to 25 times larger (U.S. Census Bureau). There
are 23% more jobs in the area, as well as many new
businesses (Congress for the New Urbanism, n.d.). The
centerpiece of the Embarcadero is the Ferry Building,
which remains a ferry terminal, but has also been
repurposed for offices and a farmers market. The removal
of the freeway made financial sense as well. The project
cost $50 million with only $3.25 million for the actual
demolition. A three year project to repair the expressway
would have cost $70 million (The Preservation Institute,
n.d.).

Community
In the 1950s, community opposition challenged San
Francisco’s highway plan. Although the Embarcadero
separated an industrial waterfront from the business center
of downtown, extension of the road was halted by
opposition from the Rincon Hill and South Beach
residential
neighborhoods
(Siegel,
2007).
One
neighborhood that the road served well was Chinatown,
causing merchants to oppose the removal four decades
later. With the freeway gone, the character of the land use
along the Embarcadero has changed dramatically.
Commercial and residential uses have replaced industrial
buildings, making the area one of the most desirable places
to live in the city. The Embarcadero’s public spaces and
multi-modal corridor have drawn many more visitors and
residents to the area, and Chinatown has seen little impact
on its popularity (Seattle Department of Transportation,
2008).
7
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2.8 Seoul: Cheonggyecheon Highway
Background

Seoul developed around the Cheonggyecheon (“clean
water stream”), a former seasonal stream, which divides
the city in two. The stream has been a pivotal part of
Seoul’s landscape for centuries. By the 1950s, however,
migration from the country that settled along the banks of
the stream had exacerbated pollution.
From 1958 to 1967, the stream was encased underground,
as a 3.7-mile elevated highway was built 164 feet to 262
feet above the former stream. The elevated highway ran
parallel to a grade-level roadway, and included four lanes
of two-way traffic that carried 168,600 vehicles daily
before its deconstruction (Kil-Dong 2007).

Figure 2.7: Before and After. Source: Preserve.net

 Community
 Along the Cheonggyecheon stream today, there are new
running and pedestrian paths, waterfalls where children
play, and a museum. The park serves as the backdrop to a
variety of arts and entertainment events. Additionally,
property values and interest in the downtown area have
taken off in light of the freeway’s removal.

Between 2003 and 2005, the metropolitan government
planned and executed the removal of the Cheonggye
Elevated Highway and the ground-level roadway beneath
it that covered the stream. The Cheonggyecheon has been
restored, and it is the centerpiece of a park with two-lane
one-way streets on each side. The project cost an
estimated $384 million.

Although the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon seems to
be reaping great benefits at a broader scale in a variety of
levels, concerns have arisen for a local group of informal
merchants that once occupied and worked in the streets
around the expressway. Gentrification has caused concerns
about former residents and merchants being forced out of
the area by rising property values (Walsh 2006). In
addition, the Commission for Architecture and the Built
Environment declares the end result of the ambitious
project an “inspirational space which is family-friendly,”
but it faults designers’ failure to facilitate “inclusive
planning” that would have better accounted for a full range
of community concerns and interests such as handicap
accessibility (Commission for Architecture and the Built
Environment n.d.).

Environment and Travel Behavior

Overall, the Cheonggyecheon restoration has been an
unqualified environmental success. The restored river has
been found to reduce the urban heat island effect and
increase wind speeds, reducing summer temperatures in
the corridor by more than 3 degrees Celsius (Revkin 2009;
Vidal 2006). Air quality has also improved substantially
due to reduced motor vehicle traffic. Small-particle air
pollution has dropped 35 percent, which accounts for an
economic value of up to $40 billion per year (Revkin
2009; Hwang, 2006).

Economy

The restored riverbed was designed to maximize flood
capacity and safely accommodate 200-year flood levels
(Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; Revkin 2009). New sewage
lines were installed to segregate rainwater and wastewater
and prevent wastewater intrusion during flood events (KilDong 2007). In addition, soil and groundwater
contamination have been largely eliminated (Kil-Dong
2007). The river’s ecosystem has been greatly restored as
the stream has been engineered to serve a variety of fish
and wildlife. As a result, fish, bird, and insect species have
multiplied.
A significant modal shift occurred, diverting motorists to
buses and subways, and overall traffic flow and speeds
downtown have improved (Revkin 2009). Subway
ridership has increased 13.7% since the restoration project
began (Lee 2006). Increases in bike, pedestrian, and public
transit mode shares due to public infrastructure investment,
crossing improvements, and education campaigns promote
transportation equity for low-income commuters who save
time and money due to these improvements (Young 2010).

Tourism has boomed in central Seoul. In the first three
months after the project’s completion, approximately 12
million visitors came to the CGC, and in the three months
following the grand opening, there were more than 71
million visitors to the CGC (Noh 2009).
The project has been economically beneficial to
landowners and developers. Commercial land, located
within five hundred meters of the CGC, enjoyed greater
property value benefits with the urban greenway than they
did with the elevated highway. In addition, the restoration
of the CGC and its transformation into an urban greenway
reversed the negative impacts of the highway but conferred
beneficial economic impacts on residential landowners.
The closer one lived to an entrance to the greenway, the
higher one’s property value when compared to residents
living more than three kilometers away.
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2.9 Best Practices
All of the case studies demonstrate the concept of “induced
demand.” When a freeway exists, people will use it. The
traffic volumes that were observed on the original roadway
are based on the perception that unrestricted access is
available. When replaced with a surface street, the traffic
relocates to the new street, other streets in the network, or
to public transportation. In many of the cases, the traffic
simply disappeared, with people choosing to make fewer
trips. Thus, it is appropriate to replace freeways with lower
traffic volume streets.

for neighborhood activity. In some cases, the new areas
took on new names and identities. With the Portland and
Embarcadero examples, the roadways followed the
waterfront. This created a barrier in which city residents
did not visit the water, and removal made the locations
gathering points. In these cases, neighborhoods were not
created, but they became more residential. Because
highways often exist in industrial areas, many of the case
studies featured industrial buildings being repurposed into
residential and commercial space.

The case studies fall into two main categories of highways:
redundant roads and spurs. In Boston, Portland, Seoul, and
Oakland, the roads connected two highway sections that
remain. In Portland, the road was redundant because of
another existing highway. In Boston and Oakland, the
projects involved replacing the freeway with another.
Seoul took the most drastic approach, removing the
roadway altogether. In all of these cases, removing a link
caused a new equilibrium of highway traffic. In
Milwaukee and San Francisco, the roads were spurs,
leading to surface streets rather than another highway. In
all three cases, these spurs were unnecessary, and removal
was successful with the use of existing street grids.

New development around highway removal increased
property values in all of the case studies. As mentioned
above, some of the cities were able to create new parcels,
generating revenue with their sale. In several of the cities,
special districts were created to capture the rise in property
values or to encourage development with incentives. Many
of these cases featured a vision of urban development
consistent with New Urbanism, and used strict design
requirements to achieve this.
The lifespan of an urban freeway was fairly consistent
within these case studies: 30 to 50 years. In the Bay Area
case studies, the freeways were damaged by a natural
disaster, but the degrading quality of the structures had
been documented beforehand. There is a necessary state of
disrepair with these removals; the idea of removing them
when they are new isn’t likely to have traction. Repairing
costs are often higher than removal, another reason for
these lifespans.

In most of the case studies, stakeholders redeveloped the
actual footprint into something other than private
development. Linear parks are commonly chosen to
feature prominently in the design. Surface boulevards
often replaced the freeway, usually focusing on a more
multi-modal facility with bike lanes, transit, and pedestrian
facilities. In San Francisco, small pockets of new land
were developed. Milwaukee was the only case study that
used the footprint predominantly for new development.

Citizen action was a key ingredient to the movement to
remove highways. These groups often protested the initial
construction of the freeway but only found their voice
again after the lifespan mentioned above. Unfortunately,
the citizen action was not enough – a political champion
was needed. Mayors, city councils, and governors were
often the leading voice in the highway removal. City
planning departments and traffic engineers were more
likely to oppose the removal.

Before a freeway is removed, traffic engineers and others
will often express the need for a highway due to traffic.
Burial of a new highway and alternate routes are popular
options. These proposals were part of the planning process
for all of the case studies but were only built in Boston and
Oakland. Building a new freeway elsewhere can remove
the financial benefits of highway removal; that is, it is
cheaper to not rebuild. Boston is an oft-cited example of
how expensive such a project can become.

An important aspect to the success of highway removal
observed in case studies was construction periods. Many of
these projects took five or more years to complete and
were disruptive to the neighborhoods around them.
Business owners were often hesitant about the removal
simply because of the drop in customers during the
construction. There are techniques to minimize the
disruption, such as pedestrian walkthroughs and signage
for businesses. Many of these construction periods were
lengthened because of political infighting, design disputes,
and cost overruns. There are delays that should be better
planned to reduce the time it takes to remove the highway.

Highway removal can reunite existing neighborhoods and
create new neighborhoods. The roads in Boston,
Milwaukee, Oakland, San Francisco (Central), and Seoul
all featured urban development on both sides, and the
division caused by the freeway was well documented. The
highway is often cited as a location with increased blight
and crime, and universally a place people don’t like to
spend time. Highways also provide a barrier to pedestrian
travel. In these cases, the new design became an attractor
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2.10 Case Study Comparison

Case Study

Boston: Central
Artery

Milwaukee: Park
East Freeway

Oakland: Cypress
Freeway

Portland: Harbor
Drive Freeway

San Francisco:
Central Freeway

San Francisco:
Embarcadero
Freeway

Seoul:
Cheonggyecheon
Highway

Built: 1959
Removed: 2006
Replaced with: Tunnel and park.

Built: 1971
Removed: 2003
Replaced with: Mixed-use
development.

Built: 1955
Removed: 1998
Replaced with: Parkway and alternate
freeway.

Built: 1942
Removed: 1974
Replaced with: Waterfront park.

Built: 1959
Removed: 1992
Replaced with: Surface boulevard.

Built: 1959
Removed: 1991
Replaced with: Surface boulevard and
streetcar.

Built: 1958
Removed: 2005
Replaced with: Urban stream.

Economic
Impacts



Environmental
Impacts





Travel Behavior
Impacts





Community
Impacts






$7.4 billion in real estate
investment.
$1.3 billion increase in property
values.
43,000 new jobs.





300 acres of green space.
Shoreline restoration.
New park on an old landfill.







11 developable city blocks.
Land values grew by over 180%.
Many planned mixed-use,
residential, and commercial
properties.
Housing market downturn has
stalled much of the development.



Limits to sprawl through land
efficiency.
More green and permeable
spaces.








Increased travel times while
closed.
Oakland Private Industry Council
provided jobs to local residents.
Retail access did not suffer.



Soil contamination in rail yards
where freeway was relocated.
Lower noise and air pollution in
West Oakland.






Tax Increment Financing to pay
for the park.
62 successful development
projects generating millions in tax
revenue.



36 acre public park.
Vehicle trips on surrounding
streets have actually dropped.






Retail businesses open along
Octavia Boulevard.
7 acres and 22 parcels were newly
developed, generating $35 million
for the city.
Rise in condo prices.



Patricia’s Green, a 16,000 square
foot park, and another linear park.








Removal was less expensive than
repair.
Increased tourist activity,
including in Chinatown.
Large increase in property values.



Linear parks, public spaces,
walking and biking promenade.
Revitalized waterfront.














8.5% drop in daily traffic.
62% drop in travel time.
Reduced travel time to the
airport.
Slight increase in transit
ridership.



Development adjacent to the
site.
Gentrification of Chinatown and
the North End.










No increase in congestion on
surface streets.
Vehicle Miles Traveled in
Milwaukee has decreased.
Reconnected the street grid
pattern.
Citywide drop in transit ridership.



Connection between two
neighborhoods.
New neighborhood identities.
New overlay zoning guidelines.









New freeway has lower traffic
volumes.
Increase in transit use during
earthquake recovery.
No HOV lane added.



Reunited the neighborhood.
Growth in income and decrease in
poverty in West Oakland.
Community chose to preserve
industrial zoning, has had trouble
attracting new industry.









Other streets absorbed traffic with
no problems.
Large increase in transit ridership.
Trucks and engineers opposed the
removal.



Affordable housing included in
much of the development.
Decrease in crime in the vicinity.
Major festivals and markets in the
new park.
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Other highways and streets
absorbed traffic, many people
made fewer trips.
Bicycle and pedestrian facilities
contributed to an increase in use
of these modes.



Neighborhoods have less urban
decay and higher land values.
Affordable and senior housing in
new developments.








Traffic successfully absorbed by
surface streets.
Increase in transit use, and high
ridership on new streetcar.




New neighborhood identities
formed.
Change in uses from industrial to
residential and commercial.
Opposition from Chinatown
merchants.









Jobs and residents returned to the
area.
Storeowners reported fewer
customers during construction.
Property values rose.

River had become an open sewer
and flood hazard, both mitigated
in the new design.
Poor air quality near the highway.
Water is artificially pumped into
the stream.
More wildlife present.

Two-lane road was built.
Bus and subway system were
coordinated.
Significant modal shift.
100,000 pedestrians daily.

Large numbers of residences in
the area.
Public spaces are well used.
Some handicapped accessibility
issues.

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
3 - History and Background
3.1 Introduction
The area directly adjacent to the Claiborne Expressway is comprised of several established neighborhoods varying in age,
composition, and history. This chapter will outline the history of the Claiborne Expressway corridor and briefly discuss the
history of the following neighborhoods adjacent to the Claiborne Expressway: Tremé, Seventh Ward, St. Roch,
Tulane/Gravier, and the CBD. Many of these neighborhoods have shared histories and similarities because of their proximity
to one another.
It should be noted that the construction of Interstate 10 in New Orleans in the late 1960s coincided with the population decline
in New Orleans from its decennial census peak of 627,525 in 1960 to 593,471 in 1970 (Gibson, 1998). This pattern of decline
has continued each decade since 1970 (Gibson, 1998), and according to 2010 Census data, New Orleans is now home to
343,829 residents (U.S. Census Bureau). The decline is attributed to several factors, including suburban out-migration,
intrusive urban renewal projects, large infrastructure projects, and the relocation of industry away from the city of New
Orleans. Such factors led to urban disinvestment in many neighborhoods, making the correlation between neighborhood
decline and proximity to the interstate difficult to isolate.

3.2 North Claiborne Avenue
North Claiborne Avenue in New Orleans was once a
commercial district filled with grocery stores, restaurants,
and businesses convenient to the neighborhood residents.
The median (referred to as "neutral ground‖ locally) of the
avenue was lined with established oak trees and greenery.
The atmosphere was vibrant and friendly. The area was the
heart of the surrounding neighborhoods, and Mardi Gras
parades rolled by as residents celebrated on the North
Claiborne Avenue neutral ground.
Until the mid-1950s, African-Americans were prohibited
from participating in Mardi Gras celebrations on St.
Charles and Canal streets (GNOCDC 2005a). Therefore,
the Krewe of Zulu and tribes of intricately costumed Mardi
Gras Indians paraded along the tree-lined avenue much to
the delight of the parade goers that resided in the area.
New Orleans Restaurateur Leah Chase was one of those
residents. Her words paint a vivid picture exemplifying the
neighborly feel of this once vibrant area of North
Claiborne Avenue:

Figure 3.1: North Claiborne Avenue, at Dumaine Street, looking
towards Elysian Fields. "Oak Tree Conservation." Undated. City
Archives New Orleans Public Library

We would go to see the Zulu parade, which was
on Claiborne Avenue from Canal Street to St.
Bernard Avenue. Claiborne was lined with
beautiful oaks then. Some of the people held
open houses on Claiborne, for their friends. The
street was full of booths, with blacks selling fried
chicken, fried fish, and red beans. My favorite
thing about Mardi Gras was that we could eat in
the street. My father never even let us eat candy
outside normally. (Chase, 2009, p. 154)
After World War II, however, the area suffered a
devastating blow that severely impacted the character and
vitality of the surrounding neighborhood.
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Figure 3.2: North Claiborne Avenue, showing oaks August 29, 1968. [Photograph by

Joseph C. Davi]. City Archives New Orleans Public Library

Figure 3.3: Circle Food Store - 1954 – before the elevated expressway. City Archives New

Orleans Public Library
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3.3 I-10 Expressway Construction
During the 1950s, the Federal government paved the way
for urban freeway construction by contributing 90% of the
necessary funds for interstate projects (CNU 2011).
Officials announced that the Interstate 10 Claiborne
Expressway, an elevated highway, would be engineered
and constructed above North Claiborne Avenue to allow
better access to the Central Business District. At the same
time, the Vieux Carré Riverfront Expressway was also
proposed, to be constructed through the French Quarter to
make the area more accessible.

Of the changes along the avenue since
the 19th century, none has been more
devastating than the cutting down of the
oaks on the neutral ground in the mid1960s to erect the interstate ramp. It took
something out of the spirit of the
neighborhood. The shady promenade ran
for blocks down the center of the avenue
and was a place where people embraced
each other in the daily rituals of life. The
old ladies would come out here and
stretch their curtains. . . .When Joe Lewis
was fighting, the men would be out here
on the backs of their trucks, and our
Mardi Gras was here. (GNOCDC 2005a)

The term "The Second Battle of New Orleans‖ has been
used to describe the controversy in the 1960s over the
Vieux Carré Riverfront Expressway. Richard O.
Baumbach, Jr. and William E. Borah, opponents of the
project themselves, described the expressway fight in: The
Second Battle of New Orleans: A History of the Vieux
Carré Riverfront Expressway Controversy. The idea of an
elevated freeway along the riverfront was not a new one. It
was suggested in 1946 by Robert Moses, a New York
builder. Baumbach and Borah explain that the project drew
opponents. Preservationists had been fighting for years to
protect the character of the Vieux Carré. They suspected
that the proposed expressway was an intrusion that would
harm the fragile beauty of the old city. On the other hand,
supporters of the expressway believed that the expressway
would preserve the Vieux Carré by alleviating traffic on
the narrow streets of the French Quarter. The Second
Battle of New Orleans became more than just a conflict
between preservationists and downtown developers; it was
a battle of values, attitudes, and conflicting beliefs and
perspectives about the character of the city (Weingraff
2011). The French Quarter Expressway was stopped by
preservationists who battled fiercely and persuaded the
federal government to withhold funding. However,
residents of the North Claiborne Avenue area—which
included some of the oldest African American
neighborhoods in the country—did not have the funds or
political clout to stop construction of the Interstate 10
Claiborne Expressway.

Figure 3.4: North Claiborne Avenue, showing oaks. Undated.
City Archives New Orleans Public Library

The construction of the elevated Interstate 10 Claiborne
Expressway permanently exchanged the historic green
space for concrete. This further diminished the vibrancy of
the neighborhood, and soon many more properties were
abandoned. Soon afterward, the business district showed a
marked decline, and the once-serene way of life for the
neighborhood residents was gone. Interestingly, in 1968,
the Zulu parade was finally allowed to roll on St. Charles
and Canal due to the destruction of the North Claiborne
neutral ground (GNOCDC 2005a).

Five hundred homes along North Claiborne Avenue were
torn down to prepare for the construction of the highway
that opened in 1968 (CNU 2011). The final blow to the
neighborhood was the removal of the quadruple rows of
live oak trees from the neutral ground of the avenue. A
May 2002 article in the Times-Picayune quotes Jerome
Smith, a resident and community activist of the
neighborhood, who recalls the days before I-10:
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3.4 Overview of Impacted Neighborhoods

Figure 3.5: Neighborhoods of New Orleans; Claiborne-adjacent neighborhoods outlined in red. Base map source: GNOCDC
(2004)

Tremé
In 1730, Fort St. Ferdinand and Fort St. John were built in
the area of New Orleans that is now known as Tremé.
Chevalier Charles de Morand owned the city‘s first
brickyard in the area, and his plantation was bounded by
North Rampart, Claiborne Avenue, and Bayou Road
(Governor Nicholls). As time passed, most of the Morand
Plantation had been acquired by Claude Tremé, who built
a plantation on Bayou Road. The area became more
accessible, especially in 1794, when the Spanish Governor
of Louisiana built a canal from the French Quarter to
Bayou St. John right through Tremé‘s land. By 1810,
Tremé had sold off most of his land, and the land was

subdivided for development. Free people of color,
Caucasians, and Creoles who had recently arrived from
Haiti purchased the subdivided lots. The people of color
who resided in the area were some of the city‘s finest
craftsmen and musicians.
Likewise, the Haitian descendants excelled as writers,
teachers, and doctors. Tremé grew in leaps and bounds,
and by 1883, there were only a few undeveloped lots left.
Double shotgun houses and Creole cottages stood among
businesses (GNOCDC 2005a). The neighborhood was
ethnically diverse and prosperous.
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are essentially the same as those of the current day Seventh
Ward, except that it is slightly larger, extending from
Elysian Fields Avenue to Esplanade Avenue. This
additional land was once owned by Charles de Morand of
Tremé fame (GNOCDC 2005b).
The development of the Pontchartrain Railroad in 1830
helped to encourage growth in the area. By the latter half
of the 19th century, the Seventh Ward developed into a mix
of French Creoles, Germans, and free people of color.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Seventh Ward was
notable for its strong business community, contributions to
early Jazz, Creole culture, and civil rights activists.
However, the construction of I-10 through the Seventh
Ward neighborhood shuttered many businesses and
rendered many homes undesirable causing residents to
relocate (GNOCDC 2005b).

Figure 3.6: Tremé Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data Center,
Tremé Neighborhood. (www.gnocdc.org).

The livelihood of Tremé was dealt a huge blow in the
1920s when the Municipal Auditorium was constructed
adjacent to Congo Square. This facility destroyed a
portion of the neighborhood in order to create a venue for
Mardi Gras balls, operas, and other events usually reserved
for the upper echelon of New Orleans society. Then urban
renewal began in earnest in the 1960s with the
construction of Louis Armstrong Park. This project
destroyed nearly one third (32 acres) of historic Tremé and
limited access to the park. Congo Square and the
Preservation Hall, hallmarks of the neighborhood, were
now fenced off, along with newer facilities like the
Mahalia Jackson Center for Performing Arts (Johnson
2001).
Around the same time as the Louis Armstrong Park was
being developed, construction of the Claiborne
Expressway began. The construction process crippled
businesses located on Claiborne Avenue. The number of
businesses along a eight block stretch on Claiborne
Avenue declined from 132 in 1960 to 35 in 2000 (Lacho,
Parker, and Carter 2005).

Figure 3.7: 7th Ward Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data
Center, Seventh Ward Neighborhood. (www.gnocdc.org).

St. Roch
St. Roch developed considerably later than the
abovementioned neighborhoods. It was settled after the
completion of the now defunct Pontchartrain Railroad
along Elysian Fields Avenue in 1830, which positioned the
area favorably between the Mississippi River and Lake
Pontchartrain. Additionally, railroad lines connecting New
Orleans to the rest of the country have for decades
crisscrossed the northern portion of the neighborhood.

Seventh Ward
The land occupied by the Seventh Ward neighborhood was
first developed by Bernard Marigny in the late 1700‘s.
After successfully developing Faubourg Marigny, he
sought to develop the Nouveau Marigny, which was
bordered by Elysian Fields Avenue, St. Bernard Avenue,
St. Claude Avenue, and Gentilly Road. These boundaries
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Culturally, the neighborhood is very similar to the Seventh
Ward as it was historically settled by French Creoles,
Germans, and free people of color. It was also home to
many early Jazz musicians, most famously Jelly Roll
Morton (GNOCDC 2005c).

St. Roch is notable for its public spaces and the St. Roch
Market, one of the last remaining historic public markets
in the city. The neighborhood‘s namesake is from the St.
Roch shrine and cemetery, which was dedicated in 1867
after a German priest invoked the healing powers of St.
Roch, the patron saint of good health, to protect his
parishioners from the yellow fever epidemic.
Miraculously none of the parishioners died in 1867 or
1868 (GNOCDC 2005c).
The portion of the Claiborne Expressway that runs through
the neighborhood is in the northern portion near the
railroad lines. The construction of the interstate further
divided the neighborhood and created an undesirable
stretch along its boundaries (GNOCDC 2005c).

Tulane/Gravier

Figure 3.8: St. Roch Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater
New Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data
Center, St. Roch Neighborhood. (www.gnocdc.org).

The early development of Tulane/Gravier involved many
owners and exchanges of property, but its namesakes are
those of Paul Tulane, founder of Tulane University, and
Jean and Bertrand Gravier, developers of Faubourg St.
Mary (CBD). The neighborhood began to develop in the
mid 19th century (GNOCDC 2005d).

There are many landmarks, such as the Dixie Brewery and
Falstaff Brewery, which hint at the industrial past of the
neighborhood. The area was essentially sandwiched
between the Carondelet and New Basin Canals, providing
easy access to both the lake and river. Later railroad
development provided the backbone for an industrial boom
(GNOCDC 2005d).
The 19th century saw increased commercialization,
especially along the main avenues (Tulane, Broad, and
Canal), in addition to increasing residential densities.
Aside from the imposing structures of the now abandoned
breweries, the neighborhood is also home to a large
number of biomedical facilities such as University
Hospital and the LSU School of Nursing (GNOCDC
2005d).
After Hurricane Katrina devastated many of the city‘s
buildings, plans were made to abandon Charity Hospital in
the CBD. LSU's medical facilities, previously housed in
Charity Hospital, and the Veterans Affairs Hospital will
relocate north of Claiborne Avenue into the neighborhood.
They will also expand their facilities in an attempt to
promote the Tulane Avenue corridor as a nationally
competitive Biomedical District. Construction is
underway, and though plans have been subject to scrutiny,
the greatest impact has already occurred. The LSU and VA
sites occupy 27 blocks and removed or demolished 249
buildings. It is anticipated that many of the streets will be
removed and much of the traffic will funnel to Galvez St.
(Save Charity Hospital 2011).

Figure 3.9: Tulane/Gravier Neighborhood Map. Source:
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina
Data Center, Tulane/Gravier Neighborhood.
(www.gnocdc.org).
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In addition to being situated adjacent to the Claiborne
Expressway, this neighborhood is also bounded by the
Pontchartrain Expressway portion of I-10.

The CBD experienced a brief renaissance in the 1970s and
80s because of the oil boom. Poydras Street became the
new hub for commerce, but when oil prices crashed in the
late 1980s, the CBD was left with a surplus of office
towers. Today, vacancy rates remain relatively high, but
many of the buildings have been converted to hotels for
the burgeoning tourist industry in New Orleans.
Additionally, commercial and residential development is
on the rise again with many projects slated for construction
along Loyola Avenue where a new streetcar line is planned
(Mowbray 2010).

Central Business District (CBD)
The CBD started out as Jean Baptiste LeMoyne de
Bienville‘s plantation, granted by the Superior Council of
Louisiana in 1719. It changed hands over the years and
was subdivided after the French Quarter Fire of 1788 by
Bertrand Gravier, who established the neighborhood as
Faubourg St. Marie (St. Mary). Americans flocking to the
city after the Louisiana Purchase (1803) made this the
"American Quarter.‖ By the 1830s, Canal Street had
replaced Chartres Street as the commercial center of the
city, and thus, the CBD was established (GNOCDC
2005e).

Figure 3.12: Claiborne Avenue circa 1960 (Times-Picayune)

Figure 3.11: CBD Neighborhood Map. Source: Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center, Pre-Katrina Data Center,
Central Business District Neighborhood. (www.gnocdc.org).

The construction of the New Basin Canal in the
neighborhood and Louisiana‘s booming sugar and cotton
trade contributed to the rise of the CBD. While the Civil
War and Reconstruction took its toll on the city, the CBD
quickly rebounded. In 1870, New Orleans became a
deepwater port, and skyscrapers, paved roads, and electric
streetcars followed. The stock market crash of 1929
brought a period of decline, which was only exacerbated
by the suburban white flight that occurred after
desegregation in the 1960s (GNOCDC 2005e).

Figure 3.10: Claiborne Expressway/Interstate 10 above Claiborne Avenue
today. Source: Congress for New Urbanism (2010).
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53 miles of new light rail service, including a light rail line
along Claiborne Avenue, extending from Carrolton
Avenue to New Orleans East. The Commission also
advocated the adoption of a "Neighborhood Center Model‖
of development (see Figure 3.13), which emphasizes
mixed use boulevards, greenways, neutral-ground transit
service, and regional connectivity.

3.5 Project Background:
Summary of Claiborne Avenue
Expressway Removal
Proposals
Throughout the Post-Katrina planning process (20052010), the removal of the I-10 Expressway at Claiborne
Avenue has been consistently identified—particularly by
residents of surrounding communities—as a top long-term
priority. In 2010, the Congress for New Urbanism released
a report on the viability and desirability of the
Expressway‘s removal. In an effort to assess the feasibility
of this proposal, the City of New Orleans submitted an
application for federal funding to perform a detailed,
comprehensive analysis, and received $2M for the project.
This section briefly outlines the various planning processes
and proposals that address the Claiborne Avenue
Expressway‘s potential redevelopment.

Lambert Neighborhood Rebuilding
Plans
Next, in September of 2006, a series of neighborhood level
recovery plans were published, in which neighborhoods
outlined priority projects and needs for their communities.
Both the 6th Ward/Tremé and 7th Ward Neighborhood
Rebuilding Plans highlighted the negative impact that the
Claiborne Avenue Expressway had on their communities,
and identified a study of its potential removal as a key
long-term recovery need. The neighborhoods‘ final plans
both included a stated recovery goal of "address[ing] the
former civic importance of Claiborne Avenue, and the
destruction and separation of the neighborhood caused by
I-10‖ (New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization Plans
(Lambert Plans): 7th Ward Rebuilding Plan 2006, p.5).

Bring New Orleans Back Commission
(BNOB)
Immediately after Hurricane Katrina (October 2005), the
Bring New Orleans Back Commission was created to
develop recommendations to the City for recovery. The
documents the commission produced, published in January
of 2006, were focused on the city‘s most immediate
priorities and did not specifically call for the
redevelopment of Claiborne Avenue. However, it did call
for new and rebuilt roads to " be designed with the wide
median (neutral ground) model for pedestrians, bicycles,
transit, and open space‖ (BNOB 2006, p.33). In addition,
the BNOB‘s "Action Plan‖ called for the development of

The Lambert Plans proposed to transition the I-10 corridor
to grade level at Elysian Fields Avenue, or, if necessary, at
St. Bernard Avenue, in a phased process which would
remove the expressway‘s access ramps first, to be replaced
with enhanced landscaping and open space, followed
eventually by the removal of the highway entirely (see
Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16). The plan also calls for the
restoration of the St. Bernard Avenue traffic circle. To this

Figure 3.13: BNOB Neighborhood Center Model. Image Source: BNOB (2006)
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end, the 7th Ward and Tremé plans demand a study to
"determine how the impacts of this divisive and
destructive elevated roadway can be minimized or
eliminated‖ (New Orleans Neighborhood Revitalization
Plans (Lambert Plans): 7th Ward Rebuilding Plan 2006,
p.17).
The Lambert plans identified pollution from the I10/Claiborne corridor as a public health concern, in
addition to noise pollution and damage to historic
buildings from vibration, and demands that, if the
expressway cannot be removed, steps must be taken to
mitigate its ongoing impacts. Interestingly, there seems to
have been some discussion of adapting the open space
underneath the expressway for recreational use, an idea
which was rejected by the community based on the area‘s
inhospitable character.

Figure 3.15: Proposed Plan and Section of Claiborne Avenue
Redesign, phase III. Image Source: City of New Orleans
(2006)

Figure 3.14: Proposed Plan of Redesigned Claiborne/I-10:
Phase II. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2006)

Figure 3.14: Proposed Section of Redesigned Claiborne/I-10:
Phase II. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2006)
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Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP)
The Lambert neighborhood plans were consolidated and
reorganized into the City of New Orleans‘ Unified New
Orleans Plan. The District Four Recovery Plan (City of
New Orleans 2007) addresses the needs of the area
impacted by the Claiborne Expressway. In this plan, the
funding of a study examining the feasibility of removing I10 (see Figures 3.17 and 3.18) was the second of 29
priority planning projects for planning District 4, with
"high‖ priority. The proposed timeline for this study was
2-5 years. The previous neighborhood plans‘
recommendations for a phased removal of the highway are
retained in this proposal (see Figures 3.19 and 3.20). The
UNOP Plan called for coordination of this proposal with
public transportation and green space planning efforts, and
identifies the project as a "highest priority project both for
planning and economic development interests‖ (Ch. 6,
p.9). UNOP cites the expressway‘s key outcomes as
reconnecting neighborhoods, restoring a tree-lined avenue
(including the restoration of the St. Bernard Avenue traffic
circle, see Figure 3.21), and providing economic benefits
to the corridor by redistributing traffic to Claiborne
Avenue businesses. The UNOP plan also suggests timing
modifications to Louis Armstrong Park (e.g. a partially
reconnected street grid through the park) with the
expressway‘s removal.

Figure 3.16: UNOP Map of Existing Freeway System.

Image Source: City of New Orleans (2007)

Figure 3.17: UNOP Map of Proposed Freeway System Adjustments. Image Source: City of

New Orleans (2007)
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Figure 3.19: UNOP Phase I Removal Proposal. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2007)

Figure 3.18: UNOP Phase II Removal Proposal. Image Source: City of New Orleans (2007)
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Figure 3.20: UNOP Proposed Re-Design of St. Bernard Traffic Circle. Image Source: City of New

Orleans (2007)

Concerns about the proposal identified in the Master Plan
include: the capacity of I-610 to handle increased traffic
diverted from the Claiborne Expressway (see Figure 3.22)
and how to maximize its capacity without widening;
restoration of Claiborne Avenue to its historic appearance;
how to best utilize land formerly occupied by the
expressway and its on-and-off ramps (see Figure 3.23);
and protecting neighborhoods from excessive through
traffic.

New Orleans Master Plan--Plan for the
21st Century: New Orleans 2030
The recently adopted comprehensive Plan for the 21st
Century: New Orleans 2030 (New Orleans Master Plan
and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, 2010) states as one
of its goals: "Advance [transportation] projects that
enhance connectivity, reduce barriers and improve
attractiveness of neighborhoods, commercial sites and
public spaces while addressing transportation mobility‖ (p.
11.20). Under the authority of this goal, studying the
removal of the Claiborne Expressway—which the plan
observe " attracted extensive comment‖ (p.11.21) during
the planning process—is mandated. Its removal, the plan
notes, would "right a decades‘ old wrong‖ (p.11.21) while
enhancing the livability of surrounding neighborhoods and
promoting private investment in the corridor.
The first step toward the expressway‘s potential removal is
the execution of a feasibility and environmental impact
study, funded by federal grants, to determine the relative
costs and benefits of removal, as well as the anticipated
near-term costs of maintaining the existing infrastructure.

Figure 4.21: Rendering of Redeveloped Claiborne Avenue,
2030. Image Source: New Orleans Master Plan and
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (2010).
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Figure 3.22: Diagram of Proposed Claiborne Avenue Expressway Removal and Freeway Redesign. Image
Source: New Orleans Master Plan and Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (2010).

“Restoring Claiborne Avenue:
Alternatives for the Future of
Claiborne Avenue”



The 2010 Restoring Claiborne Avenue: Alternatives for
Future of Claiborne report was commissioned by the
Congress for the New Urbanism in order to explore future
alternatives for the elevated Interstate-10 Claiborne
Expressway corridor. The main goal of the report was to
start the process of gathering expert opinion and
community input to inform future discussion of restoring
Claiborne Avenue. The report determined key baseline
assumptions based upon review of traffic data by
LADOTD, various studies, historical information, and
present state of the Claiborne neighborhood. The key
baseline assumptions are the following:
 Claiborne Expressway traffic is 30% or more below
the pre-hurricane levels. Surface street volumes on
parallel and intersecting streets also have below prehurricane volumes, which show that there exists
capacity to absorb or redistribute traffic.
 Retaining the expressway would entail substantial new
spending. Structurally, Claiborne Expressway is
nearing the end of its useful life and beginning to
deteriorate. Some of its exit ramps are far below
current geometric standards and would require a larger
footprint, potentially demolishing more urban fabric.






The area is currently underserved by public transit.
The removal would allow for new transit opportunities
such as a rapid-bus transit, light rail, or streetcar, and
commuters would enjoy improved circulation and
accessibility to the street network.
A study must be done dealing with the effect of
restoring Claiborne Avenue to freight routes, since the
expressway serves port traffic that is heading
eastbound on I-10.
Evacuation routes would not be affected by
expressway removal since Claiborne is not part of the
hurricane evacuation route.
Bicycle and pedestrian issues need to be addressed
since there are not bicycle facilities along Claiborne,
and there are safety concerns for pedestrians along the
corridor.

The 2008 data from the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development ranges the volume on the
Claiborne Expressway from 51,309 to 69,466 vehicles per
day. The report assumes that a restored Claiborne Avenue
would have traffic volumes of up to 50,000 vehicles per
day, and assumes that 33% of the existing freeway traffic
would disperse onto other routes. This assumption is based
on the past experience of other highway removals. The
removal of the expressway would also need to be
accompanied by a number of changes to the New Orleans
freeway system such as:
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would also provide a great opportunity to restore the
historic St. Bernard Circle, which it would function as a
three lane modern roundabout or as a traditional traffic
circle with signals to control traffic.

Interstate designation would be changed to reflect the
new system.
Freeway interchanges would need to be redesigned to
handle new traffic flows especially for freight
transportation.
A new interchange of Broad Street with the current I10/Ponchatrain Expressway should be considered to
further encourage dispersal of traffic onto alternate
routes.
Establishing Galvez as a through route can improve
connectivity between uptown and downtown across
the I-10 corridor.

The removal of the elevated expressway is organized into
three segments. Segment A includes the interchange with
I-10/Pontchartrain Expressway/North Claiborne Avenue.
Segment B includes North Claiborne Avenue from the
interchange to St. Bernard Avenue. Segment C is where
the elevated expressway crosses the 7th Ward
neighborhood, between St. Bernard and Elysian Fields.

Figure 3.23: Drawing of Expected St. Bernard Circle.
Source: Smart Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball
Architects

Segment C: There are two options for this area.

Segment A: The high speed ramps that make up the
interchange with the I-10/Claiborne Expressway would be
removed and replaced functionally with a diamond
interchange with Claiborne Avenue. A new crossing of the
Pontchartrain would reduce the volumes crossing the
Pontchartrain at Claiborne.



Figure 3.24: Segments of Express Removal Plan.

Option C1: This option would create a new atgrade boulevard through the Seventh Ward
between St. Bernard and Elysian Fields, in the
path of the elevated freeway. The cross section
would include three lanes of traffic in each
direction, a landscaped median, and a parallel
bicycle path.

Figure 3.25: Option C1 Rendering. Source: Smart

Source: Smart Mobility, Inc

Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball Architects

Segment B: The Claiborne Expressway is removed
between the I-10 interchange and St. Bernard Streets and is
replaced by a grade-level restored Claiborne Avenue. The
restored avenue would have three travel lanes in each
direction, a wide median that can be landscaped or put to
other public uses, parallel parking, sidewalks and bicycle
paths. The designed speed would be between 30 mph and
35 mph, and there would be signalized intersections as
frequently as every other block. The restored avenue
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Option C2: The expressway would be removed
from Elysian Fields to St. Bernard, but not
replaced with a boulevard. Rather, traffic
circulation and access to several alternative
corridors would be improved to encourage
dispersal onto the street network.
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neighborhoods along the Claiborne corridor are linked to
job centers, by leveraging infrastructure investments to
connect a regional vision for redevelopment to catalytic
projects along the spine of the Claiborne corridor.
Recognizing that the Claiborne/elevated I-10 Expressway
presents a physical and symbolic barrier to achieving
connectivity and revitalization in adjacent low-income
neighborhoods, the coalition is committed to study the
future of elevated expressway (Claiborne Corridor Plan,
1).
In October of 2010, the City of New Orleans was awarded
a federal grant for research on the city‘s Claiborne
Corridor Plan. In order to be eligible for these federal
funds, the city completed an application, the Claiborne
Corridor Plan: Leveraging Infrastructure to Build InterParish Access and Equity. In this application, the city
requested a total of $3 million in HUD Challenge and
DOT TIGER II Grant monies. Despite not receiving the
full amount requested, the city was awarded $2 million in
federal funding and raised over $850,000 to be provided as
the required minimum 20% match.

Figure 3.26: Option C2 Rendering. Source: Smart
Mobility, Inc. and Waggonner & Ball Architects

The removal of the elevated expressway will have various
impacts to New Orleans and the region. The report stated
that a full analysis will be required and a more detailed
feasibility study must be completed, but it found that
following impacts that should be further studied:







The city‘s requested federal funding to analyze possible
infrastructure investments that could improve transit,
connect housing to jobs, schools, and healthcare, manage
soil and water, and promote livable communities as
economic development. This analysis is to be completed
using interagency partnerships with strong community
input. The application also speaks of a strong focus on
environmentally sustainable development. It has been
recognized that there is a need and desire to re-integrate
neighborhoods across the physical Claiborne boundary, but
current investment in the area is burdened by physical and
institutional barriers that hinder the corridors
transformation. The main physical barrier being the
elevated expressway itself, which has caused depreciated
property values and therefore lack of further private
investment. Also, disconnected planning efforts have lead
to inconsistent development plans and resistant investors.

Traffic on the restored Claiborne Avenue is
projected to be reduced to 70% or less of the
current expressway volume.
Traffic will divert to the I-10 portion of the
Pontchartrain Expressway and I-610, resulting in
an increase of less than 10% of existing volumes
on these corridors.
The freeway removal will allow for improved
street connectivity, which can shorten pedestrian
travel distances.
The new avenue would result in improved
conditions for bicyclists, and an opportunity for
new modes in public transit.
The
freeway
removal
would
improve
neighborhood noise levels, air pollution, and
opportunities for storm water retention.
Economic impacts can occur due to increased
local
property
values,
redevelopment
opportunities, and new acreage availability.

The City’s Application for Federal
Funding for Further Study

The broad plans for funds addressed in the application
included a study of the corridor challenges and
opportunities to reunite a physically divided community,
development of resident leadership to increase their
planning and implementation capacity through technical
assistance, and tying workforce and small business
development to the corridor‘s investment opportunities.
The application also discussed a gap analysis of all plans
done since Hurricane Katrina to make sure investments are
catalyzed to create sustainable communities.

Following
the
announcement
of
the
federal
HUD/DOT/EPA inter-agency partnership in 2009, the
Sustainable Communities Partnership, more than a dozen
meetings took place to discuss sustainable community
building. What emerged was a priority to ensure that the
significant affordable housing investments and existing

Within this broad set of goals, the city application
describes two more specific projects. Project A is to
promote livable neighborhoods - revitalized corridors
through targeted planning interventions. Using federal
funds, these planning interventions will develop
neighborhood and economic development revitalization
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strategies in addition to Complete Streets and
Infrastructure's policy and design prototypes to address
storm water management, subsidence, multi-modal
mobility, and urban design. The primary area of study for
project A is the area between Napoleon Avenue and
Elysian Fields, which includes the commercial heart of
Claiborne and elevated I-10 Expressway and the
surrounding historic neighborhoods. The secondary area of
study will be East Claiborne Avenue in the lower ninth
ward and in Hollygrove on the west end of the city. A
future area for analysis will be Claiborne Avenue into
Jefferson and St. Bernard Parish.

citizen participation and decision-making, as well as
capacity building and knowledge sharing between
professional organizations and community stakeholders an important aspect to the successful implementation of
the planning interventions.
Many plans have been completed since Hurricane Katrina,
and the city is committed to working consistently with
three existing plans. It is essential to build on the extensive
work that has already been done in the city, and leverage
that work through cohesiveness and consistency. The plans
that the city will want to build consistency with include the
New Orleans Master Plan 2030, Unified New Orleans
Plan, and Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan.

Project B as discussed in the city application addressed
expanded mobility to link housing and employment centers
along the Claiborne corridor. This project required the
execution of a comprehensive data and alternatives study
to evaluate the future of Claiborne elevated Expressway.
It also included conducting a regional transit line
feasibility assessment along the entire corridor. This
project will be integral for the city to reach one of its major
goals, which is to create a future with vibrant regional
transit system including pedestrian and bicycle
infrastructure with Claiborne as the spine.

Part two of the application addresses the Work Plan. The
city lays out a comprehensive list of tasks necessary to
complete both projects. These plans include specific data
collection objectives and community participation
management goals. Also in part two of the application, a
project completion schedule is outlined for their two years
of budgeted time (Figure 3.28).
Part three of the application addresses leveraging and
collaboration. The city raised $858,500 for matching grant
funds, which was over the federally required 20%. The city
also voiced its desire to ensure that the billions in current
and planned investments along the corridor are integrated,
and that their benefits are maximized. Cited in the nearby
investments is the groundbreaking on the $2.2 billion VA
and University Medical Center Complex and over $700
million for the big four affordable and mixed income
housing developments.

Once the projects were outlined, the application then
summarized the city‘s goals for the entire study. Along
with each goal, they gave a brief description of the history
and existing condition of the area in reference to that
particular goal, as well as impediments to achieving the
goal. The five goals listed in the application were briefly
mentioned previously, but are worth listing again. They
include:






The final section of the application addresses capacity.
The research projects will be tackled with a three-pronged
leadership approach. This includes a governance
committee of 15 with decision-making authority, a lead
consultant, and a project advisory committee compiled of
different community stakeholders. The governance
committee and project advisory committee will work
together to set specific goals, objectives, and evaluation
criteria. They will also ensure open access to governance
committee proceedings to ensure that all disputes will be
resolved in a transparent and equitable manner.

Create connections between affordable housing
investments and jobs
Study alternative futures of Claiborne elevated I10 Expressway
Strategically tackle blight and vacancy
Advance a culture of interagency and publicprivate sector coordination
Manage storm water runoff and subsidence

In the reminder of the city‘s application, they went into
details about proposed outcomes and performance
measures for progress and impact. One significant section
of the application addressed an emphasis on increasing
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Figure 3.27: Project Completion Schedule. City of New Orleans. (2010)
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This section addresses the current context of the Claiborne Avenue corridor, including the existing transportation network, land
use patterns, the local economy, and local community characteristics and demographics. This data provides background for our
analysis of the proposed expressway removal.

4.1 Transportation System
Highway and Expressway Facilities
The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LaDOTD) maintains a publicly available database for annual
estimated average daily traffic (ADT) counts for automobiles. These ADT estimates go back to 1994 or 1997 for different
locations, with the most recent data available for 2010. The tables below, tables 4.1 through 4.4, summarize the absolute
change and percentage change in estimated ADT volumes over time for the five LaDOTD count locations on the Claiborne
Expressway and four LaDOTD count locations on nearby highways.

Figure 4.1: Claiborne Expressway Traffic Counts. Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
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Figure 4.1: Estimated Average Daily Automobile Traffic, Claiborne Expressway
Station
ID
222521

Description

1994

1997

2001

2004

2008

2010

99,049

103,460

121,367

101,467

66,343

95,844

222531

b/w Perdido St. and Gravier
St.
Near Bienville Ave.

118,940

121,464

99,531

91,600

69,466

109,923

223051

Near Esplanade Ave.

111,635

117,681

96,782

113,847

67,633

100,329

223061

Near Pauger St.

92,769

94,653

94,599

121,700

57,278

83,978

220211

b/w Music St. and Arts St.

78,723

82,148

81,904

82,569

51,309

69,323

Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development

Figure 4.2: Percent Change in Estimated Average Daily Automobile Traffic, Claiborne Expressway
Station
ID

Description

19941997

19972001

20012004

20042008

20082010

2010 as % of Peak

222521

4.50%

17.30%

-16.40%

-34.60%

44.50%

79.00%

222531

b/w Perdido St. and Gravier
St.
Near Bienville Ave.

2.10%

-18.10%

-8.00%

-24.20%

58.20%

90.50%

223051

Near Esplanade Ave.

5.40%

-17.80%

17.60%

-40.60%

48.30%

85.30%

223061

Near Pauger St.

2.00%

-0.10%

28.60%

-52.90%

46.60%

69.00%

220211

b/w Music St. and Arts St.

4.40%

-0.30%

0.80%

-37.90%

35.10%

84.00%

3.70%

-3.80%

4.50%

-38.00%

46.60%

81.50%

Average % Change:

Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
From tables 4.1 and 4.12, the following patterns emerge:
Traffic count sites on the western portion of the Claiborne Expressway (from Esplanade Avenue to the Central
Business District (CBD)) peaked earlier, mostly in the late 1990s, than those in the eastern portion which peaked in
2004.
Traffic count sites on the western portion of the Claiborne Expressway (from Esplanade Avenue to the CBD)
generally have higher volumes than their eastern counterparts.
All traffic count sites experienced significant decreases from 2004 to 2008 during which the metropolitan population
drastically declined because of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina.
- All traffic count sites experienced significant increases from 2008 to 2010. This is interesting because while the
metropolitan population is similar to pre-Katrina levels, the City of New Orleans is sitting around 75% of its preKatrina population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).

-

On average, the traffic count sites are currently around 81% of their peak levels.
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Figure 4.2: Highway Traffic Counts Near the Claiborne Expressway. Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development

Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 summarize the absolute change and percentage change in traffic volumes over time for the highway
count sites most immediate to the Claiborne Expressway.
Table 4.3: Estimated Average Daily Automobile Traffic for Nearby Highways
Station
ID
220161

Route

Description

1997

1998

2001

2004

2008

2010

LA3021

Elysian Fields Ave, north
of Claiborne

49,792

44,109

55,419

53,383

31,354

39,404

220391

LA3021

Elysian Fields Ave, south
of Claiborne

28,274

27,370

29,113

25,204

23,034

21,137

220381

LA0039

51,735

46,673

44,670

44,940

35,096

38,954

223011

US0090

Claiborne Ave, between
St. Bernard and Elysian
Fields
Tulane Ave, north of
Claiborne

22,265

25,049

19,562

36,261

17,467

19,185

Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
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Table 4.4: Percent Change in Estimated Average Daily Automobile Traffic for Nearby Highways
Station ID

Route

Description

19971998
-11.4%

19982001
25.6%

20012004
-3.7%

20042008
-41.3%

20082010
25.7%

2010 as %
of Peak
71.1%

220161

LA3021

Elysian Fields Ave, north of
Claiborne

220391

LA3021

Elysian Fields Ave, south of
Claiborne

-3.2%

6.4%

-13.4%

-8.6%

-8.2%

72.6%

220381

LA0039

Claiborne Ave, between St.
Bernard and Elysian Fields

-9.8%

-4.3%

0.6%

-21.9%

11.0%

75.3%

223011

US0090

Tulane Ave, north of
Claiborne

12.5%

-21.9%

85.4%

-51.8%

9.8%

52.9%

-3.0%

1.5%

17.2%

-30.9%

9.6%

68.0%

Average % Change:

Source: Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the following patterns:
There is consistently significantly higher traffic on Elysian Fields north of the Claiborne Expressway as compared to south
of the expressway. It should be noted that the northern Elysian Fields count site is within close proximity to Interstate 610.
The disparity between the northern and southern Elysian Fields count sites was greatest in 2008 when the southern value
was 73.5% of the northern value. The 2010 data saw this disparity shrink to 53.6%.
All sites experienced decreases in traffic volumes between 2004 and 2008. The southern Elysian Fields site had a
significantly lower decrease, in both absolute and percentage terms. However, it was the only site to decrease from 2008 to
2010, though at a rate similar the previous time period (~8%). Such consistency in its ADT volumes over the years,
especially relative to the other sites, is noteworthy.
2010 traffic volumes for the highways near the Claiborne Expressway represent, on average, a considerably smaller
percentage of their peak volumes than those for the Claiborne Expressway.
Compare the 68% average to the 81% average of the Claiborne Expressway sites.
The Tulane Avenue site’s 2010 traffic volume as a percentage of its peak is extremely low compared to the rest of the
highway sites. A possible explanation for this is the forced relocation of many residents that lived in the LSU and VA
biomedical facilities footprints.

Transit Facilities
The Claiborne Expressway corridor is served by many
transit routes. Four of these routes, at some point, run
directly adjacent to the expressway, along Claiborne
Avenue. Two bus lines, #51 and #52, make up the St.
Bernard route which runs 7 days a week from Canal Street
to the University of New Orleans. The other two routes
that follow Claiborne Avenue are express busses to New
Orleans East. These routes, the Morrison Express (#62)
and Lake Forest Express (#64), also run 7 days a week and
originate near Canal Street (Regional Transit Authority,
2010).

Jackson-Esplanade route (#91), and Elysian Fields route
(#55) cross under the Claiborne Expressway at various
locations. Additionally, the Canal St. Streetcar passes
under the expressway. All of these routes run 7 days a
week (Regional Transit Authority, 2010).
The Claiborne Expressway corridor is situated nearly
equidistant between two of the four most popular bus
routes. The Broad route (#94) and St. Claude/Jackson
Barracks route (#88) have two of the highest levels of
ridership in New Orleans. The Tulane route (#39), which
crosses the Claiborne Expressway on Tulane Avenue, also
has one of the top four ridership figures (New Orleans
Master Plan, 2010).

In addition to the adjacent bus routes, four more bus routes
and one streetcar route pass under the Claiborne
Expressway. The Tulane route (#39), Galvez route (#84),
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Rail Facilities
(New Orleans Master Plan, 2010). The Claiborne
Expressway passes over railroad tracks at only one
location, near Florida Avenue in the St. Roch
neighborhood. Since the expressway is elevated this
crossing is grade separated, allowing railroad traffic to
pass uninterrupted. In studying the feasibility of removing
the Claiborne Expressway, railroad crossings should be
addressed in a manner that does not further impede the
flow of railway traffic.

Railroad facilities in New Orleans serve six out of the
seven Class 1 railroads in the nation. Class 1 railroads are
those with the highest revenue. The six Class 1 railroads in
New Orleans are Norfolk Southern Railway, Kansas City
Southern Railway, Canadian National Railway, Union
Pacific Railroad, BNSF Railway, and CSXT
Transportation, Inc. (New Orleans Master Plan, 2010).
Each of these railroad’s national systems can be seen in
Figure 4.3. Such a large presence of railway operators
makes New Orleans a national hub for rail transportation,
for both freight and passenger rail.

Regarding passenger rail service, Amtrak provides service
in New Orleans with three direct routes heading West to
Los Angeles, North to Chicago, and East to New York
City (Amtrak, 2011). Amtrak routes in the area operate on
freight right of ways, further contributing to railroad traffic
delays (New Orleans Master Plan, 2010).

According the New Orleans Master Plan, railroad traffic is
already a problem in New Orleans as there are
considerable delays and bottlenecks attributed to the high
number of at-grade crossings throughout the city

Figure 4.3 Railroads that Pass through New Orleans. Source: New Orleans Public Belt Railroad
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Non-Motorized Facilities

Lafitte Greenway will stretch 3 miles from the French
Quarter to Lakeview, passing through Tremé and MidCity. It also happens to cross the Claiborne Expressway
along Basin Street/Orleans Avenue (New Orleans Master
Plan, 2010). Given that this facility is intended to be the
crown jewel of New Orleans’ multi-use trails and serve as
an example for future trails, its intersection with the
Claiborne Expressway should be taken into consideration.

New Orleans is expanding its network of pedestrian and
bicycle facilities through the construction of designated
bike lanes, shared bike lanes (sharrows), improving
sidewalk conditions, and expanding the multi-use trail
system in the city. The Lafitte Greenway, shown in Figure
4.4, is one of the funded projects planned to improve nonmotorized transportation in New Orleans. The proposed

Figure 4.4: The Lafitte Corridor/Greenway. Source: Friends of the Lafitte Corridor

Planned Transportation Infrastructure Improvements

Assuming that the RPC’s TIP currently acknowledges all
of the necessary repairs for the Claiborne Expressway, the
total expenditures over the next four years total less than
$2,000,000. The RPC’s Metropolitan Transportation Plan
(MTP) estimates that reconstruction of at- grade facilities
and transit along the I-10/Claiborne Avenue corridor
would cost around $400,000,000. Therefore, removal of
the Claiborne Expressway may not immediately save
money. However, it is worth noting that the RPC has not
assigned this project a number and has it listed as a Tier III
project in Fiscal Years 2025-2040. Also, the cost
projection of removing the expressway and constructing
transit along the corridor is a preliminary estimate as the
RPC has yet to conduct a formal study (Metropolitan
Transportation Plan, 2010).

Much of the discussion surrounding the feasibility of
removing the Claiborne Expressway is founded on the
premise that the expressway is in need of costly repairs to
bring it into a state of good repair. Some argue that
removal would be a less expensive alternative (Smart
Mobility, Inc., 2010; New Orleans Master Plan, 2010).
The Regional Planning Commission’s FY2011-2014
Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) has three
projects along the Claiborne Expressway corridor. All of
these projects are deemed necessary by the Regional
Planning Commission (RPC) in order to put/keep the
facilities in a state of good repair. Figure 4.5 summarizes
these projects, two of which directly involve the Claiborne
Expressway and one which abuts it on Tulane Avenue
(Metropolitan Transportation Plan, 2010).

Figure 4.5: Projects Planned by Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). Source: Regional Planning Commission,
Metropolitan Transportation Plan: New Orleans Urbanized Area, Fiscal Years 2011-2040
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density mixed-use” at St. Bernard Avenue (see Appendix
C: Future Land Use Map). The master plan’s description
of these land use categories, a classification within
“Commercial and Industrial” land use and “Mixed Use”
land use respectively, are as follows:

4.2 Land Use Patterns
Existing Land Use Patterns
The Claiborne Avenue corridor is historically a mixed-use,
neighborhood-scale commercial corridor today dominated
by a mix of retail and residential uses and a significant
number of vacant properties, particularly surrounding the
former St. Bernard traffic circle (see Appendix B: Existing
Land Use Maps). Three blocks border the historic St.
Louis Cemetery No. 2, and the newly redeveloped Lafitte
housing project (as well as the future Lafitte Greenway)
abuts the avenue at St. Peter Street. A rough geographic
breakdown of current land use is as follows:

Neighborhood Commercial Land Use: Description
(New Orleans Master Plan 2010)

Upper N. Claiborne: Tremé



Goal: “Provide areas for small-scale, neighborhoodoriented commercial development that enhances the
pedestrian
character
and
convenience
of
neighborhoods
by
allowing
commercial
establishments in select locations within walking
distance to surrounding residential areas (p.14.11).”



Range of Uses: “Retail and professional service
establishments serving local neighborhood area
residents. Common uses include small groceries,
restaurants, barber shops/salons, clothing boutiques,
banks, pharmacies, and small health professional
offices (p.14.11).”



Development Character: “Buildings are oriented to
the sidewalk (parking in rear where possible) with
maximum heights related to the character of the street.
Landscape requirements for parking lots facing the
street (p.14.11).”

(Canal Street to Orleans Avenue)
Retail/office use dominates
Three blocks cemeteries
RV park
Vacant land
Park space and multi-family at Lafitte site
Lower N. Claiborne: Tremé

Mixed-Use Medium Density Land Use: Description

(Orleans Avenue to Esplanade Avenue)

(New Orleans Master Plan 2010):

Mix of office/retail and residential (single family
and duplex)



Goal: “Create medium-density neighborhood
centers to enhance walkability and serve as focal
points within neighborhoods. Proximity to transit
encouraged (p. 14.13).”



Range of Uses: “Medium-density residential and
commercial uses. Limited light industrial uses
(craft and value added industry and passive
warehousing and storage) may be allowed in
some areas (p. 14.13).”



Development Character: “Height/mass of new
development varied to ensure proper transitions to
surrounding
lower
density
residential
neighborhoods. Many structures will feature
ground floor retail with residences on upper floors
(p. 14.13).”

A little light industrial/manufacturing
Lots of vacant properties fronting expressway
Several “unknown use” parcels
th

Lower N. Claiborne—7 Ward
(Esplanade Avenue to St. Bernard Avenue)
Mix of office/retail and residential (single family
and duplex); commercial uses dominate
Lots of vacancy around St. Bernard Circle

Future Land Use Patterns
The New Orleans Master plan calls for North Claiborne
Avenue within the study area to be entirely a
“neighborhood commercial” corridor, with “medium-
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Iberville Housing Redevelopment
The Iberville public housing development, located at the
edge of the French Quarter and stretching to Claiborne
Avenue, is currently a finalist for a HUD Choice
Neighborhood Grant. The development is the Housing
Authority of New Orleans’ last conventional housing
project, has long been discussed for redevelopment as a
mixed-income community, and is expected to move
forward regardless of the outcome of the federal grant. The
redevelopment proposal submitted for grant consideration
entails the preservation of roughly 1/3 of the existing
1940s buildings and would result in a net increase in
residential population in the area. In addition, the
redevelopment will include new retail and restaurants.

Figure 4.6: Claiborne Corridor Future Land Use /Source:
New Orleans Master Plan 2010

Figure 4.7: LSU/VA Hospital Footprint and Iberville housing
development /Source: Times-Picayune

Future Land Use: Major
Developments

Current Zoning Classifications:
The study area’s current zoning is mixed, and includes
general commercial district, central business district,
neighborhood business district, light industrial district,
multi-family
residential
district,
and
Historic
Marigny/Tremé residential and commercial district
classifications (see Appendix D: Zoning Maps). Curiously,
the site of the planned Lafitte Greenway is currently zoned
as C1-A “general commercial district.” These zoning
classifications are likely to change with the development
of the city’s new Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.

LSU/VA Hospital
The $2 billion, 70 acre LSU Medical Center and VA
Hospital complex, currently under development between
Canal Street and Tulane Avenue in lower Mid-City will
have a significant impact on land use in the vicinity of
North Claiborne Avenue. The VA hospital is scheduled for
completion in 2013, and the LSU Medical center is
expected to open sometime in late 2014. In total, these
projects will generate more than 7,000 new jobs in the
area. The project involved the demolition of several
residential blocks, and will result in substantial
modifications of the street grid, reducing overall
connectivity in the area, and changing the character of
downtown New Orleans.
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Tailor the commercial districts to the form, function and
use of various commercial areas.

Upper N. Claiborne: Tremé
C-1A General Commercial District
Central Business District

CBD-2

•

CBD-2B Central Business District

Create a commercial district specifically designed to
accommodate and encourage pedestrian-oriented,
walkable shopping environments.

RM-3 Multiple-Family Residential District
LI Light Industrial District
Lower N. Claiborne: Tremé

•

Create commercial districts where shoppers arrive
primarily by auto to be pedestrian-friendly and
functional, but where parking is not the most
prominent land use.

•

Revise the current shopping center district standards
to ensure a high quality of design and integration with
other uses, as well as safety and comfort for
pedestrians.

•

Map commercial areas on the Zoning Map, based
upon the future land use map and Master Plan
policies, to create compact commercial and mixed-use
development.

•

Include design standards for each scale of commercial
development. Districts like Magazine Street need
different design approaches than commercial areas
like the Bullard Avenue commercial corridor.

•

Locate mixed-use development on the Zoning Map
within or near commercial areas. Mixed-use
development can also function as a buffer between
large-scale commercial development and adjacent
neighborhoods.

B-1 Neighborhood Business District
HMC-2 Historic Marigny/Tremé Commercial
District
HMR-1
District

Historic

Marigny/Tremé

Revise the current commercial district structure so that
district standards are responsive to their purpose and
desired character.

Residential

C-1A General Commercial District
Lower N. Claiborne: 7th Ward
B-1 Neighborhood Business District
C-1A General Commercial District
C-1 General Commercial District
HMC-2 Historic Marigny/Tremé Commercial
District (at Esplanade Only)

Future Zoning Classifications:
The city’s new Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance has not
yet been released; however, the New Orleans Master Plan
states that:

4.3 Local Economy

“All land use actions must be consistent with, or
at a minimum, not interfere with, the goals,
policies and strategies of the Land Use element of
the Master Plan and any future amendments to
the
Master
Plan.
This
includes
the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance and any other
land development regulations and amendments,
including preliminary or final approval of a
subdivision plan, site plan, approval of a planned
unit development, or a similar site-specific
development plan” (New Orleans Master Plan
2010, Executive Summary p.33)

Before the construction of the Interstate 10, North
Claiborne Avenue was the commercial center for the
downtown African-American communities of Tremé and
the Seventh Ward. The area developed as such because of
Jim Crow; segregationist laws forbid African American
businesses and patrons from participating in the main
commercial sectors of Canal Street and the Central
Business District (CBD) during the 1930s, 40s and 50s
(Samuels 33). Today, the corridor does not carry the same
significance but does represent an important employment
center for the city.

Therefore, we can presume that the corridor should be
primarily zoned as “Neighborhood Business District,”
though historic Marigny/Tremé district designations will
likely remain in place to protect the area’s historic
resources.

Employment

In addition, the Master Plan outlines the following “Zoning
Principles” for Neighborhood Business Districts (p.14.27):
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Within two blocks of N. Claiborne Avenue, there are
12,282 jobs divided between 340 registered employers
(NORPC). Within five blocks of the avenue are 31,252
jobs between 1,837 employers. In both cases, the single
largest employer in the area is Louisiana State University
Health Sciences Center, which employs 7,000 people.
Figure 5.8 displays the number of jobs supported by each
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in one of the city’s largest industries, which represents
nearly 20% of industry employment distribution in both
Tremé and Tulane/Gravier. Because the Louisiana State
University Health Sciences Center is the largest employer
in the area, health care and social assistance is the second
largest employment industry for all four neighborhoods.
Figure 4.8 shows the complete employment distribution
for the Tremé, Seventh Ward, Tulane/Gravier, and
Iberville neighborhoods.

of the five largest employers within two and five blocks of
N. Claiborne Avenue.
The numbers, however, are somewhat misleading. The
LSU Health Sciences Center is within two blocks of North
Claiborne Avenue but exists within the city’s biomedical
district in the Tulane/Gravier neighborhood. This area is
adjacent to the CBD and benefits from that proximity. The
employment numbers increase substantially five blocks
from the avenue because the commercial corridors of
Loyola Avenue, North Rampart Street, and the upper half
of Canal Street are included in the count. A look at both
maps below show that employment is not concentrated
directly on North Claiborne Avenue, but on the
surrounding streets.

Real Estate
A good indicator of the economic health of a community
is the housing vacancy rate. In the neighborhoods around
North Claiborne, housing vacancy rates are very high.
Iberville tops the list with 44% of all residences vacant.
Tremé and the Seventh Ward have vacancy rates of 37%
and 38% respectively. The high vacancy rates are partly
because much of the population displaced by Hurricane
Katrina has not returned, but unlike other neighborhoods in
New Orleans, the North Claiborne area has not attracted
many new residents either. This is not unique to the North
Claiborne area. Most neighborhoods in New Orleans have
higher housing vacancy rates in 2010 than they did in 2000
(GNOCDC, “Population Loss and Vacant Housing”).
Detailed information on the number of vacant housing
units is shown in Table 4.5.

Largest Employers Located Within 5
Blocks of N. Claiborne
Company
Louisiana State Univ Health
US Post Office
Entergy Corp
Catholic Charities Archdiocese

# of Employees
7,000
4,000
1,000
800

Weiser Security Svc Inc

525

Largest Employers Located Within 2
Blocks of N. Claiborne
Company
Louisiana State Univ Health
Weiser Security Svc Inc
Gurvich Detective Agency
School of Allied Health
Louisiana State Univ Health

Table 4.5: Vacant Housing Units by Neighborhood - N.
Claiborne Corridor 2010

# of Employees
7,000
525
375
335
300

Neighborhood

Vacant
units,
2010

Share of
New
Orleans
total,
2010
0.8%

Percent
vacant,
2010

383
44%
Iberville
Development
2,641
5.5%
38%
Seventh Ward
1,124
2.4%
37%
Tremé/Lafitte
1.4%
35%
Tulane/Gravier* 656
Source: Greater New Orleans Community Data Center

Figure 4.8: Largest Employers within 2 & 5 Blocks of N.
Claiborne Avenue. Source: New Orleans Regional Planning
Commission

The unemployment rates in Tremé, Seventh Ward,
Tulane/Gravier, and Iberville are all significantly higher
than state and national averages. Table 1 shows a higher
percentage of the population is not in the labor force when
compared to national averages, with almost all areas
having a population of 50% or higher not in the labor
force. This could indicate the areas around the Claiborne
corridor have a significant retired and elderly population
that is not actively searching for employment.
As expected in downtown New Orleans, the largest
percentage of the employed population works in the food
service industry. Residents of the neighborhoods
surrounding the Claiborne corridor play an important role
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2.11% 0.38%
1.55% 0.06%
2.73%

4.4 Local Community and
Demographics
Ten Census tracts 1 surround the Claiborne Avenue
corridor. Figure 4.9 outlines the relevant tracts in blue with
Claiborne Avenue highlighted in green. The recently
released data from the United States (US) Census 2010
only contained population counts and race data so for all
other information the 2005-2009 American Community
Survey (ACS) data was used. Additionally, the 2010
Census data contained no information for census tracts 58
and 59 so the 2005-2009 ACS data was used for all
information, including population and race. Also, the
2005-2009 ACS data gives population estimates for census
tract 44.02 whereas the 2010 Census reports the population
as being zero. This discrepancy is due to tract 44.02 being
the location of the Lafitte Housing Projects which was torn
down in 2008 (Wulff, 2008, para 1). The population and
race data which is reported below uses the 2010 Census
data for tract 44.02 but for all information given the 2005-

Black
White

19.92%

Other
Multi-Race
Asian

73.26%

American Indian
Pacific Islander

Figure 4.10: Racial Makeup of Census Tracts Surrounding the
Claiborne Corridor.Sources: (1) New Orleans Regional Planning
Commission, 2010 U.S Census Orleans Tract Shape File. (2) US
Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey, 5-year
estimates, Table B02001

commission plus the 2005-2009 American Community
Survey estimates for tracts 58 and 59. The total population
in the area is approximately 10,916 people. The racial
makeup of the area is approximately 73% Black, 20%
White, 2% Asian, 2% Multi-racial, and 3% other (see
Figure 4.10).
The area surrounding the Claiborne corridor has a fairly
Census Tract 60
Census Tract 59
Census Tract 58
Census Tract 49
Census Tract 48
Census Tract 44.02
Census Tract 44.01
Census Tract 40
Census Tract 39
Census Tract 34
0

40

60

80

Median Age in Years

Figure 4.9: Census Tracts Surrounding the Claiborne
Corridor/Source: U.S. Census 2006 Reference Map

Figure 4.11: Median Age for Census Tracts along Claiborne
Corridor. Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B01002

2009 ACS estimates are used for that tract.

Because the 2010 Census data did not include census tracts
58 and 59, the figures reported below for the population
counts and racial makeup of the census tracts surrounding
the Claiborne corridor are based on the sum of the 2010
Census data from the New Orleans Regional Planning

equal age distribution if only considering residents
younger than 65 years old. Approximately 26% of
residents are younger than 18 years old, 30% of residents
are between 18 and 39 years old, and 35% of residents are
between 40 and 64 years old. The percentage of people age
65 and above is much lower than the rest at 9% (U.S

1

Census tract numbers: 34, 39, 40, 44.01, 44.02, 48, 49,
58, 59, and 60.

20

39
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Census, 2009a). Despite the overall age distributions being
relatively large for residents under age 65, the median ages
within each census tract varied greatly. The range of
median ages are from age 13 in the now demolished
Lafitte Housing Projects of census tract 44.02 to
approximately age 58 in census tract 59 (U.S Census,
2009b). The median ages for each tract are shown in
Figure 4.11.

1.91%

1.93%

Along the corridor, almost half of all households (49%) are
householders living alone. Approximately 9% of
households are made of unrelated people living together.
The remaining 52% of households consist of families.
Approximately 28% of households surrounding the
Claiborne corridor are made of female householders and
their families with no husband present. Approximately
13% of households are made of married couples with their
families, and approximately 1% of households are made of
male householders and their families with no wife present
(U.S Census, 2009j).

3.00%

Regarding the workers ages 16 and older who live in the
area around the Claiborne corridor, approximately 97% of
workers work within the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner
Metropolitan Statistical Area. Furthermore, approximately
88% of workers from this Claiborne area work in New
Orleans itself (U.S Census, 2009d). Of these workers who
commute, approximately 63% of them will leave home to
go to work between 6:00 A.M and 8:30 A.M (U.S Census,
2009h). The majority of workers who live in the area
(approximately 74%) will take less than 30 minutes to get
to their jobs (U.S Census, 2009i), and the majority of
people (approximately 57%) drive to work in a personal
automobile, whether alone or in a carpool (U.S Census,
2009g). For the remaining workers, approximately 19%
take public transportation, approximately 14% walk,
approximately 3% take a taxicab, and approximately 2%
ride their bicycle (U.S Census, 2009g). The data regarding
the modal split for workers is shown in Figure 4.12.

14.39%

2.77%

46.85%
19.14%

10.00%
Drove alone
Carpooled:
Public transportation (excluding taxicab):
Taxicab
Bicycle
Walked

As noted above, only about 19% of workers who reside in
the Claiborne corridor take public transit to work.
However, public transit riders make up 45% of the
commuters who take longer than thirty minutes to get to
work and are overrepresented among those with relatively
long commutes. In contrast, people who drive to work
(whether alone or in a carpool) make up about 58% of all
commuters from the area but only constitute approximately
48% of workers who take longer than 30 minutes to get to
work. Similarly, people who take a taxicab, walk, or use a
bicycle to travel to work make up about 22% of all
commuters but represent only about 7% of the commuters
who take longer than 30 minutes to get to work (U.S
Census, 2009k). The burden of long commute times is
spead unevenly across the population in the Claiborne
corridor. Riders of public transit make up a
disproportionately high amount of the the people who have
long commutes while automobile and other non-public
transit riders make up a disproportionately low amount of
the workers with long commutes.

Other means
Worked at home

Figure 4.12: Means of Transportation to Work for all
Claiborne Corridor Residents/Source: US Census Bureau,
2009 American Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table
B08301

In addition to having long commutes, public transportation
users often face other difficulties. For workers from the
area surrounding the Claiborne corridor, approximately
80% of people who commute to work via public transit
earn less than $25,000 a year, and it is estimated that no
40
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completely without choice. Approximately 83% of all
workers age 16 and older who live in a household have
access to an automobile, and approximately 25% of all
public transit commuters have one vehicle available to
them (U.S Census, 2009f).

public transit riders make more than $50,000 a year (U.S
Census, 2009e). While relatively low incomes are not
unique to workers who ride transit—84%, 71%, and 45%
of walkers, taxicab and bicycle, and automobile
commuters, respectively, earned less than $25,000 per
year—public transit users face the double burden of low
income and long commute times (U.S Census, 2009e). The
wealthiest commuters are automobile commuters since
approximately 95% of commuters who earn more than
$50,000 commute by automobile, whether alone or in a
carpool (U.S Census, 2009e).

5%

11%

The area surrounding the Claiborne corridor is
predominately low income: 52% of the households have an
income less than $19,000. A full breakdown of household
incomes in the households surrounding the Claiborne
corridor is provided in Figure 4.13. Also 71% of the
occupied housing units are renter occupied (U.S Census,
2009).
The area also has a large proportion of historic properties
since 70% of the units were built in 1949 or earlier (U.S
Census, 2009m). The area of the district between North
Claiborne Avenue and North Rampart Street is subject to
the full control of the City of New Orleans’ Historic

Less than $10,000
31%

6%

$10,000-$19,000
$20,000-$29,000

12%

$30,000-$39,000
21%

15%

Less than 9th Grade

$40,000-$49,000

7% 8%

$50,000-$59,000
3%

More than $60,000

12%

9th to 12th Grade
18%

20%

Figure 4.13: Household Income for Claiborne Corridor
Residents/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B19013

32%

High School
Graduate
Some College
Associate Degree
Bachelor Degree
Graduate or
Proffesional Degree

5%

1990 or later
25%

70%

Figure 4.15 Level of Education Attained for Claiborne
Corridor housing/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B19013

Between 1989
and 1950

District Landmarks Commission. The area above North
Claiborne is subject only to control of demolition and
demolition by neglect (Historic District Landmarks
Commission, 2011). This can create administrative hurdles
in renovating or building new units due to historic
preservation rules. It would also create added renovation
costs to the property owners and limit their development
potential. At the same time, the number of historic units
would create a unique neighborhood along the corridor and
would bring support from preservation groups in
revitalizing the corridor. Figure 4.14 presents an overview
of the time period in which housing units in the Claiborne
corridor area were built.

1949 or ealier

Figure 4.14: Date of construction for Claiborne Corridor
housing/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American
Community Survey, 5-year estimates, Table B19013

While public transit commuters from the areas around the
Claiborne corridor tend to have longer commute times and
have lower incomes than commuters who use other
transportation modes, public transit users are not

With respect to the residents, 28% of the residents over 3
years old are enrolled in school. The rate for females is
27%, while males have a slightly higher rate of 29%. Of
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obtained a high school degree or equivalent. And 20%
have obtained some college education but not a college
degree. Any plan for revitalization of the corridor must
include jobs that match the skills of the residents. A
disaggregated view of educational attainment is given in
Figure 4.15.

those who are enrolled in schools, 89% are enrolled in
public school (U.S Census, 2009k). These facts are
important in order to see which investments can have a
greater effect to the residents. In this case, programs in
public schools must be considered to strengthen the
benefits to the residents. 32% percent of the residents have

Comparing Expressway-Adjacent and
Non-Adjacent Tracts

expressway and residents residing elsewhere in New
Orleans. Upon isolating the adjacent census tracts from the
rest of New Orleans’ census tracts, it becomes apparent
that residents of the adjacent census blocks are much less
likely than other New Orleanians to own an automobile or
to commute to work by automobile.

The aim of this section is to compare automobile
ownership and commuting patterns of census tracts
adjacent to the Claiborne Expressway to the remaining
non-adjacent census tracts in New Orleans.
Data from Tables B08141 and B08301 of the 2005-2009
American Community Surveys show a distinct difference
between residents living in census tracts adjacent to the

Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 below show the differences in
vehicle ownership and means of transportation to work.

Some points of interest are:
Approximately 27% of residents in adjacent census
tracts do not have any vehicles available, a rate over
three times that of non-adjacent tracts.

Adjacent residents commute by public transit at rates
twice that of non-adjacent residents
Adjacent residents commute by walking at rates at
rates three times that of non-adjacent residents.

Non-adjacent residents are three times more likely to
have three or more cars per household than adjacent
residents.

Commuting by bicycle is similar for both groups of
residents. This is strange considering the high levels
of other forms of non-motorized transportation for
adjacent residents.

Adjacent residents are about 20% less likely to
commute to work by automobile than other nonadjacent residents. This means they are more
dependent on transit, bicycling, and walking.

0
27.15%
8.88%

Adjacent Census Blocks, Aggregate
Non-Adjacent Census Tracts, Aggregate

Vehicles Available per Household
1
2
42.85%
23.98%
33.74%
39.22%
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Figure 4.16: Vehicle Ownership Rates, New Orleans, 2005-2009/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American Community
Survey, 5-year Estimates, Table B08141
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Figure 4.17: Means of Transportation to Work, New Orleans, 2005-2009/Source: US Census Bureau, 2009 American
Community Survey, 5-year Estimates, Table B08301

42

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
4 - Local and Regional Context
4.5 Works Cited
Amtrak. (2011). Routes:South. Retrieved from Amtrak:
http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=am%2FLayout&p=1237405732511&cid=123760
8339235
Friends of Lafitte Corridor. (2009). Lafitte Corridor Greenway and Revitalization Project. Retrieved from Friends of Lafitte
Corridor: http://folc-nola.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/FOLC_brochure.pdf
Historic District Landmarks Commsision. (2011). Treme. City of New Orleans.
Retrived from: http://www.nola.gov/RESIDENTS/HDLC/Districts-and-Maps/Treme/
Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. (2011). Estimated Annual Average Daily Traffic Count Sites.
Orleans Parish, Louisiana.
Metropolitan Transportation Plan: New Orleans Urbanized Area, Fiscal Years 2011-2040. (2010). Regional Planning
Comission. Retrieved from Regional Planning Commission: http://www.norpc.org/assets/pdf-documents/mtp-no2040.pdf
Moran, K. (Nov. 23, 2008). Plans for new LSU-VA hospital campus expected to come this week. The Times-Picayune.
Retrieved from: http://blog.nola.com/tpmoney/2008/11/plans_for_new_lsuva_hospital_c.html
New Orleans Master Plan (2010). Retrieved from: http://www.nolamasterplan.org/documentsandrresources.asp
New Orleans Public Belt. (n.d.). International Ties, North American Reach. Retrieved from New Orleans Public Belt Railroad:
http://www.nopb.com/nopb/railmap.html
New Orleans Regional Planning Commission. (2010). Census 2010 Orleans tract shape file. Retrieved from
http://norpc.org/assets/pdf-documents/zip/orl_census2010_tract_pl.zip
Reckdahl, K. (March 18, 2011). Iberville public housing development is a finalist for federal grant. The Times-Picayune.
Retrieved from: http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/03/iberville_is_finalist_for_fede.html
Reckdahl, K. (Oct. 31, 2010). Iberville housing complex area: the next Lakeside Shopping Center? The Times-Picayune.
Retrieved from: http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/10/iberville_housing_complex_the.html
Regional Transit Authority. (2010). Maps and Schedules.
Smart Mobility, Inc. (2010). Restoring Claiborne Avenue: Alternatives for the Future of Claiborne Avenue. Congress for the
New Urbanism. Retrieved from: http://www.cnu.org/sites/www.cnu.org/files/Claiborne_Alternatives_071510.pdf
U.S. Census Bureau. (2006). Census Tract Reference Maps. Retrieved from:
http://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/special/HurKat/CT_ReferenceMaps/CT_NewOrleansLA.pdf
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B01001. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B01002. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B02001. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B08016. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B08119. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B08141. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B08301. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B08302. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B08303. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B11001. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B15001. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B19013. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table B25034. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
43

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
4 - Local and Regional Context
U.S. Census Bureau. (2009). American community survey 5-year estimates: Table C08134. Available from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
U.S. Census Bureau. (2010). 2010 Census Redistricting Data (P.L. 94-171) Summary File. Orleans Parish, Louisiana.
Woodward, A. (March 15, 2011). The Lafitte Greenway: Underway. Gambit Weekly. Retrieved from:
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/plans-for-the-lafitte-corridor-greenway-are-still-on-the-rocky-road-torecovery/Content?oid=1620787
Wulff, R. (2008). Lafitte Projects Demolished. WDSU.com. Retrieved from http://www.wdsu.com/news/15849382/detail.html

44

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
5 - Interview Stakeholder Results
5.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies and describes concerns elicited during interviews with a variety of stakeholders affected by the proposal
to remove and redevelop the Claiborne Expressway. A brief methodology explains our research design for this section. Upon
analysis of interview responses, several reoccurring themes emerged. The sections that follow outline these primary themes and
describe differences among interviewee responses. The most noted theme of economic impacts includes how the project would
affect the planned medical district, fears of gentrification of the greater Tremé area, the costs of removal and construction, and
traffic impacts. The final section details concerns related to the larger social and cultural impacts of the project on local
neighborhoods, the greater New Orleans area, and the region.

5.2 Methodology
Stakeholder interviews were conducted from March 29th through April 21st, 2011. Our study group identified key individuals
from the public, non-profit, and private sectors, who represent a range of interests involved in the proposal to remove and
redevelop the Claiborne Expressway. Interview requests were made by phone and through email. Some stakeholders who were
identified either were unreachable or unable to complete the interview. Twenty-five stakeholder interviews were completed.
For a complete list of stakeholder names and affiliations, see Appendix G. Individual team members conducted stakeholder
interviews in person, over the phone, or via email. Each interview took between 20 minutes to one hour to complete.
The first question of the interview addressed the stakeholder’s role in the community and his or her interest in the Claiborne
redevelopment project. Afterward, each stakeholder was asked to explain his or her thoughts and opinions regarding the
following questions:


Do(es) you/your group support or oppose the freeway
removal project?



Assuming the highway were removed and replaced with an
at-grade boulevard, how would the removal affect your
community/interests?



Who would you say champions the Expressway’s removal?



Who would you say are the major opponents of removal?



Do you think there are viable alternative routes to take other
than the current Claiborne Expressway?



Would you consider public transit, bicycling or walking as
real alternatives to driving along Claiborne Avenue?



If the proposal went through, what redevelopment efforts
would you expect?



Do you or your community feel that the redevelopment
project would accomplish those expectations?

Interviewees provided personal opinions, recommendations, and
thoughts on the removal and redevelopment of the Claiborne
Expressway. The results of these interviews are documented along
the next sections of this chapter.
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I would expect to see family businesses
return to the area. We would see varied
services pop up along the avenue from a
farmer's market and outdoor cafes to movie
theaters and funeral homes. It would turn
into a livable, walkable community where
people could find a variety of services and,
behind that, housing. I am thinking of the
Embarcadero area in San Francisco where
that has already occurred.
-James
McNamara,
President
and
CEO of the New
Orleans
Biodistrict
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McNamara both recall the Lower Garden District’s
comeback after the Camp Street up-ramp to the
Pontchartrain Expressway was removed in the 1970s. That
area now comprises prime New Orleans real estate.

5.3 Economic Impact
Proponents and opponents alike anticipate significant
economic impacts arising from the expressway removal.
Observers on both sides of the debate often point to the
decimation of Tremé’s residential and commercial fabric
in the wake of the expressway’s construction. Some see in
its removal the potential for making the businesses along
the Claiborne corridor more visible and accessible to the
traffic passing by. A long-time Tremé restaurant owner,
for example, believes removing the expressway will result
in more traffic from vehicles and pedestrians to his
business and others along Claiborne Avenue.

Weigle predicts the removal of the Claiborne Expressway
could spur new interest in the old Charity Hospital
building on Canal Street, a roughly 1 million square foot
structure that sits vacant, and that he envisions potentially
becoming a mixed-use residential and retail space that
houses doctors, medical residents and students working in
the area.
But Jim Coningsby, director of Phoenix New Orleans
(PNOLA), a nonprofit that provides rebuilding assistance
to those affected by Hurricane Katrina, takes a more
ambivalent view of the project. He cautioned that it may
prove beneficial to the area, but worried that it could also
go horribly wrong.

Leo Jackson, owner of Jackson Quality Used Cars, at
Orleans and Claiborne, shares the belief that added car
traffic in the area would help boost his sales. Although he
believes most in his neighborhood are against the proposal,
he said competent planning leadership and input from the
community would help address concerns.

“New Orleans has a lot of big dream developments that
turn into nothing regularly: film studio, computer chip
factory,” Coningsby said. “ … They could do something
really special, but they will probably just turn it all into
parking lots.”

A long-time Tremé restaurant owner, for example, believes
removing the expressway will result in more traffic from
vehicles and pedestrians to his business and others along
Claiborne Avenue.

The following subsections relate to more specific
economic effects anticipated from the project. These
include the potential impacts on the new medical district
and gentrification along with the affiliated removal and
reconstruction costs.

Many interviewees predict significant new interest
following the expressway removal in the property in and
around the corridor, a section of the city now riddled with
blight and vacancies. They envision new neighborhood
retail amenities being attracted to the area, notable among
them, a grocery store.

Medical District

Keith Scarmuzza, a landscape architect who lives in the
Tremé neighborhood, points to the various commercial
corridors in the vicinity of Claiborne Avenue that, in
addition to the avenue itself, could benefit from the
expressway removal. These include St. Bernard, Tulane
and Orleans Avenues as well as Canal Street.

Weigle, whose district runs from Iberville to the
Pontchartrain Expressway and from the river to Claiborne,
believes the expressway removal would eliminate a
physical and psychological barrier now dividing two
otherwise similar sections of downtown. Furthermore, he
believes it would help boost businesses on the riverside of
the existing expressway, especially in light of the new
medical district taking shape on the lakeside of Claiborne.

“Since the expressway was put in, these commercial areas
have become stagnant,” Scarmuzza said. “Right now, the
downtown economy stops at Claiborne.” Should the
expressway be removed, “they will become economically
viable … like they once were.”

“What we want is access to the 7,000 people in the
medical district who can shop downtown, live downtown,
and walk to work,” Weigle said. “If we make it a simple
stroll to that part of Canal Street (on the river side of
Claiborne) or other parts of downtown, I think it would
support a lot more residential and retail along that area. It’s
a few blocks’ walk, but right now it seems as if it’s on the
other side of the moon.”

He specifically points to St. Bernard Avenue as a historic
commercial corridor that could flourish again if the
expressway were removed. Although there is some
commercial activity along the corridor now, “it would
experience a rebirth if the expressway was gone,” he said.

Gentrification Fears

Kurt Weigle, president of the Downtown Development
District, considers fallow properties between Crozat and
Claiborne, now occupied by parking lots and abandoned
buildings, especially ripe for redevelopment. Additionally,
there is potential for redevelopment on land now occupied
by expressway infrastructure.
Residential development could also be substantial.
Expressway removal proponents Bill Borah and James

While proponents argue that new development will
translate to more amenities for residents, more business for
existing outlets and increased tax revenue for the city,
some worry that the expressway removal project will
generate so much interest in the corridor that the existing
low-income residents will be priced out.
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Coningsby is among them. He believes others in the
neighborhood will likely view the project through a
negative lens. “I suspect most of the neighborhood would
be suspicious,” he said. “When the overpass was first built,
it tore much of lower Mid City and Tremé apart, and most
people feel it was a racially-motivated decision to build it
there to begin with.”

substantial disruption for existing businesses in and around
the project’s vicinity.

Noting the displacement already occurring in Mid City in
anticipation of the new LSU/VA medical complex, he said
the expressway-removal project could provide yet another
disruption to the area.

5.4 Commuter Impacts

One Tremé resident worries that the few existing small
businesses along the Claiborne corridor would be
especially vulnerable to business disruptions while
Claiborne is removed.

Removing the expressway would inevitably alter traffic
flow. Some interviewees suggest that the resulting traffic
patterns would be an improvement over existing
conditions. For example, Borah argues that boulevards
generally work very efficiently in terms of moving traffic.
If a primary route is clogged, drivers may choose from
numerous alternatives, something far more difficult on a
limited-access interstate, he said. The grid pattern in place
elsewhere in the city, he added, has served New Orleans
well in terms of traffic flow.

Jeff Schwartz, an urban planner who favors the
expressway removal, points to mechanisms available that
can minimize the negative effects of rising property values
on existing residents. These include options such as the
creation of a land trust to assist those who don’t own their
homes.

Removal costs

Some predict that removing the expressway would
increase commuting times. An elected official interviewed
pointed to congestion already plaguing the corridor. He
believes removing the expressway would exacerbate the
problem.

The relatively lower cost of tearing down the expressway
as compared with maintaining it was another factor cited
by proponents. They assert that it would be far less
expensive to remove the expressway and construct a
boulevard in its place than it would be to maintain the
structure, which is nearing the end of its life span and will
soon be in need of repair. “Why conduct a costly highway
project that we know disrupted the surrounding
neighborhoods … when we could build a good thing where
a bad thing used to be?” said Patty Gay, director of the
Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans.

Nick Malcovich lives Uptown but drives daily to the
ammunition manufacturing facility he owns near the
Stennis Space Center in Bay St. Louis. He worries that
even a ten-minute extension of his 51-minute, one-way
commute would become annoying. “It increases the whole
concept of randomness that doesn’t exist on the freeway,”
Malcovich said, noting the possibility of a second line – or
a shooting – disrupting flow on the grade-level avenue.
“Randomness in commuting,” he said, “is never good.”

Some, however, question the validity of these price
estimates and caution that further analysis is necessary to
determine actual costs. Furthermore, as Weigle points out,
whatever investment is required to take down the
expressway is money that cannot be used toward another
public project. Weigle additionally notes that the
deconstruction of the expressway and construction of a
surface-level boulevard could prove lucrative for area
construction companies, but that it could also provide a

Mehdi Qalbani, a Tremé resident and psychiatrist who
frequently commutes to work on the West Bank using the
expressway, on the other hand, would welcome a longer
drive in exchange for the expressway’s removal. “I’d have
a longer commute for a better life,” he said. He added that
rejuvenating the core of the city should be foremost in
planners’ minds, even if it means adding to the commute
times of those living outside the center of the city.

“It’s a mistake to build any expressway in any
city. Highways should have been limited to the
edge of cities and then stopped.”

Valuing the redevelopment of the city core over other
neighborhoods angers some residents of New Orleans
East, who see in the interest surrounding the removal
project evidence that their neighborhood is being written
off.

-Bill Borah
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“People don’t understand the economic value of New
Orleans East to New Orleans,” said a vocal project
opponent who lives in New Orleans East. Those involved
in the commercial sector of the East, which serves as a
major economic engine to the entire city, agree that their
success is tied to the Claiborne Expressway, the woman
said. She further asserts that removing the expressway
would have a tremendous negative impact especially on

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
5 - Interview Stakeholder Results
the industrial companies that move their products between
eastern New Orleans and the port.

Emily Danielson, a Tremé resident, is involved in
researching and organizing around social justice issues
related to the expressway. Although she fully supports the
expressway removal, she believes certain externalities need
to be accounted for in order to make the project a complete
success.

Another New Orleans East resident who commutes to her
corner shop job near Esplanade and Claiborne cringes at
the concept of the expressway removal. “With the bridge,
traffic is heavy,” she said. “Without the bridge it could
only get worse.”

“If the overpass is taken down without any other programs
or assistance, I doubt the street will become what it once
was – a relatively safe, vibrant business and meeting

Another resident of eastern New Orleans, on the other
hand, said she would support the removal project, but
would like to see it done in conjunction with improved
transit between downtown and her neighborhood.

“The multi-layer opposition this community
faces has worked in concert with the
overpass to cripple entrepreneurship,
development, and political and economic
power.” Emily Danielson

5.5 Social and Cultural Impacts
Longtime Tremé residents and business owners recall a
time when the oak-lined Claiborne Avenue neutral ground
was a prime community gathering spot. As the owner of a
40-year-old Claiborne Avenue business remembers it, prior
to 1965, families gathered there every Sunday for
barbecues. End-of-weekend festivities continued into the
evenings, when music could be heard trickling out of
neighborhood bars.

“Don’t let them tear it down, young man.”
Tremé resident of 30 years
space,” Danielson said. “The multi-layer opposition this
community faces has worked in concert with the overpass
to cripple entrepreneurship, development, and political and
economic power. If the overpass is deconstructed and the
street does not quickly represent its historical stature, the
fault will be placed on Tremé/7th Ward and the black
community of New Orleans.”

These days, the business owner closes up shop around 6:30
every night to avoid what he describes as the criminal
element that now menaces the area. The neighborhood
surrounding his establishment, he said, is riddled with drug
dealing, guns, and violence.

Meanwhile, among some residents of the predominantly
black neighborhood of eastern New Orleans, there is a
sense that removing the expressway would perpetuate
another injustice, this time at their expense. “Do two
wrongs make a right?” one resident asked.

Some, including City Councilwoman Cynthia HedgeMorrell, suggest the full potential of the Tremé
neighborhood will not be realized so long as the
expressway remains.

Even in Tremé, not everyone is convinced of the merits of
the removal project. Some grew up knowing the
expressway as a community centerpiece – a place often
used as a practice venue for brass bands, among other
purposes. They worry ripping out the expressway will
mark yet another wound inflicted on their neighborhood.
One resident noted that there are no guarantees that
removing the expressway would make Claiborne what it
once was.

Removing the expressway would make for a more livable,
pedestrian-friendly neighborhood, said Maggie Tishman,
special programs developer for Providence Community
Housing, which is working to redevelop the Lafitte
Housing Project. The expressway’s teardown could create
new space for community gatherings, encourage more
bicycling and walking and open up space for new transit
service, Tishman said.
Qalbani agrees. “I think it would make the neighborhood
more of a neighborhood,” he said, pointing to nearby
Esplanade Avenue as a model for what Claiborne could
become. He hopes the removal will allow in particular for
the resuscitation of the shuttered Claiborne Avenue Circle
Foods Store.

“That’s our area,” said a Tremé resident of 30 years, found
sitting on a porch in the neighborhood with his son.
“That’s our shelter from the heat. If they rip that out, they
rip out our community spot.”
“We grew up barbecuing there all the time,” his son
interjected. “It seemed like every weekend we were
grilling out.”

But a Tremé restaurant owner is not convinced removing
the expressway will translate to safer streets or a more
cohesive neighborhood. The problem, he believes, lies in
modern culture and not the expressway. It will take time,
he said, to resuscitate the strength of community that once
existed along the corridor. Others echoed this sentiment.
As Weigle put it, removing the expressway alone will not
“heal the wounds” of the neighborhood.

Schwartz, meantime, points to various means of integrating
the new ways in which the expressway is used by the
neighborhood into the design of a surface-level roadway.
He cited as an example a proposal for turning elements of
the old expressway structure into a music-performance
venue.
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5.6 Topics for Further Study
area has the potential to become socially and economically
revitalized, they argue.

New Orleans residents recall a Claiborne Avenue of 50
years ago that was a community-oriented street in a
minority-dominated area. The street and neutral grounds
were used for residential and commercial gatherings
central to neighborhood and city bonds. Soon after, a
federal expressway eviscerated the landscape.

Opponents, including some commuters from Uptown and
New Orleans East worry about negative traffic
consequence stemming from the removal. The uncertain
cost of the project and skepticism about the plan’s benefits
are two other sources of concern.

Removing the Claiborne Expressway is frequently held up
as a project that would reverse an injustice imposed on
Tremé decades ago and in the process help reinvigorate a
historic section of the city experiencing a resurgence in
public interest. This interest has been spurred in part by
growing demand for downtown living and the introduction
of the eponymous HBO television show.

Several interviewees were uncomfortable taking a stand on
either side of the expressway debate, citing a need for
more information and further analysis of the project’s
implications.
The interviews themselves lead to further questions: How
much inconvenience will commuters tolerate? How
informed is the public about the potential benefits and
drawbacks of the proposal? How substantially do these
opinions vary by neighborhood? Additional studies are
needed to address these topics before New Orleans
residents can make an informed decision.

Proponents say the project would benefit the
neighborhoods in its immediate vicinity by catalyzing
business development, attracting new amenities, and
helping to reduce the blight and crime that now plague the
area. Given careful thought and strategic investment, the
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6.1 Methodology
To better understand the community’s opinions regarding the future of the Claiborne Avenue corridor, a public survey was
conducted. Given time and funding constraints, this survey was distributed and completed over the Internet. The limitations of
this approach include the inability to capture responses from populations without regular Internet access and a low-likelihood
that survey respondents reflect the same
Table 6.1: Demographics Comparison between Survey Sample and Orleans
demographics of the city’s population.
Parish (continuation)
The questionnaire was distributed using
Survey
Orleans
Qualtrics, an online survey response
Responses
Parish
tool. This tool, hosted through the
%
%
University of New Orleans, allowed for
Male
50.6
47
respondents to fill in responses from any
Gender
computer with an Internet connection.
Female
48.3
53
Survey respondents were sought using a
White
87
32
variety of paths: 1) advertising the
survey online, 2) directly soliciting local
African American or Black
11
63
stakeholder organizations, and 3)
American Indian and Alaska Native
2
0.2
directly soliciting people. Appendix H
Race
Asian
2
2.8
contains a full list of stakeholder groups
sought out for survey responses. The
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific
0
0.1
program included a feature that would
Islander
not allow any computer to submit more
Some other race
0
1.1
than one response. This prevented
5
4.3
Ethnicity Hispanic or Latino (of any race)
“stuffing the ballot box.”
High school graduate or higher
100
82
Education
Bachelor's degree or higher
85
29

Figure 6.1: Survey respondents by Zip Code
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6.2 Demographics of
Respondents
Gender & Age

Table 6.2: Demographics Comparison between Survey Sample and and
Orleans Parish
Survey Responses
Orleans Parish

34.3
36.7
Median Age
The survey obtained 829 respondents over the age of
Median household
20, with an almost even divide amongst males and
$60,763
$36,258
income*
females. The total number of respondents that
completed the survey was 836. For the most part, *In 2009 inflation-adjusted dollars
age distribution was normal, with the most common
Masters or professional degree, for a total of 85% holding
age bracket being age 25-29, accounting for 26% of
college degrees.
respondents. The median age for our survey sample was
34.3 years old, as compared to Orleans Parish’s median
Income
age of 36.7 years old.
Describing the average income of survey respondents
proved difficult, as respondents fell into a clear bimodal
Race & Ethnicity
distribution between two income brackets: $100,000 or
Looking at racial composition, 87% of respondents
more per year and between $30,000- $49,999 per year. The
identified themselves to be white, 11% identified
higher earning bracket certainly aligns with the higher
themselves as African American or Black, and 4%
educational attainment described earlier. Perhaps the
identified themselves with a race other than these two.
strong response numbers from $30,000 - $59,999 earners
People were allowed to self-identify themselves with more
can be aligned with the distribution method, as these
than one race, but less than 1% did so. Looking at
respondents may represent the student and young
ethnicity, 5% percent identified themselves as to be
professional population most likely to complete the survey.
Hispanic/Latino.
In addition, the median household income for the sample
surveyed was of $60,793, which represents almost twice as
Education Level
much as the Orleans Parish’s median household income of
$36,258.
The survey shows that respondents were well-educated
with 42% holding a Bachelors degree, while 43% held a

6.3 Key Findings
Usage of Claiborne Corridor
Survey respondents use the corridor with varying
frequency. Comparisons of usage between the interstate
and street level portions shows respondents use the
interstate slightly more (see Figure 6.1).

Current perception and usage of
neighborhood
When provided a map of the five block area around the
corridor, survey respondents overwhelmingly disagreed
that the corridor area was safe and inviting, possessed
attractive community facilities, and provided parks and
open space.
The majority of survey respondents did not live, work, or
have family that lived within the corridor study area.
Respondents were also asked if they shopped at stores, ate
at restaurants, or drank at bars in the study area. Again
respondents overwhelmingly did not use the area
frequently, with a majority responding that they rarely or
never spent money in the area in these capacities (see
Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4).

20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
6 or
4-5
2 - 3 Once a 2 - 3
About
more days per days per week days per once a
days per week
week
month month
week

Use Interstate Portion

Less
often
than
once a
month

Never

Use Street Portion

Figure 6.1: Survey Respondents Usage of Corridor Infrastructure
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Opinions Regarding
Expressway Removal &
Future Revitalization

75%

Agree

The survey revealed that 57% of respondents
50%
support the removal of the expressway and
Somewhat
17% oppose the removal (see Figure 6.5).
Agree
Meanwhile, 21% are uncertain about the
25%
Somewhat
removal, and 6% are indifferent about the
Disagree
removal. Certainly if the removal project
Disagree
moves forward, more public education and
0%
additional analysis will be necessary as 21% of
The area is safe and
The area offers
There are parks and
respondents expressed uncertainty. When
Don't Know /
inviting
community facilities open spaces to utilize
asked how the removal of the expressway
No Opinion
that are attractive
in this area
would change the corridor study area, 82% of
(e.g. library, daycare,
respondents thought “it would be a change for
churches, etc.)
the better.” Respondents appear to largely
agree that the removal would improve the Figure 6.2: Survey Respondent’s Perception of Community Attributes
neighborhood in some way, but there are concerns
100%
associated with the change the removal might bring. As
Table 6.3 shows, respondents agreed that property values
80%
would increase as a result of the removal. However,
respondents did not agree that this property value increase
60%
would result in fewer housing options for low-income
residents; in fact, more respondents disagreed than agreed.
40%
Similarly, respondents did not agree if the removal of the
20%
expressway would produce significant traffic delays
elsewhere in the city. In fact, most respondents either
0%
disagreed or somewhat disagreed that the expressway
Work in Area
Live in Area
Family in Area
removal would increase their commute by 1 to 10 minutes
(47%) or more than 10 minutes (52%) (see Table 6.4).
Yes No
Figure 6.3: Survey Respondents Consumption in Corridor
As Table 6.5 shows, opinions on the revitalization effects
Study Area
produced by the expressway removal are diverse.
Respondents agree most strongly that revitalization in the
Treme and 7th Ward neighborhoods will be aided by the
expressway’s removal; however, respondents appear to
60%
believe in revitalization effects for several neighborhoods
50%
(including the CBD, Tulane-Gravier, and Iberville)
surrounding the study area. The survey attempted to
40%
measure the demand for particular types of infrastructure
necessary for the successful revitalization of the Claiborne
30%
Avenue corridor. Survey takers found certain infrastructure
20%
very important: sidewalks (87%), public parks and
greenways (68%), bicycle lanes (67%), and a wide neutral
10%
ground with trees (63%). Interestingly enough, only 36%
of respondents noted parking as very important (see Table
0%
6.6).
Shop in Area
Eat in Area
Drink in Area
Often

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

Figure 6.4: Survey Respondents Usage of Corridor Study Area
Figure 6.5: Survey Respondents Favorability of Freeway Removal
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Table 6.3: Removal of the expressway will…
Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Don't Know /
No opinion

46%

29%

4%

9%

12%

11%

20%

20%

27%

23%

21%

22%

18%

21%

18%

Result in higher property
values in the area
Result in fewer housing
options for low-income
residents
Create significant traffic
delays elsewhere in the city

Table 6.4: I am concerned that the removal of the Claiborne Expressway will increase my
commute…
Somewhat
Somewhat
Don't Know
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
/ No opinion
10 minutes or more

19%

14%

8%

44%

15%

1 - 10 minutes

16%

22%

6%

41%

16%

Table 6.5: The removal of the Claiborne Expressway will help revitalize…

Agree

Somewhat
Agree

Somewhat
Disagree

Disagree

Don't Know /
No opinion

38%

26%

8%

16%

11%

French Quarter

27%

24%

15%

22%

12%

Treme
7th Ward

51%
45%

24%
25%

5%
5%

11%
12%

9%
13%

Tulane-Gravier

41%

26%

7%

13%

13%

Iberville Public Housing

39%

24%

8%

15%

13%

Downtown New Orleans (the
Central Business District)

Table 6.6: How important are the following elements to the
successful revitalization of the corridor?
Very
important

Somewhat
important

Not
important

Bike lanes

67%

25%

8%

Sidewalks

87%

11%

2%

Light rail / streetcar

56%

34%

10%

Wide neutral ground with trees

63%

27%

10%

Public parks and green space

68%

28%

5%

Public art

40%

37%

24%

Parking

36%

42%

21%

53

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
6 - New Orleans Community Survey
6.4 Examination of Key Findings
neighborhood canvassing instead of electronic surveys
given the lack of response from residents in this area.
Meanwhile, for respondents claiming to work within five
blocks of the expressway (18% of the respondents), a
smaller majority (59%) were in favor of removal. Only
15% of workers in the immediate area stated removal
opposition, while less than 20% of workers in the
immediate area were uncertain of removal (17%).

A crosstabs analysis allows for a more detailed analysis of
how particular subsets of survey respondents feel about the
proposed freeway removal. The following section
highlights several key findings and isolates characteristics
of particular respondents such as where they work, live,
and travel.
When asked the level of support for removal of the
expressway, a majority of respondents stated support for
the project, regardless of their frequency of use of the
Claiborne Expressway (see Table 6.7). However, among
those respondents who stated that they use the expressway
4-5 days per week (likely to be commuters), 28% of them
were opposed to removal, 18% were uncertain, and 50%
were in support. Those who use the expressway 6 or more
days per week had a slightly lower level of support as the
previous group (48%) and the same level of opposition
(28%).

The survey also attempted to illuminate respondent’s
primary concerns with potential removal. Respondents
were asked to select as many concerns among the
following options: “Longer Commute Time, Additional
Traffic in the Neighborhood, or Gentrification.” Also, a
fourth option allowing respondents to fill in other concerns
was available. Among completed surveys, 168 respondents
left additional concerns, which could be summed up, in
nine major categories.
The top three categories people expressed concern relate to
traffic. These were “Longer Commute,” “Increased Traffic
Near Expressway,” and “Heavy Traffic in Other Areas of
the City.” Other frequently expressed concerns were
gentrification, general impacts on neighborhood, and
general concern with the project (see Table 6.9).

Among respondents that claimed to live within 5 blocks
the expressway (9% of the respondents), a strong majority
(80%) are in favor of the removal (see Table 6.8).
However, drawing conclusions as to actual neighborhood
opinions will require additional survey work involving
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Table 6.7: Level of Support For Removal of The Claiborne Expressway Based On Frequency of
Use.
Support Removal of
The Expressway

Oppose Removal of
The Expressway

Indifferent About
Removal of The
Expressway

Uncertain

6 or more days
per week

48%

28%

5%

18%

4 - 5 days per
week

50%

28%

4%

18%

2 - 3 days per
week

51%

22%

4%

23%

Once a week

58%

11%

8%

23%

2 - 3 days per
month

63%

8%

7%

21%

About once a
month

59%

13%

5%

23%

Less often than
once a month

65%

9%

5%

21%

Never

77%

4%

8%

12%

Table 6.8: Level of Support For Removal of The Claiborne Expressway in Those
Who Live or Work Near Expressway.
Support Removal
of The
Expressway

Oppose Removal
of The
Expressway

Indifferent About
Removal of The
Expressway

Uncertain

Live Within 5
Blocks of
Expressway

80%

9%

4%

7%

Work Within 5
Blocks of
Expressway

59%

15%

9%

17%

Table 6.9: Concerns Regarding The Removal of the Claiborne Expressway
# Concerned
Longer Commute Time
106
Increased Traffic in Area Near Expressway
80
Heavy Traffic in Other Areas of the City
Gentrification
Other Impacts on Neighborhood Near Expressway
Too Great a Cost/ Where is Source of Funding
New Project Must be Safe for Pedestrians and Bicyclists
Removal Would Hinder Hurricane Evacuation
Too Much Existing Crime in the Area

47
27
27
25
13
8
7

Negative Economic Impacts on New Orleans
Confusion of What Project Entails
General Concern

7
7
27
55

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
7 - Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Introduction
This section summarizes key findings developed during the course of this project’s background research, examination of best
practices from other cities, stakeholder interviews, and survey efforts, and it evaluates the implications of these findings within
the context of the proposed removal of the Claiborne Avenue Expressway. It also provides recommendations for future
research as the City of New Orleans moves forward with its feasibility study on removing the expressway.

7.2 Transportation Implications

Failure to leverage public investment in this project—and
in the RTA’s streetcar expansion program—by
concurrently planning for transit enhancements, which
facilitate transit use, would be a missed opportunity. These
transit improvements may be immediate, such as the
development of bus rapid transit (BRT) along the corridor,
or may include redesigning the median in such a way as to
accomodate the potential restoration of fixed-rail, such as
streetcar or light rail in the future.

Traffic Impacts
A full analysis of the proposed removal’s traffic impacts is
critical. Opponents of the expressway removal perceive
that the project will increase traffic congestion and
commute times. Stakeholder interviews show that some
people feel these detrimental effects will be substantial and
prohibitive. However, only 33% of survey respondents felt
that removal would result in commute time increases of 10
minutes or more. Conversely, proponents of the removal
believe that traffic flows will actually improve if the
expressway is removed. They pointed to benefits such as
drivers being allowed to make full use of the street grid if
Claiborne Avenue itself is congested. For the
redevelopment of Claiborne Avenue to move forward, it
must be demonstrated that traffic flow will not be
adversely impacted. Future traffic studies for the removal
of the expressway should inventory nearby road facilities.
For example, parallel roads such as N. Galvez, N.
Rampart, N. Miro, N. Broad, and Basin Streets should be
analyzed for capacity and quality in order to promote
maximum efficiency of the grid network.

In addition, the redevelopment of Claiborne Avenue
should fully align with the state’s Complete Streets policy
and include enhanced bike and pedestrian facilities. 87%
of survey respondents found the provision of sidewalks to
be very important to the revitalization of the corridor.
Additionally, 67% of respondents found bicycle lanes to be
very important to revitalization efforts.

Access

The decision to bring expressways into cities was intended
to increase access for multiple user groups, particularly
residents and freight. While such access may have
contributed to the urban exodus of the mid 20th century, the
relationship between inner-city expressways and freight
access was not studied in this report as freight statistics
were difficult to find. However, freight accommodation is
an important component of studying the impact of the
removal of the Claiborne Expressway and should be
included in future studies.

Some of the expressway removal case studies in this
report, like that of the Central Freeway in San Francisco,
illustrate the concept of induced demand. In such
scenarios, induced demand was created by the construction
and/or expansion of expressways. However, as the case
studies demonstrate, when replaced with a surface street,
traffic congestion does not necessarily follow; lower
surface street capacities do lower traffic volume, but do
not negatively impact traffic flow. This phenomenon
should be considered in any traffic studies conducted.

Transit and Complete Streets Policy

Highway redevelopment provides an opportunity for the
construction of landscaped boulevards, multimodal
facilities including infrastructure for active modes of
transportation and transit, and infill development.
Throughout the planning for the possible removal of the
Claiborne Avenue Expressway, care should be taken to
ensure that transit service in the corridor is maintained or
improved during and after construction, minimizing impact
to transit users and encouraging a greater proportion of the
future corridor’s users to utilize transit.
56

New Orleans Claiborne Avenue Redevelopment Study:
7 - Conclusions and Recommendations
7.3 Economic Implications
However, infrastructure alone is not enough, and the city
must ensure that the economic development impacts noted
above genuinely benefit the affected neighborhoods and do
not displace existing residents. There were concerns in
most stakeholder interviews that gentrification could
occur, harming the residents of the area.

Construction Impacts
The lengthy construction periods involved in most
highway removal projects are a significant drawback and
stakeholder concern, impacting nearby businesses.
Professionals and residents alike expressed worry over the
deconstruction of the expressway potentially harming
existing businesses. However, measures can be taken to
mitigate these impacts, such as pedestrian walkthroughs
and increased signage for businesses. Construction periods
can be minimized with careful planning to avoid midproject disputes and cost overruns.

Some stakeholders believe that the removal would be
harmful to the social and cultural integrity of the
neighborhood. The area surrounding the Claiborne corridor
is predominantly occupied by low-income households and
is largely renter occupied. These factors must be
considered in the expressway’s proposed removal in order
to avoid displacement caused by higher property values
and increased rental prices. Many others, however, believe
that the removal has the potential to be a catalyst for
positive change if it is supported by other programs and
assistance to the area, such as the development of land
trusts to ensure the continued existence of affordable
housing.

Economic Development
Highway removal can reunite and reinvigorate
neighborhoods - decreasing blight and crime, increasing
pedestrian access, and attracting economic activity.
Removal projects, like those of the San Francisco and
Portland, have been shown to increase property values in
the surrounding areas, thus increasing tax revenues for
municipalities. Proponents of the expressway removal
expect new businesses of diverse types, as well as new
residential development to be drawn to the redeveloped
Claiborne corridor.

Coalition Building
The removal of the expressway is consistent with goals
identified by impacted communities during the various
post-Katrina planning processes, as well as with the City’s
new Master Plan. Yet, many stakeholders lack adequate
information about the possible impacts of the expressway’s
removal and are, therefore, uncomfortable forming an
opinion on the issue. 21% of the surveyed respondents
said they were uncertain about removal. Therefore, the
City’s upcoming feasibility study for the removal of the
expressway and redevelopment of the area has the
potential to have significant influence on public opinion
through its process and findings.

Value in terms of economic growth and development can
be further leveraged through the development of special
districts to encourage new development in the blighted
blocks along and near the corridor. The city must develop
a plan for how to maximize economic impacts of the
project; the case studies demonstrate that building the
infrastructure alone is not always sufficient. In particular,
the retention and attraction of small businesses should be
prioritized, and supported by programs providing access to
capital for entrepreneurs as well as technical support for
small business development.

The case studies demonstrate that in order for highway
removal projects to move forward and succeed, they must
have the strong support of a wide cross-section of
community members and other stakeholders. Citizen
activism is a key component of highway removal.
However, the identification of political champions to drive
the redevelopment process forward and mitigate the
political and logistical squabbles which lead to project
delay is equally important. This may include a mayor,
governor, or city council leaders. The development of an
organized coalition of project proponents to build
community buy-in, correct misperceptions, fill public
information gaps, and provide a strong voice for residents
of impacted neighborhoods will be essential to the
Claiborne
Avenue
redevelopment
proposal’s
implementation.

7.4 Community Impacts
Neighborhood Revitalization and
Gentrification
Neighborhood revitalization is one of the driving
arguments for the Claiborne Expressway removal; it is
hoped that blighted neighborhoods now divided by the
highway can be restored and reunited through the
corridor’s redevelopment. The revitalization of Claiborne
Avenue also has the potential to benefit low-income and
working class residents through increased real estate
wealth, economic investment, and new employment
opportunities.
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7.5 Recommendations for Further Research and Analysis
trolley buses and combustion powered vehicles, as well as
cycling and pedestrian amenities.

The demographic make-up of the survey respondents were
not reflective of the demographic make-up of New Orleans
or the North Claiborne Avenue communities, and we did
not have the time to statistically weigh the survey results
so that they would better represent the city and
communities which may be affected. Because the survey
effort had over 800 respondents, the results should be
weighted and the data should be reexamined on a weighted
basis.

The redevelopment proposal’s possible role in ongoing
storm water management master planning efforts should be
considered. For example, Claiborne Avenue once had a
canal that connected to the Bayou St. John via the
Carondelet Canal and was used to help drain storm water
from the surrounding neighborhoods. The reopening of
that canal should be considered. Perhaps a water feature in
the neutral ground with green space could complement the
redevelopment of a boulevard along Claiborne Avenue.

In addition to the reexamination of our survey data, a full
cost-benefit analysis and feasibility study of potential
transit alternatives should be completed to provide
communities and residents with a better understanding of
possible alternatives to the expressway structure. This
analysis should include, but not be limited to, streetcars,
light rail and bus rapid transit – including both electric

There is some skepticism of the claim that it will actually
cost less to remove the expressway than to maintain it.
Further studies to determine the actual costs of removing
the expressway and of maintaining it are needed.
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Appendix A: Case Studies
1 Boston: Central Artery
1.1 History
Boston, Massachusetts had one of the most congested
highway systems in the United States. The primary culprit
was an elevated highway called the Central Artery that ran
through the center of downtown. Traffic on the Central
Artery remained constantly jammed up with cars slowly
lurching forward. The same problem plagued the two
tunnels under Boston Harbor between downtown Boston
and East Boston (Massachusetts Department of
Transportation, 2006). In order to solve Boston's enormous
traffic problem, a plan was constructed in the 1980s to
build new infrastructure that was capable of handling the
expected traffic flow. The plan was initially called the
Central Artery Tunnel Project and later became known as
“The Big Dig.”

Figure 1.2: Construction of the Tunnel

The Big Dig also called for the Leonard P. Zakim Hill
Bridge to be built. It is the world‟s largest cable-stayed
bridge, carrying 10-lanes of traffic from the new
underground expressway across the Charles River.
The Big Dig also encompassed the extension of the
Massachusetts Turn- pike I-90 to Logan Airport. To extend
the turn pike, Ted Williams tunnel was built underneath
Boston‟s Harbor (Massachusetts Department of
Transportation, 2006).

The Big Dig consisted of a series of construction projects
reshaping the entire city. The Central Artery highway,
consisting of six-lanes, was torn down and replaced with a
ten-lane underground expressway directly beneath it. This
would separate fast highway traffic from slower traffic that
existed downtown. The vacant surface land would undergo
beautification and have a large portion designated for
public green space.

This mammoth project required countless man-hours,
spent billions of dollars, consumed enormous amounts of
resources, and took over a decade to complete. The Big
Dig is truly one of the biggest, most complex projects in
the United States.
The Big Dig's most difficult challenge was to build the
project in the middle of Boston without cutting off
transportation. Special care was taken to maintain access to
residents and businesses throughout construction. The city
even waited until the underground expressway was
operational before they started tearing down the existing
highway.

1.2 Travel Behavior Impacts
Boston's horrendous traffic congestion created a huge
burden on the city and its residents. Cars stuck in traffic,
wasted fuel and emitted harmful pollutants like carbon
dioxide into the city. Traffic congestion also meant
Table 1.1: Timeline for the Central Artery Project
more car accidents putting people's life at risk and
1985 Final Environmental Impact Statement.
draining revenue from the city (Massachusetts
1986 Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff begins work on the design.
Department of Transportation, 2006). The Big Dig
1990 Congress allocates $755 million to project.
successfully fixed these problems by eliminating
1991 Federal Highway Administration gives final approval.
traffic congestion and by indirectly promoting
Construction begins on Ted Williams Tunnel.
public transit along with cycling.
1995 Ted Williams Tunnel opens to commercial traffic.
In 2004, with most of the traffic projects
1999 Overall construction 50 percent complete.
completed, Boston's Department of Transportation
2002 Leonard Bunker Hill bridge completed.
hired an independent company to assess the impact
2004 Dismantling of the elevated Central Artery Highway (I-93).
of the Big Dig. The study found that total Vehicle
2006 The Big Dig completed.
Miles Traveled (VMT) had risen thirteen percent
Spectacle Island Park opens.
from 1994 to 2004. This increase was expected and
2007 Restoration of Boston city streets.
is due two factors: 1) the natural growth of traffic
Construction of the Rose Kennedy Greenway and other parks.
volume during this time period and 2) the slightly
Source: Massachusetts Department of Transportation

Figure 1.1: The Zakim Hill Bridge
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use to, to get from point A to
point
B
(Massachusetts
Department of Transportation,
2006).

Table 2.2: Changes in Volumes & Times: Central Artery

The Big Dig created no
infrastructure for bikes, but it
indirectly created provisions for
bikes
through
government
mandates. In order to offset the
carbon-dioxide
emissions
emitted from the construction of
the Big Dig, the Federal
Government
and
the
Environmental
Protection
Agency required the City of
Boston to curb carbon dioxide
emissions and to increase public
transit citywide (Ragovin, 2010).
Immediately after the project was
completed in 2007, the city
started promoting cycling as a
way to curb carbon-dioxide
emissions. To accommodate
cyclists, several bike racks were
installed throughout the city,
giving people a place to park
their bikes. Miles of bike-onlylanes were created, providing
safety for cyclists by separating
them from potentially dangerous automobiles. The city's
efforts paid off, and there has been a huge surge in cycling.
Although the Big Dig did not directly create this surge, it
was the driving force behind it (Amiton, 2010).

Source: Economic Development Research Group, 2006

longer mileage involved for those using the Massachusetts
Turnpike Extension which is 0.3 miles longer than the old
route going through the Central Artery. The study also
found a drastic reduction in people's traveling time through
the project area. Travel time in the project area was
reduced on average by 62 percent, depending on the time
of day. This means it takes people less than half the time it

As part of the agreement for the Big Dig, the city increased
the availability of public transit along with doing several
things to promote public transportation. More light-rail
stops have been created between existing stops and the city
is running additional buses. Park-and-ride stations were
constructed allowing residents to early park their cars and
take light rail to work. New housing developments were
built specifically around light rail stations to make light
rail convent for people, thus encouraging ridership. Plans
are currently underway to expand light rail services. For
instance, the city plans on extending the Green Line by
2014 to reach areas that house lower income
neighborhoods. The city's effort to promote public
transportation is working, and the Massachusetts DOT is
seeing a gradual increase in ridership (Ragovin, 2010).

1.3 Environmental Impacts
The Big Dig created several positive changes to Boston's
environment. Three-hundred acres of green space were
created, over two-thousand trees were planted, and the
city's carbon-dioxide emissions lowered. Boston became a
greener city overnight. Besides these obvious
environmental benefits, the project also helped the
environment in less obvious ways, such as shoreline

Figure 1.3: Spectacle Island, which was once a city dump. It is
now a national park with miles of hiking trains.
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adjacent to the Central Artery. Residents of the Chinatown,
restoration. Dirt removed in order to build the underground
South Boston, and North End have been concerned of the
expressway was used to rebuild local shorelines that had
consequences of such development as to be similar to the
eroded away.
The area, where the central artery highway once stood, was
redeveloped for people rather than automobiles. Seventyfive percent of the new area was designated specifically for
Boston residents in the form of parks and open space
(Mass. DOT). This included public plazas, water fountains,
park benches, and other amenities. The most well known
open space is the Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway,
which is a narrow tree lined boulevard, spanning over
twenty-five blocks in the heart of downtown.

1.4 Community Impacts
The construction of the Central Artery created more
development opportunities in Boston. Also, it has
contributed positively in reducing travel time for residents
traveling from south and west Boston heading to Logan
Airport by 74 percent (International Tunneling And
Underground Space Association [ITA], n.d.). Along with
reducing travel time and increasing mobility, the project
connected neighborhoods that were served by the elevated
highway (ITA, n.d.).

Figure 1.4: The Central Artery in the 1950s separated
neighborhoods. Source: xtimeline.com

early case of gentrification in the South End after
constructing expensive lofts and shops (Economic
Development Research Group, 2006). Some argue that the
proposed 27-story residential development in Chinatown
would impact the neighborhood‟s theme (Goodnough,
2008).

The former space that was occupied by the elevated
highway was utilized as parks and open spaces for the
residents of Boston. It contributed positively in connecting
neighborhoods that were once separated by the elevated
highway. The project introduced almost 45 parks and
public plazas. On the old path of the elevated highway
from Chinatown through Wharf District and North End, a
series of parks and fountains were introduced and are now
knows as the Rose Kennedy Greenway (ITA, n.d.).

Along with the concerns that the increase in property
values and taxes might price out local residents, another
concern was foreseen. It was the concern that landowners
might sell their lands as a result of the increase in its value
to seek more profit. However, the city of Boston hired Ken
Greenburg, a Canadian urban design consultant that was
responsible to draft a future visualization of the city‟s
future Greenway. The consultant saw the importance of
keeping the current lifestyle and theme of the area through
maintaining existing North End Italian atmosphere
(Economic Development Research Group, 2006).

During the early stages of the project, aside from the
massive engineering difficulties, it was important to
convince the public that this project will not harm the local
residents. During the 1950s, the construction of the
elevated Central Artery displaced thousands of residents.
In the planning process of the project, it was planned that
there will be no destruction of any family houses;
however, a displacement of residents would affect the area
indirectly (Goodnough, 2008).

As for the Greenway, it was seen as a massive open space.
Jerold Kayden, an urban planning professor at Harvard,
said to the New York Times that the parks have created an
urban void (Goodnough, 2008). He adds on “It might have
been more interesting to leave the highway intact as an
elevated park …One would be hard-pressed to say this is a
creative, cohesive, singular public space that will redefine
the city of Boston…And that is too bad, when you have
that much space” (Goodnough, 2008).

The increase in development opportunities would increase
property taxes in the area, thus raising property taxes. This
fear of gentrification was noticed in residents in areas

1.5 Economic Impacts
In 2006, after 14 years, the Big Dig was completed and its
cost has been estimated to be $22 billion, accounting for
interest payments on bonds, and it will not be paid off until
2038 (Boston Globe, 2008). As stated before, this project
was a great undertaking and cannot be easily described in
how much steel, engineering plans, or labor it consumed.
The most important description is the benefits this
project brought to the Region of Boston. Since this project
brought
Figure 1.5: Residents showing concern.
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effect of the green and open spaces
created by the Project calculated the
total change in property values was
$1.3 Billion (Tajima, 2006). This
number was calculated by looking at
the increase in property values around
Boston and the new green spaces,
along with surveying people to see how
much they would pay for close proximity to those new
green and open spaces. The final results are listed on Table
1.5.

Table 1.3: Describing Structural and Non Structural Economic Benefits
Non Structural Economic Benefits
Structural Economic Benefits
Commuters time saved
New private development
Less fuel consumed
Property price increases
Jobs from new construction
New land available for development
benefits that range from social, economic, and
environment impacts, it is hard to extract a cost benefit
analysis. Instead, this section of the report will only focus
on the economic benefits of the project. The economic
benefits will be categorized into two categories: Structural
and Non Structural Economic Benefits. The Structural
economic benefits are those related to real state, such as
new development investments, wages from constructions,
property price increases, and tax revenue from real estate.
The non structural economic benefits are those related to
Boston residents, such as time saved commuting and less
fuel consumed.

The removal of the elevated highway created the potential
of 1,000 acres of new development, which accounts for a
total of more than $4 billion in benefits if completely build
out to the Boston Area, as seen in Table 1.6.

Table 1.6 shows the low and high estimates of each
scenario if the whole 1,000 acres are completely developed
(Boston Redevelopment Authority, 2000). The study done
by the Boston Redevelopment Authority shows that there
is potential for yearly property
Table 1.4: Real Estate Development by Central Artery Since 1990
tax revenue of $99 million to
Site
Investment
Apt.
Hotel
Office
Retail
Other
$122 million, which would go to
(in millions) Units
(sf.)
(sf.)
(sf.)
(sf.)
the city. The study doesn‟t
(sf.)
account for indirect benefits
101.4
141
0
213000
3000
0
Charlestown
such as temporary constructions
1991.5
3695
951000
1405000 136000
147000
Chinatown
jobs or long-term growth in
2182.2
1075
1600000 4086000 254000
256000
Downtown
economic activity.
200
375
250000
0
0
0
Kenmore
The Big Dig succeeded in
304.3
683
33000
105000
48000
202000
North End
reducing the time commute of
2671.3
1721
3884000 3403000 249000
75000
Seaport
many travelers, as well as
7450.7
7690
6718000 9212000 690000
680000
Totals
reducing the time they would
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
wait in traffic (Massachusetts
Department of Transportation, 2006). These reductions
created two added benefits. The first one is that reduction
in time commute can be translated into a monetary benefit
by estimating each traveler‟s cost of time. The second is
that a reduction in traffic congestion translates into savings
in fuel consumed and also costs associated in operations of
a vehicle. As we can see in Table 1.7, these savings added
to $167 million annually, which is composed of $143
million in timesaving and $24 million annual savings in

As of 2005, Boston holds the third highest Class A office
rents in the country. In part, this is thanks to the Central
Artery Project that began in 1982 (Ford, 2005). High rental
rates increase property tax revenues and accelerate real
estate development projects.
The greatest economic benefit of the Big Dig was the $7.4
billion in private investment due to new real estate
development since 1990, shown in Table 1.4.
This private development will translate into
43,425 jobs as seen on the chart on the
following page.
These jobs will create additional indirect
benefits, such as tax revenue from wages and
additional economic activity to the area. Also,
the construction of the development will add
additional temporary jobs (Massachusetts
Department of Transportation, 2006).
As stated before, the Big Dig added green and
open space to the new areas. It has been
recorded that these additions would increase
property value of the adjacent areas, and such
was the case for the Central Artery Tunnel
Project (Tajima, 2006). A study done on the

Figure 1.6: Number of Jobs From New Development
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vehicle operating costs (Massachusetts Department of
Transportation, 2006). It is important to know that this
total savings does not take into account the reduction in
accidents from the new highway, the delays during
construction of the project, or the increase in traffic of
subsequent years beyond 2010.
It is difficult to describe and quantify every single
economic benefit the Central Artery project brought to the
city of Boston and to predict the continuation of those
benefits in the years ahead. The economic benefits listed in
this section are simply to demonstrate that the Big Dig
brought changes in Boston. This section did not try to
show a cost benefit analysis because of the many
unquantifiable benefits such as improved quality of life or
increased positive perception of the city.
Table 1.5: Total Changes in Property Values
Total
Type of Property
$2,319,346
Other Residential
$866,104,681
Commercial
$448,493,976
Condos
Source: On Top of The Big Dig Economic Analysis of the Urban
Parks Created by The Boston Central Artery/Tunnel Project
Table 1.6: Potential Economic Benefit of New Development
Potential Build Out
Low Estimate
High Estimate
4200000
5400000
Office
6000000
6000000
Hotel
5000000
8000000
Residential
500000
750000
Retail
500000
1250000
Industrial
16200000
21400000
Total
Potential Construction Costs
Low Estimate
High Estimate
1033200000
1328400000
Office
1500000000
1500000000
Hotel
1180000000
1888000000
Residential
123000000
184500000
Retail
125000000
312500000
Industrial
3961200000
5213400000
Total
Potential Property Tax after build out
Low Estimate
High Estimate
33764976
43412112
Office
49020000
49020000
Hotel
8532580
13652128
Residential
4019640
6029460
Retail
4085000
10212500
Industrial
99422196
122326200
Total
Source: Boston Redevelopment Authority, Seaport Public
Realm Plan and interviews
Table 1.7: Change in Value of Time and Operating Costs (in millions)
Pre Construction Post Construction Savings
Category
198
56
142
Traveler Time Cost
52.1
23.9
Vehicle Operating Cost 76
167
Total
Source: The Economic Impact of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
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2 Milwaukee: Park East Freeway
2.1 History
The process of removing the Park East Freeway took many
years due to a group of people, called the Save Our Spur,
which did not want the freeway to be demolished. George
Watts was the biggest advocate against the destruction of
the freeway, claiming that the freeway system “is the life
blood of the city” (The Preservation Institute). He tried
many tactics to try and stop the removal of the freeway,
including spending almost all his money to run for mayor
against Norquist so that he could have been a part of the
decision making process. He contested the information
given by the traffic engineers and threatened suits against
the city to delay the destruction of the freeway. An article
written by him in a column of the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel stated that “sixteen downtown businesses would
be damaged if the freeway were to be removed” (The
Preservation Institute). Gary Grunau, a developer, talked
with fourteen of the business owners. Ten said they
supported the removal of the freeway, and four thought
that it would not affect them (The Preservation Institute).

The highway movement that was sweeping the nation in
the 1950s and 60s also took hold of Milwaukee. In the
1960s, the city hatched the grand scheme to create a loop
of freeways surrounding their entire downtown. In 1958,
the plans for the Park East Freeway were drawn. The
original plans called for the freeway to go from I-794 to
Lake Michigan. In 1965, the city began to acquire
property for the freeway. They then began to demolish the
houses and businesses that would become the Park East
Freeway. In 1971, the Park East Freeway opened for use,
though it was only one mile long stretch. Old Park East
Freeway was a remnant of the original plan of a freeway
system to surround the city, which did not achieve
complete build out.
From the start of construction, a campaign began to stop
the construction of the freeway by environmentalists and
surrounding neighborhoods. Ted Seaver was the leader of
the campaign against the Park East Freeway, along with
the rest of the freeways in Milwaukee. The greatest
argument against the Park East Freeway was that it would
run through Juneau Park. The people didn‟t want the park
to be cut off from the lakefront. The elected officials
eventually joined the activists with attempting to stop the
freeway (The Preservation Institute).

In 1999, the County Board decided to remove Park East
Freeway with a vote of 20-2. Following that meeting, the
Public Improvement committee of the Milwaukee
Common Council approved the removal of the freeway
with a vote of 5-0. Watts finally sued the city saying that
the traffic studies were incorrect and the environment
impacts would be severe. The study was ordered to be
redone, and the findings are half of what was anticipated.
Finally a U.S. District Judge, Charles Clevert, sided with
the city of Milwaukee. The demolition of the Park East
Freeway began in June of 2002 and was completed in
April 2003 (The Preservation Institute).

In 1972, Mayor Henry Maier vetoed the funding for the
relocation of the utilities. The mayor‟s greatest argument
was the cost to the city to finish the construction of the
Park East Freeway. He said, “America is the only nation in
the world to let her cities ride to bankruptcy on a
freeway….My city has discovered that the freeway is not
free” (The Preservation Institute, 2007). Since the Park
East Freeway was never completed, it was an under-used
one mile stretch of freeway (The Preservation Institute).

The proposal to tear down the East Park Freeway had a lot
of elements in its favor, and the final decision ended up
being made in convincing manner. First, the highway was
in need of repairs, despite lack of heavy use, which were
estimated around $100 million. Demolition estimates came
in around $25 million, of which the Federal government
had committed 80% through ISTEA funds. Second, the
Spur was only a small part of a larger proposal and
therefore had never carried its engineered capacity. Many
considered it simply a mile-long off ramp, even though it
had been engineered to carry well above its daily traffic
volume of 35,000. Because of this, studies and modeling
showed that a boulevard was not needed for displaced
traffic; simply restoring the street grid would be adequate
to handle the traffic.

In 1988, the city of Milwaukee elected Mayor John
Norquist. One of Norquist‟s major objectives was the
removal of both the Park East Freeway and the southern
part of the I-794 loop (Napolitan and Zegras, 2008). He
hired Planning Director Peter Park who helped develop the
Downtown Plan with guidelines for the removal of the
Park East Freeway and the integration of a surface level
boulevard in its place (The Preservation Institute). Park
was an urban planning professor at the University of
Wisconsin, and in 1995, he had one of his classes study the
possibility of replacing the freeway with a boulevard.
Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson and the
Department of Transportation did a traffic study of the
Park East Freeway. They found that with the low traffic
volume, a boulevard would not be needed and that
restoring the local street grid and building a new bridge
over the Milwaukee River would suffice (The Preservation
Institute).
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business, and would remove obstacles to pedestrian
2.2 Environment and Travel
activity. In addition, the creation of the on grade boulevard
Behavior Impacts
has provided more green and more permeable spaces to the
area than there were before. Minimizing impervious
With the removal of the Park East Freeway and the
surfaces helps to maintain adequate water quality and
redevelopment of the land in its footprint, there are many
replenishes groundwater stock. Also, the lesser proportion
positive environmental impacts to be had. Because
of pavement in the area can potentially mitigate heat-island
redevelopment in the actual footprint has not occurred to
effects caused by excessive concrete in urban
date, the full environmental impacts of the removal of the
environments.
freeway in this area are not yet realized. However, a few
Before its removal in 2003, the Park East Freeway crossed
impacts can be measured currently. Furthermore, the future
the Milwaukee River at two points. Since its removal, the
redevelopment of this area downtown will have the
two overpasses crossing the river were replaced with a
potential to meet many sustainable transport goals as
vertical lift bridge and helped to reinstate the river as a
outlined by the Victoria Transport Policy Institute, such as
visual feature of Milwaukee. This replacement does much
limiting pollution emissions, reversing climate change,
to enhance the waterfront aesthetics, another component of
preserving natural land and habitats, and maintaining a
sustainability. Tearing down the freeway allows for better
livable aesthetic (Litman, 2011).
development along this natural resource.
The Environmental Assessment of the removal project,
Besides enhancing the aesthetics of the waterfront, the
conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation,
removal of the overpass also aesthetically enhanced the
indicated no major environmental impacts during the
land in its surrounding areas. Before, the Park East
construction process for the removal of the Park East
Freeway was perceived as a physical barrier in the
Freeway. Similarly, the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional
downtown region. This freeway, as well as the I-794
Planning Commission completed an evaluation of current
overpass just south of the Park East, both going in eastand future traffic impacts in July 1998 entitled, "Analysis
westerly directions, acted as 2 linear divisors that split
of Existing and Year 2020 Traffic Impacts of the
downtown Milwaukee into 2 regions. Although there were
Termination of the Park East Freeway at N. 4th Street."
sidewalks provided around and under the infrastructure,
Their analysis concluded very minimal traffic effects or
the lack of direct sunlight and the lack of green
increased congestion. At the time, much of the land
landscaping created a psychological barrier and dissuaded
surrounding the freeway was used for parking. Some
pedestrian trips through the area (Milwaukee Downtown
parking would be lost in the reconstruction project, but
Plan, 1999). Its removal brings back the sense of
there would be no taking of businesses or residences in the
connection between the downtown districts. As more
removal project and reconfiguration of the area
development occurs in the Park East footprint, more
(Amendment to the Regional Transportation Plan, 2001).
pedestrian activity will be encouraged.
The Commission stated that the evaluation of the
environmental impacts indicated no substantial socioThe new formed-based zoning envelope of the area allows
economic, natural environment, physical environment, or
for much mixed use development including housing, retail,
cultural
environment
impacts
were
anticipated
office, and entertainment uses, as well as different height
(Amendment to the Regional Transportation Plan, 2001).
variances (Norquist, 2011). The form-based code outlines
the standards for uses and design in the newly reclaimed
The primary motivation in the removal project was the
area. On McKinley Avenue, in particular, most blocks
redevelopment of the land within the freeway's right of
require a minimum of 3 or 4 story buildings and a
way, as well as the redevelopment of the surrounding area
maximum of 12 stories. Some blocks allow large venue
downtown. A major component of sustainability is “land
buildings and require special features, such as unique
efficiency,” meaning conserving valuable land resources
shapes and facades, in order to continue entertainment and
by limiting sprawl, and in the case of transportation,
commercial uses in the neighborhood. The code allows for
minimizing land used for transportation infrastructure
the following uses on all blocks: residential, office,
(Litman, 2011). The Park East Freeway was built through
retail/service,
entertainment/accommodations,
and
the historic downtown. In the 1960s, much land was
institutional. It defines street edges and corners to create a
cleared in the downtown area to make room for the
pedestrian friendly public area (Park East Redevelopment
multiple freeways in plan. As a result, thousands of homes
Code, 2004). This is another example of efficient use of
were displaced and torn down, thereby encouraging
land resources. In fact, on February 24, 2011, ground was
growth in outlying areas (Bessert, 2009). The Park East
broken on the new apartment and condominium tower that
Freeway comprised almost 30 acres of downtown land.
will house 203 apartments and 14 condominiums
Removal reclaimed 11 developable blocks (Milwaukee
(cityofmilwaukee.gov).
Downtown Plan, 1999). The removal project and
subsequent redevelopment of the center of Milwaukee
Adding mixed use districts in the downtown Milwaukee
encourages a more conservative and sustainable use of
area could potentially encourage more walking trips,
land. The 1999 Milwaukee Downtown Plan called the
thereby decreasing the city's overall vehicle miles traveled
removal a “re-annexation” of land that could be used for
(Milwaukee Downtown Plan, 1999). Since 2000, overall
other purposes besides transport, such as residences and
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vehicle miles traveled in Milwaukee have decreased
parking, even though some of the land was directly on the
almost every year.
Milwaukee River and seemingly desirable plots. These
highway/freeway projects were thought to be big
investments to improve downtowns by giving the
Table 2.1: VMT in Milwaukee
automobile easy access into their core; in reality, most
7,173,100,000
2009
created easy access for residents to flee while
7,376,900,000
2007
simultaneously leading to further blight and disinvestment
7,946,000,000
2003
by the private sector. The economic effects after the 1968
7,816,076,000
2000
completion in Milwaukee‟s Park East section of downtown
Source: Wisconsin DOT
were no different.
Besides redevelopment of the downtown, another major
The Park Freeway was just a part of a larger network of
objective of the Park East Freeway removal and
freeways, many of which never came to fulfillment.
reconfiguration was the reinstatement of the grid traffic
Therefore, due to the cancellation of two other proposed
pattern in the area. This initiative also has beneficial
freeways that would have completed the loop, the Park
impacts on the environment. Before, there were only 3
East Freeway survived with little purpose making it a less
exits off the Park East Freeway into downtown. As a
controversial issue when the discussion came to tear it
result, many auto travelers would have to overshoot their
down.
destination and back track, increasing their VMT. Also, the
3 arterials that collected the exit traffic would become
During the 1980s, neighborhoods lying just beyond the
more congested. The reinstatement of the grid allows for
freeway spur started to experience a resurgence of
more efficient and direct travel in the area. It disperses
investment. Happening at least twelve years after the spurs
traffic as well as decreases idle times.
completion, it was determined that the resurgence and
development was in spite of the freeway and not due to it.
In 1999, the Park East Freeway carried approximately
This lead to the decision for a major redevelopment project
54,000 vehicles on an average weekday (Congress for New
on the land cleared for the continuation of Park East
Urbanism). The freeway spur was 0.8 of a mile, so the
Freeway to Lake Michigan. In the 1990s, this sizeable area
removal accounts for a reduction of 43,200 vehicle miles
was redeveloped into a community of residential and retail
traveled each day. This also translates into 41,904 pounds
land uses reconnecting the traditional neighborhood called
less of CO2 being emitted each day on account of travel on
East Pointe (Norquist, 2011). The development called East
the freeway, and approximately 15 million less pounds of
Pointe Commons was an $85.3 million project that initially
CO2 being emitted each year (EPA.org). How those
created 122 apartments and 62 townhomes, with plans to
vehicle miles have been dispersed on other routes is not
eventually reach 700 total apartments (Daykin, 2005).
known. Transit ridership in Milwaukee has not seen an
increase in trips since 2003 and the removal of the
After the initial plan for tear down was agreed upon, the
freeway. The National Transit Database recorded
city expanded the amount of the spur pinned for
64,033,885 unlinked trips in 2002 just before removal and
demolition by one block leading to an increase in the
only 47,972,057 unlinked trips in 2009. There are 5 bus
teardowns cost. The raised cost for the project came to
routes that intersect the new on-grade boulevard built in
$37 million with separate plans for redevelopment
place of the freeway. Transit decline may have more to do
planning and infrastructure costing an additional $8
with transit policies made under the current mayor and
million (Daykin, 2005). Many new development plans and
may have no relationship to the freeway's removal.
propositions came were presented to the city. According to
a 2006 statement by Michael D‟Amato, chairman of the
Common Council‟s Zoning, Neighborhoods and
Development Committee, the $45 million tear down
project would bring $800 million of new construction,
which would have been double the total value of new
construction in all of Milwaukee for 2005 (Daykin, 2006).
Local planners had more conservative estimates than the
$800 million suggested by Mr. D‟Amato. Based on their
projections, they expected the assessed values in the entire
64 acre redevelopment area to increase from $58 million to
$500 million at build out (Knapp and Wiewel, 2005).

Overall, significant changes in travel behavior in the area
have yet to be realized. As the footprint begins to be
developed, it is likely that changes in behavior will be
more apparent.

2.3 Economic Impacts
Although only a small portion of the freeway was ever
built, the right of way for the entire planned freeway was
purchased and cleared. By 1969, 99% of the land in the
right of way had been acquired, and 1,590 homes had been
cleared at a cost of $22 million (Bessert, 2009). The
process of clearing a large amount of land through the
central part of an established traditional neighborhood in
downtown Milwaukee created a drastic decrease in
surrounding property values as well as a loss of former and
future tax revenues. In addition to lowering the value of
the surrounding land, the spur also resulted in causing the
primary land use directly surrounding it to become surface

With the completion of the removal of Park East Freeway
in 2003, the city of Milwaukee now had a prime 64-acre
redevelopment site. The city created several planning and
development guidelines, including implementing a formbased code that included specificity in design and
developer guidelines that mandated the use of union wage
pay for construction worker done on county owned parcels
(Daykin, 2006). Some believe the county‟s strict
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(Daykin, 2006).
guidelines have hindered the redevelopment process on the
footprint of the Park East (Hiebert, 2011). However, the
Park East Square, planned by Chicago developer
downtown plans propose many improvements for these
Richard Curto for 4 acres east of N. Water St. and
potential redevelopment sites including improving and
north of E. Ogden Ave. Curto wants to build a 125adding to housing stock, adding entertainment venues,
room boutique hotel and a 140-room hotel catering
providing travel connections to other downtown
to business travelers; 120 apartments, 270 condos
destinations, and creating a mixed use pedestrian oriented
and over 215,000 square feet of retail and
design.
restaurant space. Curto's firm, RSC & Associates,
has until October to exercise its options to buy the
Some of the projects proposed early on in the
vacant parcels from Milwaukee County and is
redevelopment include the following, which were cut from
continuing to work on its plans (Daykin, 2006).
a 2006 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel newspaper article:
A 44,000-square-foot office building proposed by
MLG Development Inc. for a small parcel bordered
by N. Water, N. Edison and E. Knapp streets. MLG
has a purchase option for the county-owned site
(Daykin, 2006).

The North End, planned by Mandel Group Inc., at
the 8-acre site of the former Pfister & Vogel
tannery, overlooking the Milwaukee River along
N. Water St., mainly south of E. Pleasant St.
Mandel eventually plans to have 395 condos, 88
apartments and 20,000 to 25,000 square feet of
street-level retail space on the site, which the firm
bought nearly five years ago. Mandel plans to
begin demolishing the former tannery this fall and
begin construction on The North End's first phase
in early 2007, said Richard Lincoln, senior vice
president of development. The firm's executives
continue to talk with city development officials
about obtaining financial assistance for the project

Terraces at River Bluff, a 160-unit condo
development planned for south of E. Ogden Ave.,
between N. Broadway and N. Milwaukee St. Big
Bend Development LLC bought the site in 2005,
demolished the former Milwaukee Center for
Independence facility and is completing design
work for Terraces at River Bluff, said Randy
Scoville, Big Bend partner. The firm hopes to
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break ground within six months, he said (Daykin,
2.4 Community Impacts
2006).
The Milwaukee Park East Freeway was built on a stretch
Ruvin Development Inc. and Dallas-based
of land that consisted of houses and business. In total,
Gatehouse Capital Corp. are proposing a $104
there were 26 acres of houses and businesses that were
million project, including a 175-room hotel, 70
demolished to make room for the freeway. Because only
condos, 55,000 square feet of offices, 31,000
one mile of the freeway was built, the remaining land
square feet of retail space and a 330-car parking
remained vacant and turned into surface parking lots (The
structure. Rana Enterprises wants to build a $34
Preservation Institute).
million project, featuring a 202-room hotel, a gas
station/convenience store, 14,000 square feet of
offices, 9,000 square feet of additional retail space
and a 400-car parking structure (Daykin, 2006).

The Milwaukee Park East Freeway was initially welcomed
in the community, but soon after construction began, the
controversy began. The freeway divided the downtown
area from the neighborhoods, which made walking from
downtown Milwaukee to the surrounding neighborhoods
unpleasant. The freeway route was going to run through
Juneau Park and separate it from Lake Michigan. The
cherished open space caused the construction of the
freeway to end (The Preservation Institute).

Reaching build out has become a longer process than
initially thought. The Park East community in downtown
Milwaukee has run into some bad timing. As the freeway
fell, so did housing prices. This coupled with the credit
crunch caused developers to postpone, change, or cancel
many projects due to trouble obtaining adequate financing.
Since the down market began, many developers have been
approaching the city to ask for funding help. These pleas
for financing assistance were meet with mixed emotions,
especially those that looked to be more speculative (2007
Daykin). In 2007, the City Development Commissioner
said the city would not help finance developments that
were too speculative and that he didn‟t want to potentially
hurt existing downtown developments (2007 Daykin).
Although the city wouldn‟t help some speculators, they did
act as a conduit for bond sales in order to acquire cheaper
financing for some development projects.

Before the Milwaukee Park East Freeway was demolished,
the land surrounding the freeway and surface parking lots
became blighted, which was an eyesore as people were
headed toward the downtown area. After the demolition of
the freeway, the roads surrounding the freeway were
restored to the original street grid to handle to traffic. The
redevelopment of the area created three new
neighborhoods: McKinley Avenue District, Lower Water
Street District, and Upper Water Street District (The
Preservation Institute).
The McKinley District is planned for office development,
retail shops, and entertainment. The district is set up for
large sites and waterfront access, making the area ideal for
restaurants and clubs (The Preservation Institute).

Currently much of the 24 acres of the Park East Freeway
footprint still lay vacant, but there were a couple of
significant advances in the Park East District. First, the
Moderne finally received financing for a 30 story, $70+
million development that includes condos, executive
residences, and retail, and although it has yet to officially
break ground, site preparation has already started.
Secondly, The North End Phase II project received
funding, though it is still working with the City of
Milwaukee to complete the project‟s financing. Finally,
Milwaukee School of Engineering (MSOE) proposed the
building of a parking garage/athletic facility in the Park
East, which seems to be on the fast track. So, with an
improving economy it looks possible that the Park East
project will be able to get back on track in 2011 (Reid,
2011).

The Lower Water Street District is planned for offices near
the water front, with some retail businesses and residential
buildings. The east part of the district is predominantly
residential area, which is adjacent to an existing
neighborhood (The Preservation Institute).
The Upper Water Street District is planned for some office
buildings, but the majority of the area will be mixed use
buildings. The emphasis is on residential development,
which has already started (The Preservation Institute).
The building of the areas that was previously demolished
for the Milwaukee Park East Freeway has connected the
downtown Milwaukee to the surrounding neighborhoods.
The walk from the downtown area to the neighborhoods
has become safer. The improvements of turning vacant,
blighted land to buildings have made the area more
appealing for the residents in the area. Not just the Park
East footprint, but all surrounding areas downtown have
seen improvements since the removal project.

The city‟s new commissioner for the Department of City
Development has stated that the continued redevelopment
plan will not be “mega-block buildings” but small
construction that will need city financing (Daykin, 2007).
His development plan envisions a number of three to four
story office, retail, restaurant, and living space buildings.
Obviously, the difficulties implementing some of the largescale redevelopment projects have had an effect on the
commissioner. But regardless of what direction the city
attempts to steer further redevelopment efforts, the razing
of the Park East Freeway has lead to a tremendous amount
of private investment and will continue to be an economic
boon to the city and downtown.

The city of Milwaukee has approved the use of art to draw
people into the new neighborhoods. The art was done to
try to beatify an area that is not beautiful. The art was done
to create a sense of value to the real estate in the area.
The art was also done to bring awareness of how important
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increased the property values in the area and increased tax
the Milwaukee River is to the community (Schultze,
revenue for the city. Between 2001 and 2006, the average
2009).
assessed land values per acre in the footprint of the Park
Though the development of the area has been slow, the
East Freeway grew by over 180% and average assessed
neighborhoods are no longer full of blight. They now have
land values in the Park East Tax Increment District grew
a better physical connection with the downtown area
by 45% between 2001 and 2006. This growth is much
without the congestion that was previously feared. Many
higher than the citywide increase of 25% experienced
other cities are in similar situations and can learn a lot
during the same time period (Case Studies for the I-81
from the actions taken from demolition of the Milwaukee
Challenge, 2011).
Park East Freeway. The redevelopment of the area has
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3 Oakland: Cypress Freeway
Environmental Relief Team charged with evaluating
placement of the project instead proposed moving the
freeway east toward the bay where it would run near the
more industrialized port of Oakland and the military base.
Caltrans accepted this alternative and finalized the freeway
location in September 1991. The Oakland community was
included in a decision the city made for them; in the past,
their opinions were largely ignored (Brett, 1998) (CDOT,
1999).

3.1 History
On the 17th of October 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake,
at 7.1 on the Richter scale, shook Oakland to the point that
a key component of its highway infrastructure, the upper
level of the Cyprus viaduct, collapsed and killed 42 and
injured 108 people. Although the section of the viaduct
that collapsed was only 1.5 miles, 160,000 cars per day
were left with no other choice but to disperse amongst the
heavily used Oakland freeways and streets. This further
added to the city‟s existing traffic congestion. The excess
congestion from the removal of this section of I-880 had
serious implications on the shipping industry and other
employment centers throughout the city.

Actual construction of the project did not commence until
January of 1994. The new stretch of freeway and
connectors span 5.2 miles in length accommodating traffic
and providing additional connections. Service to key
economic areas and through routes for vehicle users were
to be improved by connecting I-80 with the San Jose and
East Bay Area. The new Cypress Freeway, at 6 lanes, has a
lower vehicle capacity than the original 8-lane freeway. By
providing High Occupancy Vehicle, or HOV, lanes to
promote carpooling and public transit, Caltrans believed
they could operate the freeway more efficiently (Audit,
1998) (Brett, 1998). Even with HOV lanes, connecting
metropolitan areas proved to be the project‟s greatest asset.
The main community revitalization proponent of the plan
was the connection of I-80 to I-880. Caltrans believed that
it would alleviate the majority of congestion running
through the adjacent arterial streets.

Reconstruction of the infrastructure was initiated with an
Environmental Review in January 1990. California
Department of Transportation or Caltrans proposed
rebuilding the project in the same location as the original
Cypress Freeway. Community leaders opposed this plan as
the previous freeway in 1955 blighted and divided the
community of West Oakland. At that time, the
predominately black community of West Oakland was
split in two by the double deck section of interstate leaving
the area beneath for storage of equipment. The blight,
noise, and pollution caused by the Cypress Freeway were
an eyesore and drove away businesses leaving behind
gangs and violence (Nadel 2011). The Community

The Cypress Freeway Project was scheduled for
completion by March 1997 though delays pushed back the
opening until November 1998. The freeway replacement
project faced several delays in acquiring a right-of-way on
I-880 providing financial difficulties (Audit, 1998) (Brett,
1998). Redeveloping the site of the previous freeway
continued with the construction of Mandela Parkway from
2004-2005. Developers have shown interest in building
mixed use projects throughout West Oakland though much
debate continues over concerns of gentrification.

3.2 Economic Impact
Freeway closures have unprecedented economic impacts.
A year after the Loma Prieta Earthquake shut down the 1.5
mile stretch of highway; the cost amounted to $22.5
million in added travel times for motorist, delays in
shipment of products, and higher vehicle operating costs
(LA Times, 1990). The cost associated with the destruction
of structures amounted to $5,287,716 for the 9 county San
Francisco Metropolitan Area. This is aside from the cost of
the collapsed freeway (Kroll, 1991), giving some idea of
the earthquakes magnitude in respect to financial damage.
By 1994, $1.106 billion in Federal relief funds had been
allocated to the repair of the I-880 freeway. $650 million
was spend on construction, $350 million on right of way
acquisition, and another $56 million in costs remained that
were not eligible for federal funding and left for the state
level to contribute. Before the project was complete,
Figure 3.1: Location of Cypress Freeway Project in
Relation to Cypress Viaduct Source: Caltrans
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minorities, women and local residents. According to the
Oakland lost $491,000 in toll revenue from the Oakland
agreement, contracts and jobs from the relocation of the
Bay Bridge.
highway were allocated in the following ways: 35%
Not all aspects of Oakland suffered greatly economically
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise participation or
from the freeway collapse. The San Francisco Bay Area
businesses owned by women or minorities, 20% Local
retail sector was not really affected. Access to retail proved
Business Participation, with the 45% remaining
to be an economic priority of the San Francisco Bay
employment consisting of local residents, women, and
residents. A survey conducted in January 1990 with a
minorities. Over 1000 people received employment
rating system of 1-no problem to 5- very severe, consumer
through this project (CDOT, 1999). In order to enforce
access after the earthquake ranked a 3.5 for the City of
complacence of the Agreement, Caltrans later sent
Oakland. This rating implied that accessibility may have
associates out to monitor the projects compliance with the
been reduced but not necessarily sales. A deterrent to
stated employment targets and found that, although
consumer spending was an indirect implication of the
employment goals are being achieved, minorities were
closure of the I-880 highway. The provision of adequate
under represented in the resulting hiring initiative. Despite
infrastructure is central to the economic success of an
some flaws, this project performed an economic revival of
urban community or what can be inferred from the
Oakland with awarding $90 million in contracts to local
research into Oakland. (Audit, 1998)
businesses in its construction phase (Kroll, 1991).
Negotiations over the project design between Caltrans, the
City of Oakland, and West Oakland community groups
3.3 Environmental Impacts
produced promises of many favorable economic outcomes.
One such provision was a direct off ramp on the new
The environmental impacts of removing and relocating the
freeway offering a means to service the Port of Oakland in
Cypress Freeway had both negative and positive
turn removing the presence of heavy freight trucks
environmental impacts including: contaminant exposure,
traveling through residential neighborhoods. $25 million
noise/visual pollution, community reunification, and
was spent on adding this interchange to the newly
cultural wealth. The most detrimental environmental
constructed portion of the highway. In terms of economic
impact of replacing the Cypress Freeway was the redevelopment, this feature would enhance the port‟s
construction process, which mostly took place in an
competitiveness amongst other west coast ports as well as
industrial corridor. Much of the site was formerly the
facilitate employment opportunities. Taking local
location of Southern Pacific‟s railroad yards and industrial
businesses concerns of limited access into consideration,
shops. The facilities on site included paint shops, vehicle
Caltrans refrained from removing the existing off-ramp on
washing facilities, foundries, gas works, fuel storage,
Market Street. The preservation of the Market Street offbattery shops, etc. which are known producers of
ramp maintained accessibility to local businesses thus
hazardous byproducts like hydrocarbons, solvents, heavy
directly boosting the revenues of community and business
metals, and asbestos (Snyder, 1992).
Of course,
groups. Caltrans claimed the replacement for the Cypress
contaminants
were
eventually
discovered
and
freeway, the Mandela Parkway project, would enhance the
environmental remediation of such contributed to a final
quality of life in Oakland and in turn raise property values
project cost nearly double the original plan (Miami Herald
through the enrichment of Oakland. The remediated
1997).
highway design included green space, bike paths and
32 contaminated sites were identified in the footprint of the
pedestrian trails as well as an opportunity of
new freeway. Contamination was found in both the soil
redevelopment in the heart of West Oakland. (CDOT:
and groundwater and included the following contaminants:
1999)
asbestos, lead, petroleum hydrocarbon, Polynuclear
Another investment into the economic livelihood of
aromatics, VOCs (Toulene, Vinyl Chloride), DDT, and a
Oakland was the establishment of a community outreach
semi-VOC (Benzopyrene). The contaminated soil was
venue. The Oakland Private Industry Council was set up to
either shipped to a disposal facility or remediated and
provide Oakland residents with the training necessary to
reused in embankments while the contaminated water was
become involved with the freeway reconstruction project.
treated and used for construction, dust abatement, or
The center was an extremely effective utility towards
simply discharged into the ground (Caltrans, 1999). The
alleviating unemployment with an 82% job placement rate.
vinyl chloride contamination posed the largest problem as
Caltrans believed that this would stimulate a unity between
it caused months of delay while the EPA deliberated the
West Oakland and Oakland. As of 1999, 700 people
proper process of dealing with the carcinogen. Ultimately,
graduated from the center and 82% were placed in
it was decided that the level of contamination was below
construction related employment in northern California,
what was deemed unsafe. Still, construction avoided
though only 65 graduates worked on the Cypress Freeway
excavating in these contaminated areas, and the U.S. EPA
Replacement Project.
filtered the groundwater (Jackson, 1998).
Oakland City Council approved the Freeway Performance
Agreement in 1993. It encouraged investment from
disadvantaged and local contractors to generate
employment. The initiative primarily focused on hiring

Addressing noise and visual pollution for the new freeway,
Caltrans installed noise barriers on freeway structures and
embankments in addition to installing sound walls and
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dense landscaping along residential portions of the corridor
These patterns only persisted until debris was
(Caltrans, 1999).
removed and non-controversial infrastructure was
repaired.
The environmental impact of replacing the Cypress
Freeway was positive in many ways for the local
Liminal Phase: the travel patterns between a
community, such as its relocation away from major
restoration of non-controversial travel infrastructure
residential areas, cultural excavations, and seismic
and the ultimate transportation system outcome
upgrades.
(relocation and reconstruction of the Cypress
Freeway). This phase is characterized by planning and
Relocation of the freeway resulted in significantly lower
construction. It is subject to high degrees of variability
noise pollution and vehicle emissions for the former
because of the construction process and sheer length
corridor, which affected a larger residential population. It
of the project.
also allowed for the redevelopment of the median into a
landscaped, multi-use pathway called the Mandela
Terminal Phase: the travel patterns after
Parkway (Caltrans, 2004). Many residents of West
reconstruction is complete, i.e. reconnection of I-80 to
Oakland attributed their higher incidences of certain health
I-880 via the relocated Cypress Freeway. This phase is
issues to vehicle exhaust, a notion supported by health
defined by two significant events: the completion of
officials. Therefore, removal of the freeway should also
the new Cypress Freeway and the creation of the
lower rates of related health concerns. These
Mandela Parkway.
environmental improvements in the former corridor likely
As per the request of the local community, the destroyed
contribute to its improved economic development as well.
portion of I-880, known as the Cypress Freeway, was to be
Unfortunately, a small residential area in the extreme west
relocated to the periphery of West Oakland, allowing the
of West Oakland, known locally as the “Lower Bottom,”
reunification of the community of West Oakland. This
was severely impacted by the new route of the Cypress
portion of I-880 was heavily traveled as it linked Oakland
Freeway. Residents of this area entered a legal battle to
and surrounding communities with San Francisco,
locate the new freeway completely away from residential
Berkeley, and the South Bay. Prior to the Loma Prieta
areas but ultimately settled for increased mitigation
earthquake, an estimated 160,000 motorists used this
measures (USDOT).
facility every day (Jackson, 1998). Needless to say, the
During the demolition phase of construction, archeologists
absence of the original Cypress Freeway would alter travel
discovered large quantities of historical artifacts from the
patterns, especially amongst motorists. Even once the new
1800‟s. Most of these were related to the Africanfreeway was completed, its capacity was estimated to be
American heritage of West Oakland and its railroad
116,000 vehicles daily (Miami Herald 1997).
industry. These artifacts were placed in exhibits and
The immediate impact of the collapse of the Cypress
museums locally and nationally (USDOT).
freeway was rather interesting. As could be expected many
The improvement of the seismic resistance of the new
motorists simply re-routed their travel patterns by
freeway is another beneficial environmental impact. The
detouring through nearby I-580 and I-980. This re-route
old freeway was known to be fatally flawed, and
resulted in an increase in traffic on these facilities and
reconstruction allowed for utilization of the newest and
additional travel time (Fernandez, 1998). However, in the
most seismic-sensitive construction methods. Light-weight
days immediately following the earthquake, during the
embankments were constructed so as to not put
reactionary phase, there was a simultaneous decrease in
unnecessary pressure on the local soil, Bay Mud.
automobile use and significant spike in transit use. While
Precautions were also taken to avoid the rusting of steel
surface transportation facilities were devastated by the
and concrete and to withstand an earthquake of 7.4
earthquake, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) rail
magnitude (Caltrans, 1999).
system survived relatively unscathed. Residents of the East
Bay were essentially limited to travel by rail or water to
Overall, the beneficial environmental impacts seem to
get to San Francisco. During the week following the
outweigh the negative impacts. The issue with vinyl
earthquake, daily ridership figures increased by over 50%,
chloride in the “Lower Bottom” is unfortunate but has
from 218,000 to 342,000. This spike put pressure on the
been resolved.
BART system, so ferry service between San Francisco and
the East Bay was expanded during the month-long closure
3.4 Travel Behavior Impacts
of the Bay Bridge. Perhaps as result of these post-disaster
travel behaviors, BART ridership has steadily increased
The relationship between travel behavior patterns and the
over the years and commuting by ferry has become a
impact of removing the Cypress Freeway is best
“mainstay of the North Bay commute market” (SPUR,
understood when broken into three post-Loma Prieta
2010).
Earthquake phases: Reactionary Phase, Liminal Phase, and
In the nine year liminal phase that followed the reactionary
Terminal Phase.
phase, new traffic patterns emerged. However, due the
Reactionary Phase: the immediate travel patterns
intermittent completion of reconstruction, these patterns
resulting from the collapse of the Cypress Freeway.
were relatively in flux and difficult to come by. In addition
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It should also be noted that a multi-use pathway, The
to the use of I-580 and I-980 as alternate routes, many
Mandela Parkway, was created in the footprint of the old
motorists began to navigate through local roads in West
Cypress Freeway. Aside from revitalizing a corridor, it
Oakland to avoid traffic on the now heavily congested
also provides bike lanes and a pedestrian trail (Caltrans,
freeways (Jackson, 1998). The reconstruction process was
2004). This could lead to more pedestrian, bicyclists, and
essentially completed in 3 portions: the2.5 mile main line
transit users in the immediate area.
running along the Southern Pacific Railroad and skirting
West Oakland, a 1.3 mile connection to the Bay Bridge to
Because this project deals with highway removal and
the west, a 1.4 mile connection to I-80 in Emeryville to the
relocation as opposed to mere removal, its overall travel
north. Caltrans decided to complete the connection to the
behavior impacts are expected to be minimal and localized.
Bay Bridge first as an economic study concluded that
The key impact is that traffic was relocated to the
every month without that connection would result in a loss
periphery of a community that abhorred its omnipresence.
of $2.5 million per month in travel time and vehicle
Also, the collapse and devastation of highway
operating expenses for the public. Unfortunately, the
infrastructure in the area could be attributed to overall
construction process ran into considerable delays,
gains in transit and ferry ridership.
especially regarding HOV lanes (USDOT, 1998).

3.5 Community Impacts
The history of the West Oakland community runs deep.
Many of today‟s social conditions can be traced back over
100 years. In the 19th century, wealthy residents of the San
Francisco Bay area settled in the hill, leaving the middle
and lower classes to live along the alluvial plain that is
now the city of Oakland. Racial divides, both implicit and
explicit perpetuated this divide into the early 20th century.
West Oakland became notable after a group of African
American rail workers unionized and bargained for higher
wages. For the first time they were able to own homes and
many settled in the neighborhood closest to the rail yardWest Oakland (Nadel, 2011). After WWII, lower costs and
taxes lured much of West Oakland‟s industry south leaving
little more than an elicit economy (Nadel, 2011)
(Praetzellis & Praetzellis, 2004). In 1955, the city of
Oakland decided to build the I-880 Cypress Freeway
through this neighborhood taking advantaged of
disenfranchised residents with little resources to fight and
low right of way costs due to the depressed property values
and widespread abandoned buildings.
After Caltrans selected the alternate site for the I-880
exchange closer to the industrial area of West Oakland,
they enlisted the help of the Anthropological Studies
Center at Sonoma State University (ASC) to conduct a
study of the area. As part of compliance with the National
Historic Preservation Act, they were charged with
examining the area of potential effects of 22 city blocks.
Since the freeway was being built so close to the San
Francisco Bay, large footings were required that they knew
would destroy artifacts of the area‟s 100+ year old history.
The Cypress Archaeology Project that resulted produced
an extensive historical overview of the early years of West
Oakland. Caltrans then compiled the artifacts into a
traveling exhibit called “Holding the Fort: An Exhibit of
African American Historical Archaeology and Labor
History in West Oakland.” This study and resulting exhibit
help shed light on the formation of West Oakland‟s
culture, and the authors hoped their report would act as a
source of historical knowledge and pride for the presentday community (Praetzellis & Praetzellis, 2004).

Figure 3.2: Status of the Cypress Freeway.
Source: Caltrans

The terminal phase marks the completion of construction.
It should be noted that the new Cypress Freeway has a
lower capacity than its predecessor. The two connection
facilities are each 4 lanes total. It was the hope of highway
planners that by including a High Occupancy Vehicle
(HOV) lane, the capacity of the new freeway would match
that of the old. Much to their chagrin, HOV lanes were
eliminated from all portions of the Cypress Freeway
project except for the 1.3 mile connection to the Bay
Bridge. This was done in response to the cost of restoring
other earthquake-damaged infrastructure in the region.
Still, the project did considerably reduce congestion in the
immediate area, especially West Oakland. By providing
better connection to the Port of Oakland, the Oakland
Army Base, and certain industrial and commercial areas
via new interchanges, much of the truck and industry
related traffic in West Oakland was reduced (USDOT,
1998).
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was completed between 2002 and 2005. (Caltrans, 2004)
In 1989, residents seized on an opportunity to reunite their
community after the Loma Prieta earthquake destroyed the
Redevelopment in West Oakland has been a struggle as
Cypress Freeway. A team of community and civic leaders,
well. One notable mixed-use development, Mandela
Caltrans, and interested citizens were formed as a
Gateway at the corner of Mandela and 7 th Street includes
Community Emergency Relief Team, or CERT, which
“168 [affordable] residential rental units, 14 for sale
gave the citizens an unprecedented voice in the rebuilding
townhomes, and 6,500 sq. ft. of retail space” (Oakland
of their community. The charts below show a snapshot of
Housing Authority, n.d.). Located across from the West
West Oakland in 1990. As the 1990 census data shows, the
Oakland BART station and close to the Oakland Main Post
predominantly African American West Oakland
Office, the development is the only mixed use
community had higher poverty rates, lower incomes, lower
development on Mandela and will most likely stay that
home ownership, and higher rental vacancies than the city
way (Nadel, 2011). Other efforts to bring higher income
of Oakland (U. S. Census, 1990).
Eleven
years
after
the
earthquake, the I-880 had been
rebuilt but debate continued on
the fate of the previous site of the
Cypress Freeway. The 2000
census reported several changes
in the community (see Figure
3.3) though overall, West
Oakland still lagged behind the
rest of the city. A 36.29% growth
in average income along with a
3.7% decrease in poverty from
1990 to 2000 indicates some
improvement in the area‟s
economy. Housing indicators
show a possible gap developing
between those who can buy and
many who can barely afford to
rent. Average income for
borrowers rose 32% to $95,600,
well over the average family
income of $38,600. At the same
time rental housing units
decreased by 300 even as
vacancy rate stayed constant and
of the 8,700 housing units in
West Oakland, 18.4% were either
overcrowded
or
severely
overcrowded (U. S. Census,
2000).
Even with the obvious need for
economic development, debate
over what to do with the former
Cypress Freeway site delayed
economic
and
community
improvement. Local businesses
petitioned the city to make the
wide median an extensive
parking lot, but many in the
community wanted a linear treelined park. Again, community
members won, and the Mandela
Parkway project with winding
sidewalks and green spaces,
decorative lighting, and benches
Figure 3.3: Demographic Change in West Oakland
Source: Census
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Given the crime rates from 1969-2008, the earthquake
housing developments or rezone abandoned industrial
probably had little impact with minor exceptions (see
facilities
for
mixed
use
high
density
Figure 3.4). Notable exceptions include total larcenies,
residential/commercial/light industrial have been denied as
felony assault, murder, and robbery which showed
threats of gentrification. West Oakland‟s Councilwoman
substantial decreases throughout the 1990s. Whether or not
Nancy Nadel says would rather preserve the zoning to
the I-880 rerouting had any effect is hard to say as there
maintain the historic manufacturing tradition of West
may be a variety of forces at work (No data was provided
Oakland. Efforts to attract new industry have not yet
for 1995 except for Murders).
succeeded, though the local high school will be
implementing a manufacturing focus to train the next
generation of West Oakland‟s youth (Nadel 2011).
Figure 3.4: Summary of Crime Offenses, 1969 - 2008
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4 Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway
4.1 Introduction
Portland has long been progressive in their efforts for
urban renewal. Nearly forty years ago, Portland, led by the
efforts of Governor Tom McCall along with strong public
support, razed Harbor Drive freeway to replace it with a
large park and reclaim their waterfront. While the nation
was still going strong in their efforts to build veins of
highways linking cities, Portland was the first to remove a
freeway from an urban area and hasn‟t looked back since. 1

Figure 4.2: Robert Moses’ Proposed Harbor Drive
Freeway Source: www.PortlandMercury.com

cityscape were I-84, I-5, I-405, I-205 and the Harbor Drive
Freeway3.
Funded by the Roosevelt Administration, Harbor Drive
was a ground-level four-lane highway following the
western side of the Willamette River, essentially walling
off downtown Portland from the waterfront. It was termed
as an expressway even though it was not built to the
modern freeway standards of the time because it was a
“limited access road, closed to pedestrians and to cross
traffic, with access through freeway interchanges.” 4 Upon
completion in 1942, the three mile long route was carrying
25,000 vehicles per day. 5 By 1950, the Harbor Drive
Freeway could still be classified as limited access and
carried US Route 99W.6

Figure 4.1: Portland, Oregon. Highlighted portion shows
area of Former Harbor Drive Freeway. Source: Google
Maps.

As the US entered the 50s and with the passage of the
Federal Highway Act in 1956, many more highways were
planned for Portland but none would technically qualify as
a limited access road. 7 By 1964, I-5 was completed and
spanned the east bank of the Willamette, running in the
same cardinal directions as Harbor Drive and built to
highway modern standards- now two highways hugged the
Willamette.8

4.2 History
In winding back the clock to discover the genesis of the
Harbor Drive Freeway, it‟s not necessary to look any
further than the “master builder” Robert Moses. In the
early 40s, the City of Portland invited Moses to lead
guidance in writing the town‟s road construction plan. 2
After a couple months and with the aid of his team, Moses
released his report that included blueprints on what he
thought best for the town in order to thrive in what he saw
as a concrete-laden and sprawling future. Among the roads
and routes drawn in the blueprint and carving up the

During the late 60s and early 70s, Portland was also
fighting urban blight and the barrier between the
downtown and the river in the form of Harbor Drive was
only exacerbating a rough situation. By 1968, in
anticipation of rapid growth and to aid in their bid to host
the 1968 Olympics, Portland and Oregon as a whole
3

Mirk.
The Preservation Institute. (2007). Removing Freeways –
Restoring Cities. Berkeley. Retrieved from
http://preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysHarbor.html
5
Seattle, 6B-1.
6
Congress For the New Urbanism. (2010). Portland’s
Harbor Drive. Retrieved from
http://www.cnu.org/highways/portland
7
Seattle, 6B-1.
8
Preservation.

1

4
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further attempted to bolster their infrastructure 9 . During
coordinated with the consulting firm to research the
this process, the State Department proposed widening the
various Harbor Drive options. 16
existing Harbor Drive expressway from four lanes to six.
The independently contracted consulting firm issued a plan
More politicians and citizens were finding their voices in
that would route existing traffic on two newly designated
10
letting their displeasure of widening the road be heard.
one way streets. Engineers, the citizens, and the Governor
Thus began a long, winding battle for the removal of
were all against this plan, as was Glenn Jackson, who led
Harbor Drive.
the taskforce to adamantly oppose it. 17 A local planner
As a corollary, the 60s were a period of upstart and grass
argued Front Avenue alone could handle a good portion of
roots activism. The young visionaries and generally
the spillover traffic if the lights were improved, a median
younger politicians that were beginning to populate offices
constructed, and better pavement put in place to support
were more prone to hear the citizens‟ voices. In 1968,
additional weight18
groups of citizens began calling for closing down Harbor
Drive and developing the land as a park instead.
Simultaneously, as the state began purchasing land around
Harbor Drive in an effort to expedite the widening process,
a citizen alliance against the expansion found an audience
with the Governor, Mayor, and County Commissioners.11
Then-Governor Tom McCall was the primary proponent of
getting the road removed. These politicians sided with the
alliance as they argued against traffic engineers of the
time, who said that closing the freeway would be a
disaster. In turn, the alliance argued that the overflow
traffic from shutting down the highway would find
spillover lanes or follow I-5 in order to move north and
south within the city.12 By 1969, the governor had formed
a task force to hold public hearings on the future of the
expressway. The task force came up with three options:
1) Widen the lanes from four to six; straighten them.

Figure 4.3: Harbor Drive Freeway prior to closure, 1974.
Source: Portland City Archives

2) Sink the expressway and cover it with parks.
3) Widen the road to six lanes AND relocate it one
block away from the riverfront.

In response to this plan, Governor McCall pushed for the
closing of Harbor Drive altogether so a park could be put
in its place. Traffic engineers remained unconvinced and
fought against the closure of the freeway. 19 To achieve
closure, the Governor and Task Force needed to convince
the City Council that traffic can be safely and efficiently
routed to the surrounding roads and highways. 20 They
recommended closing Harbor Drive upon the completion
of I-405 in 1973 in addition to providing ample notice to
the public of the impending closure, so alternative routes
could be discovered as the most beneficial to the city.21

Nowhere in the options was closing Harbor Drive
considered. 13 Traffic Engineers claimed that the
expressway was essential to the community and must
remain open since a projection at the time showed that
they would have 90,000 trips per day on that span by the
year 1990.14
The chair of the task force, Glenn Jackson, recognizing the
outcry of a public feeling left out, gave his word that the
public‟s input would carry actual weight with the final
decision. He also urged the hiring of an independent
contractor to study the feasibility of removing the
expressway altogether and recommended that the state
work far more closely with the citizens 15. Subsequently, a
committee of citizens was implemented as a result of
Jackson and McCall‟s urging. The citizens‟ committee
held their first meeting two months afterward and

On the day in 1974 Harbor Drive finally closed, traffic
engineers saw not a “ripple” in the traffic patterns that day
as other roads handled spillover and drivers found
manageable alternate routes. 22 Following the removal of
Harbor Drive, there were very few negative impacts. This
was in part due to the existing traffic grid pattern and also
the traffic management of downtown Portland.23 All streets
16
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in the downtown area were converted to one-way streets
and the traffic lights were synced to ensure smooth travel
through the downtown area. As a bonus, the one-way
pattern allows for a better walking and bicycling
environment.24

4.3 Economic Impacts
Prior to the removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway,
Portland was a struggling city that had both mounting
environmental and economic problems. Like many other
cities during that era, Portland was coping with suburban
sprawl and decay of its urban core. The creation of the
Downtown Waterfront Plan and the lack of the support of
the community and politicians for the expansion of the
Harbor Drive Freeway in 1968 led to the removal of the
freeway and the revitalization of the city‟s under-utilitized
and undervalued waterfront property. In 1974, the freeway
was closed completely, and the park that was designed to
replace it was opened in 1978. 25 In 1984, the park was
renamed Tom McCall Waterfront Park, after one if its
staunch supporters. Tom McCall Waterfront Park not only
functions as an accessible and walk-able buffer between
Downtown Portland and the Willamette River, but also as
a catalyst for economic growth and contributed to the
revitalization and resurgence of the city as well.

Figure 4.4: Tom McCall Waterfront Park, 2009.
Source: Event.com

fund large-scale projects through tax-increment financing
(TIFs). Tax-increment financing is a process where
assessed value of real property is frozen within a
designated urban renewal. As the other investors and the
city continue to invest in the area, property values increase.
The increase in property taxes above the frozen amount is
then reinvested into the development. After 20- 25 years,
property taxes are unfrozen, and the city benefits with
massive influx in new property tax revenue. 27

Local support for the use of Tax-Increment Financing
(TIF) to pay for Tom McCall Waterfront Park and the
establishment of the Downtown Waterfront Urban
Renewal Area (DTWF URA) surrounding the park has
perpetuated continuous growth and development in the
area since it was created. The development has lead to a
substantial increase in property tax revenue for the city.
Since its development, roughly 62 development projects
(retail, mixed use housing, office space) have been
successfully implemented. 26 Some of the most profitable
an economically viable of these projects include the
development of the Pioneer Place commercial building,
RiverPlace retail and housing development, and The Yards
at Union Station. Continued interest in development within
the district (Revitalization of Old Town/Chinatown,
Ankeny/Burnside, and the Portland Saturday Market)
illustrates that the land that once was a three-lane highway
and Brownfield site is still thriving.

In the case of the DTWF URA, the use of TIFs has been
quite successful. According to the Portland Development
Commission, property values in the DTWF URA have
increased by 10.4% annually between 1974 and 2008,
from $466 million to roughly $1.6 billion. 28 When the
urban renewal district was first created in mid 1970s, most
of the properties within its boundaries were worth the same
or less than the value of the land. Since 1975 property
values in the area have tripled and as of 2002, the DTWF
URA was growing at a 7% faster rate than the rest of
Portland. 29 Much of the success of the DTWF URA
should be accredited to the vitality and popularity of Tom
McCall Waterfront Park, the first and most important
developments within the boundaries of the urban renewal
district.

Once local leaders decided that they were going to
officially close down the freeway in 1974, the Portland
Development Commission (PDC) officially designated the
area as the Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Area
(DTWF URA). The Portland Development Commission
designated this land as an urban renewal district in order to

27
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Tom McCall Waterfront Park is a 36.59-acre open park
that stretches from RiverPlace to the Steel Bridge that
comprises of 13 tax lots. 30 The park continues to attract
both locals and visitors into Downtown Portland and the
Waterfront. Though much of the economic benefits of
Tom McCall Park are reflected by increased property
values of nearby housing and retail shops, many of the
festivals and the Saturday Market in Ankeny Plaza do
generate a substantial amount of money for the local and
state economy. In 2008, the Oregon Brewers Festival
generated more than $1.5 million dollars for the state of
Oregon.31 In 2010, the Safeway Waterfront Blues Festival
raised roughly $600,000 for the Oregon Food Bank, a
festival record. 32 Tom McCall Waterfront Park is also
home to the famous Portland Saturday Market, which
Figure 4.6: Pioneer Place, 2008.
annually attracts close to 750,000 visitors and generates
Source: Flickr.com User: Yuichir0
33
roughly $8 million. There are also a number of privately
run hotels and restaurants that generate a great deal of
1985 to 1995. 34 After the final phase of the project was
revenue and have high valued property taxes as well.
completed in 1995, the site featured a mix of residential,
retail, and office space, resulting in 480 condos, 6,000
The RiverPlace development project is one of the first
square feet of retail, and 42,000 square feet of office
large scale mixed-use projects in the Downtown
space. 35 Of the total $84.3 million dollar cost, $60.8
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area. Located adjacent to Tom
million dollars were funded through private contributions;
McCall Waterfront Park, Harbor Drive, and River
the PDC funded the rest through TIF money. 36 Of the
Parkway, the RiverPlace development project was initiated
money allocated for this development, more than half went
in the early 1980s and completed over three phases from
towards development of residential housing units and
$33.8 million dollars went into developing adequate
commercial infrastructure. As of 2002, the assessed
value of the RiverPlace is $67 million dollars and has
generated roughly $1.45 million dollars in property
tax revenue. 37 Due to its ideal location near the
Esplanade of Tom McCall Waterfront Park and close
proximity to Downtown, housing occupancy at
RiverPlace is nearly 150% higher than other housing
developments in other parts of the city.38
In 1990, the Pioneer Place office tower and
commercial center was created in the Downtown
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area. The commercial
center comprises of a 16-story office tower that
contains 316,884 square feet of office space, 215,196
square feet of retail space, and an 830 space parking
garage that cost roughly $147 million to build. 39 As of
2002, the assessed value of the property was

Figure 4.5: Annual Revenue generated by Festival/Market
30
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These projects include improvements to Tom
McCall Waterfront Park, the revitalization of
Old Town/ Chinatown, Ankeny/ Burnside, and
the establishment of the permanent Saturday
Market. According to the PDC Waterfront
Development Opportunities Project, there are
13 blocks available for redevelopment, an
estimated $4.5 million in estimated annual tax
revenue, and roughly $200 million in market
value increase as well. 44
The Portland Development Commission has also already
started creating plans for the revitalization of two blocks in
Old Town/ Chinatown as a means of increasing tourism in
the somewhat depressed area. The PDC is also working on
creating a permanent, year around, public market in
Ankeny Square. Based on the financial success of the
existing Saturday Market, this project seems as though it
will be very successful in the near future.

at $70 million and has generated $1.26 million in property
tax revenue. 40 Pioneer Place continues to be one of the
most attractive retail destinations in the city and brings in
visitors from the surrounding local and outside areas.
Pioneer Place is also located in close proximity to the
Pioneer Courthouse Square, a public space that is also the
origin of multiple light rail lines in Downtown Portland.
Development has not been limited to expensive housing
and retail in the DTWF URA. A mixed income, multifamily development designed to accommodate more than
650 residents in heart of the River District Neighborhood,
The Yards at Union Station were completed in two phases
(Phase 1 in 1998 and Phase 2 in 2000) using a variety of
funding sources. The funding sources used to construct the
$50 million project included: Low Income Housing Tax
Credits (LIHTC), developer equity, city funds for public
improvements, PDC Loans, tax abatements, and tax
exempt bond financing from the Oregon Housing
Authority.41
Half of the 158 affordable rental units built during the first
phase of the development were reserved for individuals
earning less than 60% of median income. 42 During the
second phase of development, 56 apartments were for sale
at market value, while 40% of the 321 available for rent
were reserved for individuals earning less than 60% of the
local median income, and another third was designated as
affordable housing.43 The development is one of the first
housing projects in the River District (adjacent to the
DTWF URA). The Yards requires only .75 parking spaces
per unit as a means of minimizing congestion of
automobiles and increase in public transit with its close
proximity to the light rail.

Figure 4.7: The Yards at Union Station.
Source: www.realasave.com

All in all, the tearing down of the Harbor Drive Freeway
has created a plethora of economic opportunities for the
Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Area and the city
of Portland. The removal of the freeway not only was
historically significant for anti-freeway activists, but also
was a huge catalyst for economic development and
sustainability for the city Portland as well.

These large-scale developments projects have had
significant economic impact on Portland in the area near
the former Harbor Drive Freeway. The Portland
Development Commission is currently working on several
other large-scale projects that will have a positive impact
on the local economy vitality of Downtown Portland.
40
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9.6% reduction in trips goes a long ways in lessening the
4.4 Environment
effects of these ailments.
In the 70s, before Harbor Drive closed, the road still
Additionally, Portland has seen a 65% decrease in crime in
averaged around 24,000 vehicles per day. At a total
the area surrounding the former freeway as compared to
distance of three miles, that is roughly 72,000 vehicle
just a 16% drop for the rest of the city (Seattle Urban
miles daily on the Harbor Drive Freeway. 45 Based on
Mobility Plan). Factor that into the overall improvement in
today‟s emission standards at .0465 mile per gallon, that
quality of life, increase in nearby property values, and
was about 3,348 gallons used on that stretch alone every
generally healthy growth in the area, and it proves to be a
day.46 For CO2, at 72,000 total miles per day and at .916
generally healthy environment.
pounds emitted for every mile, that is an estimated 65,952
pounds a day.

4.5 Travel Patterns

Similarly, if the Portland traffic engineers‟ estimates held
true from 1969, and there really did end up being 90,000
vehicles per day in 1990, then the above numbers increase
greatly. 47 The gallons burned would reside at 12,555
gallons per day, and the CO2 emissions increase to
247,320 pounds coughed up daily.

Despite skepticism by transportation experts and civil
engineers, the removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway in
1974 has had minimal negative impacts on travel patterns
throughout the city of Portland. The creative urban design
of downtown streets, the successful diversion of traffic to
alternative freeways, bridges and roadways, and the
development of an extensive intermodal public transit
system have contributed to the alleviation of congestion,
environmental degradation, and automobile dependency
surrounding the former Harbor Drive Freeway and
throughout the rest of the city as well.

Roughly 12,839 days have passed since Harbor Drive
became a park and in that amount of time, had numbers
remained unchanged since 1970 and if all cars previously
driving that route were to continue driving that exact route,
42,984,972 gallons of fuel would have been spent in total.
Furthermore, an additional 846,757,728 pounds of CO2
would have been released into the air.

As has been stated above, city planners and traffic
specialists understood that they needed to redesign the
street grid pattern in Downtown Portland in order to
accommodate more automobiles after the Harbor Drive
Freeway was closed. To alleviate some of the hysteria and
frenzy caused by this removal, civic leaders gave proper
notice of the road closure to Portland residents. Certain
modifications were made to street grid patterns in the
Downtown District as well. Planners redesigned the streets
to be one-way, altered traffic signals to allow for more
fluid flow of traffic, and speed limits were reduced as a
means of increasing safety for pedestrians and bicyclists.51
The development of the Naito Parkway along the Tom
McCall Waterfront Park served as a wide boulevard that
provided as an adequate replacement for the Harbor Drive
Freeway to drivers for whom this route was unavoidable.

However, things did not remain constant as The Harbor
Drive Freeway was torn down in Portland. Robert Cervero
found before and after comparisons for Harbor Drive
showing 9.6% fewer vehicle trips on surrounding roads. 48
Based on the above numbers, that significantly decreases
them both. It also suggests that by removing the road and
thereby reducing the number of trips, that the removal of
the expressway was an overall better and healthier
alternative than keeping it.
Reducing roadway capacity reduces the overall number of
auto trips. While that sounds somewhat commonsense, the
benefits derived from this reduction are not. These benefits
include “decreased energy usage and carbon emissions;
improved air quality and [overall] public health; increased
safety for motorists…; and a reduction in fumes and noise
pollution.” 49 In fact, ozone and particulate matter
stemming from exhaust have both been connected to lung
development issues and asthma within children. 50 The

The Harbor Drive Freeway was eventually closed when
the construction of the Fremont Bridge had been
completed which connected I-405 to I-5. There was a
substantial increase in the number of drivers on I-5 and I405, but some of the congestion was minimized by the
development of the Fremont Bridge. The creation of the
bridge improved the connectivity between the two major
freeways. A change in attitude by residents and civic
leaders against freeways also contributed to minimal
growth in congestion on existing freeways of the time.
Anti-freeway activists were gaining support of Portland
citizens, which could have contributed to less congested
freeways.
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Figure 4.8: Map of Tri-Met MAX Light Rail Lines.
Source: http://trimet.org/maps/railsystem.htm

MAX line stations as well. Individuals living near the
Waterfront and downtown have plenty of access to all
modes of the Tri-Met network. 54 Congestion and
overcrowding on other major highways and the grid-street
pattern near the site of the former Harbor Drive Freeway
has been greatly avoided, due to high ridership rates on the
MAX and other Tri-Met transit systems.

The most significant change in travel patterns that has
occurred since the removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway is
the massive increase in the number of commuters choosing
to use public transit services rather than drive private
automobiles. The development of Portland‟s sophisticated
transit system, Tri-Met, has caused gradual decline in
automobile trips near the former Harbor Drive Freeway
and throughout the entire Metro region as well. Many of
the citizens, whom advocated for the removal of the
Harbor Drive Freeway, were in favor of minimizing the
environmental impacts of the automobile, increasing
pedestrian mobility, and investment in adequate public
transit. Citizens were able to divert funds allocated for
other highway projects in Portland and to create the cities
first light-rail line. Since the 1980s, four different lines
have been built with 85 total miles and as of 2008, serving
roughly 118,200 riders per day on all lines. 52

4.6 Community Impacts
Looking at community impacts from the removal of
Harbor Drive Freeway, one sees that the few that have
lasted are largely positive. As opposed to other highway
deconstructions that have taken place around the country,
the Harbor Drive Freeway was not taken down because of
safety concerns or an estimated high cost of expansion
versus demolition. Interests to the public and making
downtown Portland a more inviting place for all people
directly fueled this project.

Affordable fares, efficient service, and easy access to
multiple lines from various locations have perpetuated
continued growth of ridership in all areas of the city,
especially in the
Waterfront
and
Downtown
neighborhoods. The Red and Blue MAX lines run near the
former Harbor Drive Freeway, and most likely function as
alternative transit for those who would have utilized the
Harbor Drive Freeway if was still in existence. In 2008,
21.91 million riders used the MAX Blue line (average
60,027 per day), while the Red Line saw 8.83 million trips
(roughly 24,191 per day). 53 Less than half a mile from
Tom McCall Waterfront Park (former site of the Harbor
Drive Freeway) is several Green, Yellow, Blue and Red

In terms of negative impacts, there were more present
when the highway was still in operation than after it had
closed. For one, the I-405 Freeway, which ran around the
downtown, was not easily accessible to trucks heading to
the industrial district in Northwest Portland resulting in
them using Harbor Drive.55 As result of this, truckers were
one of the voices in the community speaking up against the
removal of the freeway according to former chair of the
Portland Development Commission Elaine Cogan, “The
only people who really objected were the truckers, because
they said, „We can't get to North Portland.‟ And that's how
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For People, was instrumental in getting the community
I-405 came about. That was a way of saying, „Okay, we'll
voice heard in the process, by their peaceful picnics in the
give you another route.‟”56
area where the freeway was to be expanded. 62 These
This freight corridor clearly made for a very unfriendly
helped to encourage the governor to schedule a public
environment for pedestrians and bicyclists to try and
hearing on the expansion project.63 The resulting hearing
negotiate with, only to get to the small existing waterfront
featured an outpouring of community voices both against
park. A 1969 report by the Portland City Club stated:
existing proposals for the freeway and in favor of
eliminating the route altogether.64
The present combination of Harbor Drive and
Front Avenue along the river leaves only a narrow
One positive impact the community saw was a new sense
green strip and islands of grass and trees, which
of empowerment against the current model of highway
are more pleasant for the passing motorist than
expansion. The same year that the Harbor Drive Freeway
asphalt paving, but do nothing to attract people to
was closed, residents won a lawsuit effectively killing the
the area. Pedestrian access across Front Avenue is
Mount Hood Freeway from continuing to develop and
so difficult and the fast traffic on Harbor Drive is
instead the city used federal money to develop its light rail
so dangerous that little use is made of the area
system. As Gregory Thompson identified, it was a crucial
except when the fleet is in during the annual Rose
victory for the city in, “regaining control over the design of
57
Festival and policemen supervise traffic.
its transportation system from technocrats in the state
capital and in DC.” 65
The other leading group against the removal was the local
traffic engineers. The engineers, led by Don Bergstrom,
justified the need to expand the freeway by citing the
projection of 90,000 trips a day by 1990 and that closing it
would cause massive traffic congestion as mentioned
above.58A critic of this viewpoint, however, was Richard
Ivey (director of the downtown plan partnership for
engineering firm CH2M) who predicted, “If you let people
know well ahead of time that you're going to close Harbor
Drive, people who use it now will use I-405 which is
under-used right now, some of them will cross the river
and take both bridges because they're headed for the
Northwest district to go to work. The river is a
psychological barrier, but the fact is that the distance
involved isn't much more.”59 This did prove to be the case
Figure 4.9: Free Community Bike repair station, Tom McCall
as roads and bridges around the freeway saw a reduction of
60
Waterfront Park, 2010. Source: Author.
9.6% after the closure.
Residents and local businesses were largely in favor of the
removal of the freeway both because of the proposed
increased access to the waterfront, and the parallel I-5 on
the other side of the river. 61 A public interest group
founded by community activists and architects, Riverfront

The single loudest voice for removal as well as community
involvement was Oregon‟s Governor at the time, Tom
McCall. McCall who, was an environmentalist and created
a documentary prior to taking office about the Willamette
River (Disaster in Paradise), pushed for the removal of the
freeway and increased waterfront access, largely to benefit
the public. At a meeting in October of 1968, he stated,
“We cannot afford to spawn, through inattention and
inaction, a sort of a Berlin Wall of layer upon layer of
cement and high- speed traffic which would bar our
citizens from what should and must be one of the most
attractive, livable and useful sections of the core city.” 66
Former Oregon Land Conservation and Development
Commission Director Arnold Cogan remembered,
“[Governor McCall] didn't have a specific idea of what it
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should be, he just knew that Harbor Drive shouldn't be
there, and that it ought to be an open green space.”67
One of the biggest impacts on the community is what sits
in the footprint of the former freeway. A report issued in
1969 outlined the final project should, “be varied so as to
provide for and encourage activities at all seasons of the
year and over a large number of hours of the day […] Easy
and attractive access to the river itself should be provided
to pedestrians for scenic and recreational purposes.”68
Today the 36.59-acre Tom McCall Waterfront Park and
greenway allows visitors and residents alike to take
advantage of views of the Willamette River and
recreational opportunities. Among its ample bicycle and
pedestrian paths and green space, the park hosts many
different festivals and public events. It is home to the
Portland Saturday Market, which moved to its current
location in 1976, and is open every weekend from March
through December earning it the title of, “Largest
continually operating outdoor arts and crafts market in the
nation.” 69 The park also served as a campaign rally for
President Obama in May of 2008, hosting 75,000 people
including some in kayaks watching from the river, a task
that could never have happened were the freeway still in
use.

Figure 4.10: Portland, OR with former site of Harbor Drive
Freeway at center of image, 2003.
Source: Portland Development Commission.

4.7 Conclusion
The removal of the Harbor Drive Freeway was in the best
interest of the environment, the public, and future growth
of Portland. Like many other things that Portland has done
and continues to do, this project has served as a model in
city planning both nationally and internationally with cities
as far away as Seoul, South Korea following suite. When
Robert Moses came to Portland after World War II, he
suggested two things: create massive parks and a
sprawling concrete highway system. As history has shown,
Portland made the correct choice in which of the two
directions to follow, and in turn end up leading the rest of
the world.
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A-28

Appendix A: Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway

4.8 Works Cited
Arambula, Crandall. Tax Increment Financing: Revitalizing Cities. Crandall Arambula. Retrieved from http://www.cacity.com/images/news/pdfs/Tax%20Increment%20Financing.pdf
Baldwin, Bob interview with Ernie Bonner, December 1994, http://www.pdx.edu/usp/planpdxorg-interview-robert-baldwin
Bonner, Ernie. Riverfront for People. PlanPDX.org. Retrieved from http://www.pdx.edu/usp/planpdxorg- riverfront-people
Buntin, Simmons B. (2005) Unsprawl Case Study: Portland's RiverPlace. Terrain.org, 2005. Retrieved from
http://www.terrain.org/unsprawl/7/
Cervero, R. (2006). Proceedings from the International Symposium for the 1 st Anniversary of the Cheonggyecheon
Restoration: Freeway Deconstruction and Urban Regeneration in the United States. Seoul, Korea.
Cogan, Arnold interview with Ernie Bonner, December 10, 1999. Retrieved from http://www.pdx.edu/usp/planpdxorginterview-arnold-cogan
Cogan, Elaine interview with Ernie Bonner, December 18, 2002, http://www.pdx.edu/usp/planpdxorg-interview-elaine-cogan
Congress For the New Urbanism. (2010). Portland’s Harbor Drive. Retrieved from http://www.cnu.org/highways/portland
Handy, S. (2006). The Road Less Driven. Journal of the American Planning Association, 274-278).
Ivey, Dick interview with Ernie Bonner, (1995). Retrieved from http://www.pdx.edu/usp/planpdxorg-interview-richard-ivey
Lewis, Bowers, and Amy Dowell. PDC Waterfront Opportunities Project. Rep. Emmons Architects.
Mirk, S. (2009, September 24). The Dead Freeway Society: The Strange History of Portland‟s Unbuilt Roads. The Portland
Mercury
Oregon Uncovered Portland Saturday Market. World News. Retrieved from http://wn.com/Portland_Saturday_Market/
Portland City Club. (1969). Interim Report on Journal Building Site Use and Riverfront Development. Portland, OR: Special
Committee, David J. Lewis (Chair). Retrieved from
http://www.pdxcityclub.org/system/files/reports/Building_Development_1969.pdf
Portland Development Commission. (2010) Downtown Waterfront Home. Portland Development Commission. Retrieved from
http://www.pdc.us/ura/dtwf/dtwf.asp
Portland Development Commission. (2010) Downtown Waterfront Projects Map. Portland Development Commission.
Retrieved from http://www.pdc.us/pdf/maps/dtwf/dtwf-ura-projects-map.pdf/
Portland Development Commission. River District: The Yards at Union Station. Portland Development Commission.
Retrieved from http://www.pdc.us/pdf/dev_serv/pubs/dev_proj_fs_yards.pdf
Portland Development Commission. Pioneer Place: Phase 1. Portland Development Commission. Retrieved from
http://www.pdc.us/pdf/dev_serv/pubs/pioneerplace-casestudy.pdf
Portland Development Commission. RiverPlace: At A Glance Portland Development Commission. Retrieved from
http://www.pdc.us/pdf/dev_serv/pubs/riverplace-casestudy.pdf
Portland Parks and Recreation. (2002) Waterfront Master Plan. Portland: City of Portland. Retrieved from
http://www.portlandonline.com/parks/finder/index.cfm?action=ViewFile&PolPdfsID=328&/Waterfront%20Park%20Master%
20Plan.pdf
Portland Saturday Market. (2010). About the Saturday Market. Retrieved from
http://www.portlandsaturdaymarket.com/index.htm.
Portlandbeer.org. (2008, August 2). Oregon Brewers Festival Bucks the Economic Downturn, Celebrates Banner Year with
Record Attendance and Sales. PortlandBeer.org. Retrieved from http://www.portlandbeer.org/blog/tag/press-release/page/2/
Preservation Institute, The. (2007). Removing Freeways – Restoring Cities. Berkeley. Retrieved from
http://preservenet.com/freeways/FreewaysHarbor.html
Redden, Jim. (2008, July 12). Tri- Met Ridership Sets New Records. Portland Tribune. Retrieved from
http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=121581282918348800
Rohter, Larry and Julie Bosman. (2008, May 19). Obama Draws Huge Crowd in Oregon as Clinton Courts Kentucky. The New
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com
A-29

Appendix A: Portland: Harbor Drive Freeway
Seattle Department of Transportation. (2008). Seattle Urban Mobility Plan: Case Studies in Urban Freeway Removal. City of
Seattle. (6B-1). Retrieved from
http://www.cityofseattle.net/transportation/docs/ump/06%20SEATTLE%20Case%20studies%20in%20urban%20freeway%20r
emoval.pdf
Thompson, Gregory L. (2007). Taming the Neighborhood Revolution: Planners, Power Brokers, and the Birth of
Neotraditionalism in Portland, Oregon. Journal of Planning History. 2007 6: 214. doi: 10.1177/1538513206297457
\

Tri-Met. About Tri-Met, History of Max Lines. Tri-Met. Retrieved from http://trimet.org/about/history/index.htm

Tri-Met. Stops and Stations. Tri-Met. Retrieved from http://trimet.org/go/cgi-bin/cstops.pl
White, Ryan. "Waterfront Blues Festival Day 4: Is the Blues Dead, or Has It Moved to Sweden?" The Oregonian.
OregonLive.com, 6 July 2010. Web.
http://www.oregonlive.com/music/index.ssf/2010/07/waterfront_blues_festival_day_3.html
US EPA. (2000). Emission Facts: Average Annual Emissions and Fuel Consumption for Passenger Cars and Light Trucks

A-30

Appendix A: San Francisco: Central Freeway

5 San Francisco: Central Freeway
5.1 History
California's Division of Highways decided that San
Francisco needed highway connections both outside of the
city and also routes throughout the city. By 1945, the state
had laid out a plan of freeways. However, as plans were
made and construction started, the ugliness of the plan
became clear. Citizens soon saw the demise of dense
residential neighborhoods.
One of these routes - the Central Freeway - was planned to
bring about a web of freeways within the city. The original
plan for the freeway was broken up into two parts. One
part would go past the Civic Center and continue through
the city and connect to the Golden Gate Bridge. The
second part would go half-way through Golden Gate Park
and also end by connecting to the Golden Gate Bridge
(Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Map of San Francisco showing Civic Center,
Golden Gate Bridge, Golden Gate Park, I-80, Market, Fell,
and Oak Streets

Valley neighborhood. When the project was stopped,
ramps connected to Fell and Oak Streets (Figure 5.1). It
was a one way route but helped move traffic effectively.

Construction began in the 1950s, and the first phase of the
Central Freeway opened in 1959. At first, the only part that
was built was a freeway spur to the west of San
Francisco‟s Civic Center. The double-deck concrete
structure demolished a wide right-of-way through houses
along Division and Octavia Boulevards (Figure 5.2). Over
the next five years, other neighborhood groups realized
that the same thing was planned for their neighborhoods,
and they revolted, otherwise known as the San Francisco
Freeway revolt (Big Disasters, 2001).

In the early part of 1960, the freeway planners tried
resurrecting the freeway that would go through Gold Gate
Park through a place called the Panhandle. In 1964, Sue
Bierman organized a campaign against this proposed plan.
Politicians ignored this initially, but not after they noticed
that voters were becoming influenced. Mayor Shelley was
a firm supporter of the freeway because its construction
created jobs. However, the day before the vote, Bierman
was walking in Golden Gate Park with Supervisor Jack
Morrison, who was planning to vote for the freeway
project, though he was known as an anti-growth activist.
As they walked, she pointed out the trees that would be
removed in order to build the freeway. Morrison was quiet
for a long time, and then he made the decision to vote
against the freeway (Preservation Institute, 2007). If it had
not been for his last minute change of heart, the freeway
would probably have been built.
In 1989, while millions watched the World Series that was
being held in San Francisco, the Loma Prieta earthquake
damaged the northern portion of the Central Freeway so
badly that experts said it could not be rebuilt (Preservation
Institute, 2007). It was removed in 1992, and the Board of
Supervisors voted to ban any new freeways north of
Market Street (Figure 5.3). This ban made it impossible to
replace any part of the Central Freeway, and the area
would now be used for housing. There was a remaining
stretch of freeway north of Market Street that ran above
Octavia Street. In 1995, the city task force suggested the
freeway should be replaced by a surface boulevard, named
Octavia Boulevard. This would help local traffic to move
quicker.

Figure 5.2: The southern portion of the Central Freeway
loomed over Octavia Street.

In 1959, due to this revolt and city-wide protests to protect
cherished neighborhoods, city‟s supervisors voted to kill
seven of the ten planned freeway projects in the 1951 plan.
Thirty thousand residents signed a petition to shut down
the construction (Big Disasters, 2001). Their voices were
heard; construction stopped. This left the freeway
incomplete. The portion of the Central Freeway continuing
up Van Ness to the Golden Gate Bridge was halted, as
were plans to build several other cross-town routes. It went
from I-80 across Market Street and through the Hayes

The State of Department of Transportation decided that
this freeway was worth saving. The freeway was reopened
to traffic and plans were made to demolish its upper deck
and provide growth to the lower deck. In the fall of 1996,
they began demolishing the upper deck.
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instead, a route would be built through a light-industrial
district south of Market Street. Once the plan had been
developed to remove certain parts, they now faced the task
of removing the lower part of the Central Freeway.
The proposed boulevard was designed by a team led by
Allan Jacobs, formerly San Francisco Planning Director

Figure 5.3: Demolishing San Francisco's Central Freeway
(Preservation Institute, 2007)

Figure 5.4: Central Freeway (south of Market Street)
leading to Octavia Boulevard

Meanwhile, Patricia Walkup and Robin Leavitt were
leaders of the movement for highway removal. They
wanted to replace the freeway with Octavia Boulevard.
Mayor Willie Brown was in favor of this plan but residents
of the western part of San Francisco wanted the freeway
rebuilt for their benefit. In 1997, Mayor Brown was
convinced by his western San Francisco constituents to
reopen the lower deck of the freeway to traffic. He
eventually withdrew his support for the Octavia Boulevard
plan. The plan to rebuild passed, and designs for the new
freeway began to be created. However, in 1998, the
opponents of the freeway, led by Walkup and Leavitt,
rallied supporters and placed the issue on the ballot once
again. This time, the removal of the freeway was settled in
favor of the freeway opponents (Preservation Institute,
2007). Debate went back and forth about which parts of
the freeway should be demolished. Environmentalists
wanted to demolish the southern part, and there was
additional pressure to keep the freeway overpass over
Market Street, which would allow it to connect with
Octavia Boulevard. Finally, an agreement was reached in
which there would be no overpass over Market Street, but

and a professor at UC Berkeley (Preservation Institute,
2007). The boulevard would be one hundred thirty-three
feet wide with four lanes for traffic, a grassy median, and
two bicycle and pedestrian lanes. Buffers would be made
to make the road less noisy for nearby residents. The San
Francisco Planning Department developed a plan for
transit and a new park near the end of the freeway. The
center lanes towards the end were not needed so they have
been replaced by a park and playground. The final stretch
of the Central Freeway was removed in 2003 almost
fourteen years after the Loma Prieta earthquake (Figure
5.3). Octavia Boulevard was finally completed in 2005.
The Central Freeway south of Market was completed in
2006 (Figure 5.4).
The area brought about great economic opportunities.
Interesting restaurants and shops began to appear on Hayes
Street and attract people who worked in the Civic Center.
In June 2006, the Octavia Boulevard was given the
Freeway Project of the Year award by the California
Transportation Foundation. The park at the end of the

Figure 5.5: A timeline of historical Central Freeway events (http://www.sfcta.org/content/view/655/431)
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freeway was named after activist Patricia Walkup who
died just a few days after the project completion.
The San Francisco Freeways were failures in planning,
engineering, and design. The plans failed because they did
not take into account the new problems they might create.
There was no consideration to integrate freeway traffic or
to build a transit system that might better fit in with the
areas. It all resulted in huge costs to the city in depressed
land values, increases in crime, and urban decay (Big
Disasters, 2001).
The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake began a transformation
that lead to the opening of the Octavia Boulevard/Central
Freeway in 2005 and the adoption of the Market and
Octavia Better Neighborhood Plan in 2008. The Octavia
Boulevard project redefined traffic engineering planning
with sensitive solutions. The Octavia Boulevard project
provides neighborhood access to a regional freeway while
providing an attractive public space. A timeline of key
Central Freeway/Octavia Boulevard events is shown here
(Figure 5.5).

Figure 5.6: The northern stub of the Central Freeway
before highway removal.

5.2 Community Impacts
As previously stated, the San Francisco Freeway system
was a failure. Planners and state officials did not consider
the problems a freeway system would create. There should
have been more consideration to build a transit system that
benefits the whole San Francisco community. Negative
impacts arose for several neighborhoods that the Central
Freeway passed through. The freeways lead to an increase
in neighborhood crimes, urban decay, and depressed land
values in the communities of Hayes Valley and Market and
Octavia Streets. However, since the removal of the Central
Freeway, these areas have rebounded and are continuing to
prosper.

Figure 5.7: The northern stub of Octavia Boulevard
after highway removal.

helped pave the way for a reform in the way people view
urbanization. Cities and communities, like San Francisco‟s
Hayes Valley Neighborhood, that have opted to build atsurface boulevards in the place of freeways have
experienced a transformation or “renaissance” for the
better. Figure 5.7 is an after-shot of the northern end.
According to Marnie Hunter of CNN, the Hayes Valley
neighborhood was “crime plagued” before the Loma Prieta
Earthquake damaged the freeway overpass in 1989
(Hunter, 2007). Home to prostitutes and drug dealers,
Hayes Valley was a place to avoid. After the Loma Prieta,
the city put in a tree-lined boulevard instead of rebuilding
the freeway. Hayes Valley is now filled with “stylish
shops, restaurants, and galleries” (see Figure 5.8).
Businesses have been continually moving into the
neighborhood‟s “colorful storefronts” and Victorian
buildings, helping to drive out the crime of the past.

The destruction of the freeway made city officials look at
several issues and options for the new transit system.
First, did San Francisco want to build new facilities,
seismically retrofit existing facilities, or replace structures
with slower moving at-grade facilities? Second, while
fixing the transit system, did the city want to open up
access to waterfronts, remove physical obstructions, and
redevelop economically stagnant neighborhoods? City
officials listened to their citizens. Officials elected to build
a new surface level transit system that will lead eventually
to the redevelopment and betterment of crime-ridden
and/or economically depressed neighborhoods. San
Francisco communities such as Hayes Valley and the
Market/Octavia neighborhoods have prospered since the
freeway was removed.

The demolition of the Central Freeway supported the
development of the Market & Octavia Plan. The Market &
Octavia Plan is a comprehensive land use and
transportation strategy for almost 400 acres of the San
Francisco community and Hayes Valley area. Planning
professors Allan Jacobs and Elizabeth Macdonald from the
University of California, Berkeley, designed the Octavia
Boulevard to meet the needs of the local community‟s
traffic (Blackwell, 2006). Figure 5.9 shows the Octavia
Boulevard design plan. The affected area begins at Market
Street, stretching nine blocks till Hayes Street.

San Francisco tore down several miles of the Central
Freeway. Figure 5.6 shows the northern stub of the Central
Freeway before removal. Central Freeway was replaced
with a beautifully landscaped boulevard, a new and
improved transit system, bikeway and pedestrian facilities,
as well as new public community areas. San Francisco
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Figure 5.8: Photo by Ingrid Taylar © 2007. Hayes Street is the
main artery of Hayes Valley – a neighborhood that until the late
80s suffered for a noisy freeway ramp and a reputation for crime
and drug-related problems (about.com).

Another important point is the creation of many new
public spaces and public parks for citizens to use. For
example, revenues from the sales of the freeway‟s parcels
were used to fund construction of a 16,500 square foot
park (City of Seattle, 2008). This 16,500 square foot park
is otherwise known as Patricia‟s Green, named after
community activist Patricia Walkup. Patricia‟s Green is
located at the intersection of Octavia Boulevard and Hayes
Street‟s retail strip. A second example of more public
green space includes Octavia Boulevard itself. The
boulevard was designed as somewhat of “linear park.”
The street is lined with sidewalk cafes, shops, and
beautifully landscaped green space for citizens and visitors
to enjoy.

Census Tract 168 where contains Octavia Boulevard,
formerly the elevated Central Freeway. From 1990 to
2000, the percentage of vacant housing units in the area
has decreased by 58%.
Since the removal of Central Freeway, the Market &
Octavia neighborhood has gone through a complete
transformation like the Hayes Valley neighborhood.
Houses and condos in the area were renovated and
upgraded. Vacant land and blighted buildings were
purchased and developed for residential and commercial
purposes.
The transformation of Hayes Valley into a hip, stylish area
has also helped to increase real estate prices in Hayes
Valley and in San Francisco. From 1996 to 2006, the
average sales price of a Hayes Valley condo nearly
quadrupled. The average sales price of a Hayes Valley
condo rose over half a million dollars, from $203,000 to
$760,000 (City of Seattle, 2008). Hayes Valley‟s average
condo prices were 66% of the average for all of San
Francisco in 1996. By 2006, average condo prices
increased to 91%.

5.3 Economic Impacts
Demolition of the Central Freeway presented substantial
redevelopment opportunities. Seven acres of land
contained 22 parcels. The city‟s General Plan and the
Better Neighborhood Plan for the Market and Octavia
Neighborhood indicate that approximately half of the
parcels were used for affordable and senior housing (SF
Planning Dept, 2008). The other parcels were sold by the
city to private developers for high density mixed use
projects (Ocuillbo, 2007). The City of San Francisco made
around $35 million from the sales of the old Central
Freeway land lots to make investment on transportation
and affordable housing (Wang, 2009).
Two adjacent parcels around the Hayes Valley intersection
were transformed into a creative compound, including
restaurants and galleries. Table 5.1 compares the occupied
and vacant numbers of housing units in 1990 and 2000 in
Table 5.1: Occupancy Status
Year 1990
Year 2000
Tract 168.98, San
Census Tract 168,
Francisco County,
San Francisco
California
County, California
Occupied 3030
3194
Vacant
285
119
Total
3315
3313
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000 Census
of Population and Housing

Figure 5.9: Design Plan for the Octavia Boulevard
(www.octaviacentral.org)

Figure 5.10: Twenty-two parcels were available for
redevelopment along Octavia Boulevard
(http://www.socketsite.com/archives/Octavia%20Parcels.jpg)
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5.4 Environment and Travel
Behavior
Urban designer Elizabeth Macdonald (2006, P6)
writes about the possible traffic impacts of
boulevards that replace freeways, “Focusing on
every potential traffic conflict or possible baddriver behavior and trying to solve each by adding
greater lane widths, wider turn radii, great tree
setbacks, or more movement restrictions is a
misapprehension of the complex manner in which
good boulevards operate.” Yes, the removal of the
freeways would reduce the capacity of the roadway
in the short term. However, studies found that
traffic and congestion was diverted and spread
more evenly throughout other roadways. Yes, the
traffic congestion and car-pedestrian accident
levels may increase. This will most likely happen,
since Octavia Boulevard was designed to be bike
and pedestrian friendly. So, since the removal of
the Central Freeway, how did commuters respond
to the changes?
Did motorists switch to
carpooling, bicycling, or walking? Or maybe they
choose not to make their commute anymore?

Table 5.2: Commuting Characteristics by Sex in Census Tract 168
Subject
Total
Male
Female
Workers 16 years and over
4,230
2,497
1,733
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO
WORK
Car, truck, or van
25.7%
29.6% 20.0%
Drove alone
21.7%
26.2% 15.2%
Carpooled
3.9%
3.4%
4.7%
Workers per car, truck, or van
1.1
1.06
1.21
Public transportation (excluding taxicab)
47.0%
43.1% 52.6%
Walked
9.8%
8.3%
11.9%
Bicycle
6.7%
6.7%
6.6%
Taxicab, motorcycle, or other means
1.5%
1.8%
0.9%
Worked at home
9.4%
10.4% 8.0%
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009

Table 5.3: Commuting Characteristics by Sex in San Francisco
Subject
Total
Male
Female
Workers 16 years and over
431,900 233,992 197,908
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO
WORK
Car, truck, or van
46.7%
48.2%
45.1%
Drove alone
38.9%
40.4%
37.0%
Carpooled
7.9%
7.7%
8.0%
According to Billheimer, etc. (1998), a 1996 travel
Workers
per
car,
truck,
or
van
32.4%
29.8%
35.5%
behavior survey shows 76% of the 8,000 drivers
Public
transportation
(excluding
taxicab)
9.6%
9.6%
9.6%
who previously used the freeway had shifted their
Walked
2.6%
3.2%
2.0%
commute to another freeway, while 11% used city
Bicycle
1.9%
2.4%
1.3%
streets for their entire trips, 2.2% switched to
public transit, and 2.8% said they no longer made
Taxicab, motorcycle, or other means
6.7%
6.8%
6.5%
the trip previously made on the freeway. The
Worked at home
431,900 233,992 197,908
survey also revealed that nearly 20% of the survey
Source: American Community Survey, 2005-2009
takers made fewer trips since the freeway closure
at the local and national level, including an award from the
(Figure 5.11). There is no evidence that closing of the
American Planning Association. The boulevard begins on
Central Freeway had any significant impact on carpooling
the north side of Market Street, across from broad ramps
propensities in the Area.
leading to and from Highway 101. The Octavia Boulevard
which replaced the elevated Central Freeway is not perfect,
With the completion of Octavia Boulevard in 2005, the
but it keeps cars moving while making the surrounding
residents‟ travel behaviors changed. San Francisco's
neighborhood a better place for people (King, 2007). The
Octavia Boulevard is a four-block-long multi-way
old ramps of Central Freeway carried about 90,000 cars a
boulevard. It has narrow one-way access roadways on each
day, and the new Octavia Boulevard has the similar use,
side for slower traffic and parking, and finally, at the
while the design of the Octavia Boulevard roadway is to
edges, tree-lined sidewalks. Although only a few miles
disperse traffic. People will have more choices (Gordon,
long, Octavia Boulevard is the first true multi-way
2005).
boulevard built in the United States since about the 1920s
(Macdonald, 2006). Octavia Boulevard has been honored

From the 5-year estimates of the 2005-2009 American
Community Survey, there are 47% residents in Census
Tract 168 area choose public transportation for the means
of transportation to work, and 16.5 % walk or ride a
bicycle to work. Only 26% residents drive to work (Table
5.2). Compared to the citywide average of 33% taking
buses plus 12% walking or bicycling, the percentage of
people transit to work in this area is high (Table 5.3).

Figure 5.11: Source of traffic shifts following removal of San
Francisco’s Central Freeway, Cervero, R. (2006)
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removal have greatly outweighed the negative impacts.
5.5 Conclusion
Benefits of the Central Freeway‟s removal include a
decrease in crime, an increase in the average sales price of
By removing the Central Freeway, the city of San
real estate, an increase in public green space, and a
Francisco showed its commitment to community,
greener, more sustainable transportation system. San
economic, and environmental sustainability, while setting
Francisco was able to improve its citizens‟ quality of life,
an example for other cities to follow. Removal of the
without significantly sacrificing the city‟s transportation
Central Freeway presented the world with a new form of
performance.
urban reprioritization. The benefits of the freeway‟s
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6 San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway
6.1 Introduction and History
In 1991, the City of San Francisco demolished a 1.2 mile
stretch of elevated expressway. The Embarcadero Freeway
had a distinctive past and was the object of much disgust
over its 32 year lifetime. Its past, its removal, and the
impacts of that removal are the subjects of this case study.
With the removal of the Embarcadero Expressway, the city
reclaimed its downtown waterfront. The city experienced
real estate price increases, residential communities created,
the rejuvenated connectivity of its downtown‟s to the
water, environmental protection, increased accessibility to
transit opportunities, and various positive economic
impacts.

Figure 6.2: Freeway protestors in 1964. (Source: Carlsson)

During the post-war era, the expansion of interstate and
expressway infrastructure around the country helped the
automobile become the dominant mode of travel in the
United States. In San Francisco, City Supervisor Leo
McCarthy recalled that “the momentum behind freeway
construction was extraordinary … The Federal
Transportation Department and the California Department
of Transportation had the kind of power that comes with
having hundreds of millions of dollars to spend annually”
(McCarthy, 1996). The interstate system was making
efficient and cost-effective automobile travel between
cities a reality. However, the system originally designed to
create high-speed transport infrastructure in between cities
had subtly and significantly morphed into high-speed
transport infrastructure inside cities.

plan to crisscross San Francisco with a network of
freeways (see Figure 6.1). Implementation of this plan
began with two north/south highway corridors traversing
underutilized industrial land south of the city. Eventually
the construction of these highways reached more
residential areas where the community, local newspaper,
and several elected officials revolted against this attempted
destruction of their neighborhoods.
One highway in particular, the Embarcadero Freeway
(labeled Interstate-480 in those 1948 plans) was originally
intended to connect the Bay Bridge and the Golden Gate
Bridge (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008;
Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007). However, with the vocal
uproar of citizens and the assistance of several city
supervisors, the city was able to wield one of its few
powers against the ongoing process of freeway
construction - it had to give permission for the federal and
state construction to cross city streets (McCarthy, 1996).
With a 1.2 mile stretch was completed in 1959, the rest of
the project was canceled, along with 7 other freeways in
the 1948 plan (The Preservation Institute, n.d.). By halting
the Embarcadero Expressway completion, the city
forfeited $280 million in Federal funds (National Research
Council, 1980, p. 103). The completed section was
controversial because it disrupted connectivity between the
Market Street part of downtown and the waterfront. Had it
continued, the freeway would have gone through
Telegraph Hill and Russian Hill, two well-known
neighborhoods. Members of these communities, along
with Sunset, Potrero, Polk Gulch, and Haight-Ashbury
neighborhoods, successfully organized in the late 1950s to
stop freeway construction (see Figure 6.2). This welldocumented protest is known as the original “freeway
revolt” (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007; Carlsson). This
community action sparked a series of similar freeway
revolts around the US reacting to highway construction
occurring inside the urban cores of US cities.

The perception in San Francisco was that highways could
accommodate commuters coming in from suburban areas
and would maintain downtown as the retail and financial
hub of the region by helping it compete with newer
suburban regional shopping centers (McCarthy, 1996). In
this way, freeways inside San Francisco metropolitan areas
were supported by the chamber of commerce, the
contractors, the building trades unions, the downtown
merchants, and the aforementioned Federal and state
stakeholders (McCarthy, 1996). The governor, along with
state and local agencies and planners, promoted a 1948

A minority of San Francisco residents continued their
displeasure with the remaining Embarcadero Expressway.
In 1986, Mayor Dianne Feinstein brought referendum

Figure 6.1: 1948 San Francisco Freeway Plan (Source: The
Preservation Institute)

A-37

Appendix A: San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway
Table 6.1: 1991 Board of Supervisors Decision Options
$69.5 million
Elevated Expressway Repair Estimate
$135 million
Sub-surface Expressway Estimate (no Federal match)
$93.7 million
Removal and surface street replacement
$52.6 million
Extension of Light Rail Service
Source: San Francisco Board of Supervisors
Community activism once again led the charge against the
freeway. Proponents of repairing the damaged structure
included business interests in the Chinatown Merchants
Association and the Northshore Business Association.
Concerned about a drop in visitors due to traffic
congestion without the highway, the Chinatown Merchants
Association organized against the removal in a similar
manner as the other community groups (Yip, 1997; Seattle
Department of Transportation, 2008). Immediately after
the earthquake, the repair of major elevated highways
bridges was a primary concern and consequently the traffic
using the Embarcadero was rerouted. Therefore,
commuters were forced to take surface streets and
Figure 6.3: Embarcadero Freeway Demolition. May 9, 1991
alternative routes. This time the movement to remove the
Embarcadero Freeway was led by key decision makers,
measures to the citizens of San Francisco regarding the
including Mayor Agnos and several City supervisors
demolition of the expressway and construction of 4 lanes
agreed that removal was a good option (Wicker, 1991).
of surface level street infrastructure complete with light
City planners, the Board of Supervisors, and two mayors
rail and bike paths in its place. The two measures were
all took initiative to approve of the removal (The
defeated by voters by a margin of two to one at the
Preservation Institute). Famously, Mayor Art Agnos called
recommendation of Supervisor Richard Hongisto (The
the Embarcadero “the world‟s longest off-ramp” (Carlsson,
Preservation Institute, n.d.). Despite direct support from
n.d.). While there was much popular support, the business
the mayor, several elected officials, and several
associations and the state transportation department
neighborhood groups, the freeway would remain. The
favored the repair or replacement of the expressway, while
movement to transform the Embarcadero from elevated
the mayor supported a subsurface expressway removing
highway to a multi-use boulevard was based upon
the eyesore that blocked the scenic waterfront views. For
community activism and political will, but it had gone to a
the better part of a year after the earthquake, these two
vote of the people and failed. However, in 1989, an
sides waited as cost estimates for all options were prepared
earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale struck San
(see Table 6.1). Eventually, more than a year after the
Francisco, causing $6 billion in damages and killing 42
Loma Prieta earthquake, the Chinatown and other business
people. The Loma Prieta earthquake exposed problems in
groups opposing the removal of the freeway threw their
the way highways were built, frightened many Bay area
support behind the proposals claiming that it would be the
drivers, and changed perceptions of transportation around
fastest way to get customers back to their business
the region. Several area double decker bridges collapsed
districts. Finally in September 1990, the San Francisco
and other highway infrastructure were severely damaged.
board of supervisors voted 6 to 5 to remove the elevated
Meanwhile, the Embarcadero Freeway was severely
expressway and replace it with either a surface street or a
damaged, thereby making removal a more palatable
subsurface expressway. Later these options were clarified
solution.
once Federal funding for the subsurface expressway was
denied.
Table 6.2: Embarcadero Transportation Timeline
1959 Embarcadero Freeway Opens
1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake severely damages structure; freeway closed
October
1990 Responding to complaints of lose of Chinatown and Northshore
June
neighborhood business, Mayor Agnos distributes maps providing routes to
inaccessible neighborhoods
1990 Supervisors vote 6-5 recommending “replacing freeway with either surface
September
level or subsurface artery.”
1991 Destruction of Embarcadero Freeway begins
February
1991 San Francisco Redevelopment Agency gives $2 million to Chinatown
March
Merchants Association
1991 Freeway Construction completed; Surface street construction begins
October
2000 Embarcadero construction complete; streetcar service begins
Source: San Francisco Chronicle articles: 1990-2004
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million tons of shipping, which fell to 5.2 million in 1964
6.2 Community Impacts
(the year of the highway revolt), and to 2.3 million tons in
1977 (National Research Council, 1980, p. 103). This
Now that the Embarcadero Boulevard has been completed,
decline mirrored the increase in usage of the Port of Long
the affected areas have benefited from neighborhood
Beach and the Port of Seattle as major freight ports for the
revitalization in the creation of new public spaces.
Pacific Coast of the US (National Research Council,
Merchants had seen a decline in business while the
1980). This phenomenon of industrial decentralization
freeway was closed after the earthquake and were worried
follows patterns seen around the US as the industrial
about this becoming permanent with the highway gone.
warehousing economy of San Francisco morphed into a
However, the waterfront areas around Chinatown now
more service and finance oriented urban industrial city.
feature more jobs and residences, potential customers in
Chinatown, and the district continues to be one of the top
A good measure of success for the Embarcadero Freeway
attractions in San Francisco (Cervero, Kang, & Shively,
removal is to examine how public sentiment has changed
2007).
about the area. Approval of the transformation into a
boulevard is almost unanimous, with freeway proponents
being almost nonexistent (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).
People have also voted with their feet and dollars, showing
up in large numbers to live, work, and play in the area. The
waterfront is now more accessible for people, no matter
what mode of transportation they are using. Even in
Chinatown, the merchants begrudgingly concede that “the
vista is beautiful” (Seattle Department of Transportation,
2008).

Although the current roadway takes up a similar footprint
to the freeway, several new neighborhoods have been
formed due to the removal. Existing areas that featured
some development added thousands of offices and
residences. These neighborhoods also gained an identity,
Rincon Hill and South Beach (Siegel, 2007). These areas
are now known for some of the best locations to live and
work in the city (Congress for the New Urbanism, n.d.).

The most noticeable addition to the area formerly occupied
by the freeway is the public spaces. The boulevard does
feature travel lanes for automobiles, but streetcars, bike
lanes, and a large pedestrian promenade are all fellow
travelers. New public plazas and the promenade draw users
to the area and are cited as a reason for the economic
development of the waterfront (Congress for the New
Urbanism, n.d.). The original footprint of the elevated
highway is memorialized by a series of plaques, but the
character of the area is completely changed (Eckerson Jr.,
2006). The former industrial piers have also become an
attraction for visitors, housing shops and other public
amenities (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008).

6.3 Environmental and Travel
Behavior Impacts
As we have discussed, the Embarcadero Freeway,
completed in 1959, was originally supposed to connect the
Bay Bridge to the Golden State Bridge via downtown San
Francisco, but protests to the plan by neighborhood
residents limited construction to a 1.2 mile double decker,
elevated highway (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).
Because of the halt in construction, the highway stopped at
the Broadway off-ramp which directed traffic into North
Beach and Chinatown (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).

With any freeway removal project, the concept of
At its peak, the Embarcadero Expressway carried over
gentrification must be addressed. Before the construction
60,000 cars per day (Seattle Department of Transportation,
of the freeway, there wasn‟t a neighborhood to be
2008) and served as a connecting highway between the
bulldozed; instead, the area was generally industrial and
Bay Bridge and downtown San Francisco. In 1989, the
commercial. The freeway‟s construction caused many of
Loma Prieta Earthquake severely damaged the freeway
the buildings that lined the elevated expressway to be built
structure and forced the city to close the roadway for
without consideration of street interactions as monolithic
safety reasons (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007). With the
structures (Eckerson Jr., 2006). With the removal of the
freeway suddenly closed, San Francisco drivers found
elevated expressway, the surrounding area‟s character
alternative routes, with much of the traffic being absorbed
changed dramatically; dense land use patterns of
by other roadways (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007).
residential and commercial properties began to replace the
Surface roadways were never overwhelmed by additional
largely industrial and commercial warehousing patterns
traffic, and commuters also took to transit in record
witnessed before the freeways
Table 6.3: Means of Transportation to Work 2000 & 2009
construction. The changes in property
Mode
2000 Percent
2009 Percent
% Change
values because of the removal could
Drive Alone
40.5
38.9
-1.6
be classified as a gentrification effect,
but the area beforehand was not
Carpool
10.8
7.4
-3.4
primarily residential (Carlsson, n.d.;
Public Transit
31.1
31.8
+0.7
Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007).
Industrial facility jobs and investment
along the waterfront had been
precipitously declining since the end
of World War II - 1947 saw 7.8

Taxi, Motorcycle, other
Bicycle
Walk
Worked at Home
Source: SFMTA, 2010
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1.6
2.1
9.4
4.6

1.8
3
10.3
6.8

+0.2
+0.2
+0.9
+2.2
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2010). While we certainly cannot attribute this change
entirely to the Embarcadero, the removal of the freeway
certainly did play a role.
The Lomo Prieta earthquake in 1989 was a major reason
the freeway was torn down. If it was never severely
damaged, the roadway may still be up today. The
earthquake also brought forward a serious concern with
elevated highways in the San Francisco Bay Area – even
though the freeway had been retrofitted in the early 1980s
for earthquake safety, and the freeway did not collapse,
portions of the freeway structure did fall, injuring a
number of people below (Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007;
The Preservation Institute, n.d.). The decision, therefore, to
tear down the damaged freeway in 1991 actually increased
the hazard resiliency of the area, simply by removing the
possibility of a structural collapse rendering a major
thoroughfare impassable during a disaster. As far as
resiliency goes, Rod Diridon, chairman of the Metropolitan
Transportation Committee, may have said it best - “what
we found out from this experience is that transit surviveshighways don‟t” (Diriniger, 1989). A similar sentiment
was shared by Jim Knox, a statewide transportation
planner, saying, “If we had no transit right now, the Bay
Area would be closed. It would be shut down” (Diriniger,
1989).

Figure 6.4: Embarcadero Freeway ending at the Broadway offramp (Lost SF, 2010)

numbers (Marquez, 1989). This situation persisted until the
opening of a new, six-lane surface boulevard in 2000.
The new Embarcadero Boulevard was designed as a
complete street, incorporating auto, pedestrian and transit
into its design (The Preservation Institute, n.d.). The sixlane boulevard was designed and built to handle a
significant amount of traffic without cutting the waterfront
off from downtown (The Preservation Institute). In the
middle of the boulevard, a historic streetcar line was built
(Seattle
Department
of
Transportation,
2008).
Furthermore, the removal of the freeway allowed for the
creation of a number of waterfront parks and pedestrian
plazas that served to increase the walk-ability of the area
(Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007). One such amenity is
the Herb Caen Way, a 3.2 mile pedestrian promenade that
follows the waterfront next to the Embarcadero from South
Beach to Fisherman's Wharf (The Preservation Institute,
n.d.).

Today, the Embarcadero is a bustling, multi-use boulevard
that has helped reconnect downtown San Francisco to the
waterfront (Seattle Department of Transportation, 2008).
The removal of the double-decker freeway has opened up
the Northwest San Francisco waterfront to a host of
transportation modes and in the process also helped
improve the overall air quality by reducing automobile
dependency and promoting transit, walking, and cycling
(Cervero, Kang, & Shively, 2007; Seattle Department of
Transportation, 2008).

Overall, the removal of the freeway has resulted in
significant traffic reductions and increases in usage of
public transit on the Embarcadero. The boulevard currently
carries about 26,000 cars per day (Seattle Department of
Transportation, 2008), while the streetcar line handles
about 18,000 daily riders (San Francisco Metropolitan
Transit Authority). Assuming the 18,000 transit riders
would have driven on the freeway had it still been up, the
removal of the freeway and the opening of the streetcar
line reduced approximate CO2 emission in that corridor by
18,062 pounds per day (18000 riders x 1.2 miles of
freeway/23.2 avg mpg x 19.4 lbs CO2 per gallon gasoline)
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2005). Twenty years
later, the freeway removal could have saved 66 thousand
tons of CO2.

6.4 Economic Impacts
From an economic perspective, the Embarcadero Freeway
removal and redevelopment is generally viewed by
business interests as a very successful project. The sheer
quantity of real estate investment is telling enough, but
statistics and a number of studies also help to measure the
success of the Embarcadero. One author summarizes much
of the data and research saying: “All day long the area,
particularly around the Ferry Market building is teeming
with locals and tourists alike… On game days, the
southern end is inundated with sports fans and ticket
scalpers” (Sussler & Daniel, n.d., p.6).

Since the reopening of the Embarcadero, auto usage has
gone down and transit usage has increased along with
cycling and walking in the entire city (San Francisco
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 2010). City-wide auto
usage has dropped from 51.3% to 46.3% of mode share
going to work while transit, cycling and walking has
increased from 42.6% to 45.1% in the first nine years (see
Table 6.3) (San Francisco Metropolitan Transit Authority,

Waterfront business along the Embarcadero Freeway prior
to the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake was essentially
nonexistent. With nearly 1.2 miles of double-decker
highway blocking lining the waterfront, convenient access
to the majority of the port facilities and the city‟s historic
Ferry Building was negligible (Equity Office). Once the
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residential space, the Embarcadero area is now home to
over one million square feet of commercial office, retail,
café, and restaurant space (San Francisco Redevelopment
Agency, 2011). Jobs have increased by 23% within the last
few decades (Congress for the New Urbanism, n.d.) and
new development has sprung up in the form of small
business enterprise, commercial office space, professional
sport investment, and various other kinds of retail and
residential structures (Congress for the New Urbanism,
n.d.).
A combination of public participation along with public
and private sector investment helped to develop most of
commercial space on Embarcadero Boulevard. Although
millions of square feet of retail, commercial, and
residential development were privately financed (San
Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 2011), the entire length
of the boulevard remains welcoming to pedestrians,
bicyclists, transit, as well as motorists (Cervero, Kang, &
Shively, 2007; The Preservation Institute; San Francisco
Bike Coalition, 2010).

Figure 6.5: Embarcadero Freeway, 1960. (Source: Telstar
Logistics)

earthquake hit, the freeway extension became unusable
and traffic diverted onto other streets (Cervero, Kang, &
Shively, 2007). Particularly hit hard was the Chinatown
area less than a mile away, who‟s businesses claimed a
“20-40% drop in tourism” in the following years (Chinese
Historical Society of America, 2006). When discussion of
freeway removal was rumored from the Board of
Supervisors in April of 1990, “hundreds of Chinatown
merchants” appeared to protest the proposition (The
Preservation Institute, n.d.). Despite the economic
downturn experienced in the late 1980s, after the removal
of the Embarcadero Freeway, the waterfront has
experienced eight years of development and “San
Francisco‟s Chinatown is still bustling” (Seattle
Department of Transportation, 2008, p.6D-2).

Of the most notable icons along the Embarcadero‟s
waterfront is the Ferry Building. Originally built in 1898,
the twice earthquake-shaken structure, now owned by
Equity Office (a private nationwide joint venture), is home
to forty diversified small businesses, an iconic 245-foot
clock tower, and 175,000 square feet of Class A
commercial office space (Equity Office). Equity Office
also claims a daily count of 11,000 ferry riders passing
through its terminal, and a farmer‟s market that takes place
3 days a week drawing in 10-15,000 additional weekly
shoppers (Equity Office).

Although the Seattle DOT acknowledges the impossible
task of isolating the Embarcadero Freeway‟s removal on
economic development in the area (2008), a number of
indicators show prodigious economic growth. Housing
values in the surrounding neighborhoods rose by 300% by
the late 1990s (The Preservation Institute, n.d.), indicating
a market demand increase for area properties. Also by the
late 2000s, housing quantity increased by 51% (Congress
for the New Urbanism, n.d.), further transforming
perceptions of downtown as a place to live and spend
money. Meanwhile, international corporations
such as Gap clothing have chosen to build
headquarters
along
the
redeveloped
Embarcadero. By analyzing US Census and
American Community Survey data, one can
additionally find that the 2009 aggregate
property value in the affected Embarcadero
impact zone grew to 25 times its 1990 value,
while San Francisco aggregate property value
has grown by less than 5 times its 1990 value.
Figure 6.6 demonstrates how the impact zone,
which includes Chinatown, compares to the
city of San Francisco overall when considering
average growth using 1990 as a base year.

Existing industrial piers currently numbered one-and-ahalf, three, and five are collectively known as The Piers.
This redevelopment supports a collection of mixed used
retail, commercial, and residential space (The Piers, 2010).
These historic structures now house nearly 60,000 square
feet of Class A commercial office space and 17,000 square
feet of retail, cafes, and restaurants (The Piers, 2010).
Additionally, since 2000, the 13-acre AT&T Park
constituted a $357 million investment at the far southern

Although freeway removal may not be the sole
cause for such a stark contrast to the rest of the
city, it seems impossible to negate any
correlation altogether. In addition to increased Figure 6.6: Rise in aggregate property value (Source: US Census 1990 & 2000
and American Community Survey 2005-2009)

A-41

Appendix A: San Francisco: Embarcadero Freeway
A report co-sponsored by the Federal Highway
end of the Embarcadero boulevard area. The San Francisco
Administration identifies the quality of location, variety of
Giants home field ranks 2nd in the National League for
passenger travel services, and amount of capital
number of visitors with over three million visitors a year
investment made by developers as important signifiers of
(San Francisco Giants, 2006). The ferry provides
economic developments (Forkenbrock & Weisbrod, 2001).
transportation for over 50,000 visitors to the Giants games
Although this case study does not cover the greatest depth,
a year (Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation
the breadth of praise, inclusion of diverse modes of
District, 2010).
transport, and significant private investment each
If the city had chosen to repair the freeway to its previous
demonstrate a measure of success agreed upon by many.
state after the earthquake, the City of San Francisco would
have had to pay at least $70 million and waited until at
6.5 Conclusion
least 1992 before reaping the freeway‟s benefits once
again (Wicker, 1991). Instead, the city invested nearly $50
The removal of the Embarcadero Freeway and the
million into the project, the demolition for which only cost
subsequent creation of a complete street boulevard to
$3.25 million (Wicker, 1991). Now, users enjoy a 3.2 mile
replace it can be considered by measures of community,
long (and 25 foot wide) promenade that runs the length of
environmental, and economic indicators a success. As this
the Embarcadero from South Beach to Fisherman‟s Wharf,
case study has shown, the removal of the freeway had
employees get the opportunity to enjoy a positive and
positive community effects namely: neighborhoods
diversified work environment, and tourism in San
experiencing revitalization, communities benefiting from
Francisco has a view of the bay while dining near the
additional jobs, and real estate value increasing. All Bay
Embarcadero (The Preservation Institute, n.d.).
Area residents were benefitted by an increase in
accessibility to the community asset of the waterfront.
Environmentally, the region was benefited by changes in
transportation patterns leading to greater transit usage and
consequent reductions in air pollution, increased walkability aiding in public health, and greater resiliency with
the addition of greater transportation opportunities, and
more reliable infrastructure. Economically, the city has
benefitted greatly with a new found tourist attraction - real
estate values have raised dramatically; rejuvenated usage
of ferry facility and other investments have been leveraged
to make full use of water front; the private and public
investment in infrastructure has led to an overall
renaissance at the waterfront for San Francisco. The city of
San Francisco in making the courageous decision to not
rebuild their Embarcadero Expressway after the tragedy of
the Loma Prieta earthquake has recreated a formerly
Figure 6.7: Ferry Building on New Year’s
underutilized area for the benefit of all residents of the Bay
Area.
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7 Seoul: Cheonggyecheon Highway
7.1 Introduction
Between 2003 and 2005, the Seoul, South Korea
metropolitan government planned and executed the
removal of the Cheonggye Elevated Highway and the
ground-level roadway beneath it that covered the
Cheonggyecheon (CGC), a stream that used to run through
the center of the city (Kil-Dong 2007).
Historically, Seoul developed around the Cheonggyecheon
stream, which runs east to west, dividing the city in two.
The Cheonggyecheon restoration project has been called
“the boldest and most dramatic freeway removal to date”
(Kang and Cervero 2008, p. 3) and has won widespread
praise from the international urban design and planning
community. Despite earlier worries about the project‟s
potentially negative economic and traffic impacts, it has
gained widespread popularity among Seoul tourism and
business interests, as well as the city‟s general public.
Thanks in no small part to its ambitious scope, Seoul‟s
Cheonggyecheon Restoration Project is one of the world‟s
most often-cited examples of highway removal and
subsequent urban revitalization.

Figure 7.1: Map of Seoul (central city in black outline, CHC
in stripes) Source: Kang, C.D. and Cervero, R. (2009)

latter camp and opened the stream for sewage purposes.
During the five centuries of the Joseon Dynasty, the
tributaries provided Seoul with clean water, while the
Cheonggyecheon washed out the wastewater.

7.2 History

By 1675, the population in Seoul had grown to almost
190,000 people from 100,000 at the start of the Joseon
Dynasty (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2009c). The
stream was no longer able to accommodate sewage for the
city. It was not until almost a century later, during the
1760s and early 1770s, that King Yeongjo commissioned
yet more projects to dredge the river and build new
embankments and dykes.

Joseon Period
The Cheonggyecheon has been a pivotal part of Seoul‟s
landscape for centuries. In 1406 King Taejo, first king of
the Joseon Dynasty, commissioned several projects to
build dykes in order to control flooding in the area. Stone
embankments and bridges were built over the
Cheonggyecheon and its tributaries. Taejo‟s successor,
King Sejon, continued projects on the Cheonggyecheon by
digging ditches to divert some of the water to its tributaries
(Noh, 2009). During King Sejon‟s rule, his advisors were
divided as to what the role of the river should be. Some
believed that the river should be kept clean according to
the principles of Feng Shui, while others believed that
Seoul need sewage options. King Sejon sided with the

Japanese Occupation - Construction
of the Cheonggye Highway
Around 1914, during Japanese occupation, it is believed
that the stream got its current name, Cheonggyecheon,
which means, “clean water stream.” During this period,
many farmers that lost their land migrated toward Seoul
settling around the edge of the Cheonggyecheon. The
increase of the urban poor along the stream led to more
pollution, making the stream a source of diseases and
crime (Kil-Dong 2007).

Figure 7.2: Huts lining the edge of the Cheonggyecheon
Source: PreserveNet
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an estimated $384 million (Revkin 2009). Several
organizations were established to guide the project, among
them the Citizen‟s Committee for Cheonggyecheon
Restoration Project and the Cheonggyecheon Restoration
Research Corps. The project was completed within two
years. Since 2005, the Cheonggyecheon stream has been
open to the public and it stands as a major success story in
urban rejuvenation and beautification.
The project was rendered politically feasible by the fact
that the Cheonggye Elevated Highway was in need of
serious and expensive repair (Kil-Dong 2007; Kang and
Cervero 2008), but the real impetus behind the project was
then-Mayor Lee Mung-Bak‟s desire to “make a city where
people come first, not cars” (quoted in Cervero 2006, p.1).
In other words, the CGC project represents a political
paradigm shift in South Korea, a nation that had long
viewed highway construction as a signal of the nation‟s
modernity. The project represented an explicit move away
from favoring increasing automobile capacity toward
improving the quality of the urban environment and the
quality of life of urban residents (Kang and Cervero 2008).

Figure 7.3: Cheonggye Elevated Highway Source:
PreserveNet

In 1925, the Japanese started to cover up many of the
tributaries, converting them into sewers as part of a project
designed to give Seoul a proper underground sewage
system. The idea was to cover the Cheonggyecheon as
well. From 1926 to 1940, the Japanese devised several
plans to cover the river for different purposes. These
included proposals calling for filling in the stream to create
new land for development, the creation of a roadway with
an elevated railroad over it, the creation of a road for cars,
and the construction of a tram on the surface and a subway
underground. These early proposals floundered, mainly
because of the economic strain that the Sino-Japanese war
was exerting on Japan. But the Japanese had covered a
small section of the river by 1937 (Noh 2009).

7.3 Economic Impacts
The highway and road removal was part of an overall plan
to revitalize the economy of the city since the area was
“becoming a slum and losing any appeal it may have had
as a residential or commercial area” (Kil-Dong 2007, p.
12). The CGC area contains more than 100,000 small
shops and is South Korea‟s largest commercial district, but
it had suffered from both residential and job depopulation
in the years before the project‟s implementation and
declining importance as a business center (Lee 2006). In
the ten years prior to 2002, the population of the CGC area
decreased by 40,000, the number of jobs fell by 80,000,
and several business headquarters moved out of the CGC
area (Lee 2006). The CGC Restoration Project aimed to
reverse these negative economic trends by attracting
residents and various industries back to the area (Kil-Dong
2007).

After World War II, South Korea developed plans to
dredge the Cheonggyecheon, which had become heavily
silted under Japanese occupation. Once again, plans for the
improvement of the stream were halted, this time because
of the Korean War. By the 1950s, the Cheonggyecheon
had come to symbolize the poverty and grime left behind
after fifty years of colonialism and war. It was essentially
an open sewer in the middle of the city that deterred
investment (Noh 2009).
In the late 1950s, the huts surrounding the edge of the
stream were removed, and the Cheonggyecheon was
encased underground in a four-phase construction project
that lasted from 1958 until 1976. A 3.7-mile elevated
highway was built 164 feet to 262 feet above the former
stream (Kil-Dong 2007). The elevated highway ran
parallel to a grade-level roadway, and included four lanes
of two-way traffic that before its deconstruction carried
168,556 vehicles daily (Kil-Dong 2007). As with many
other highway projects, it was originally considered a
successful urban renewal project, one that brought
modernity to the city and would inevitably attract people
and business.

Highway Removal and Stream
Restoration

Figure 7.4: Street Vendors in Seoul. Source:
http://evelynhoward.blogspot.com/2010/11/street-vendorsseoul.html

In 2003, Seoul‟s mayor, current president of South Korea
Lee Myung-bak, commissioned a project to remove the
elevated highway and restore the stream. The project cost
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SMG to propose that vendors peddle at Dongdaemun
Despite the promised benefits of the project, there were
Stadium, which was being used as the new temporary
major concerns about the short-term economic impacts.
parking lot for the CGC area (Noh 2009). As with the
The two main segments of the population that objected to
storeowners, the provision of a new business site helped
the roadwork were the owners of the CGC area‟s many
placate the street vendors by giving them a location that
shops and the street vendors who worked along the CGC
was free of the dust and noise that they feared would hurt
corridor (Noh 2009). These store owners and street
their sales.
vendors organized into three interest groups to speak out
against the project. These groups held at least 14
Taken together, the commercial incentives given to
demonstrations between December 2002 and December
storeowners in the CGC area, the new business sites
provided to storeowners and street vendors, and the host of
transportation changes (described below) made prior to the
highway removal all served to mitigate most of the
negative, short-term economic impacts that the CGC
Restoration Project may have had. At the very least,
enough negative impact was accounted for so that the
merchants‟ resistance subsided, and the project could be
completed without continued disruption.
Since the completion of the project, tourism has boomed in
central Seoul. In the first three months after the project‟s
completion, approximately 12 million visitors came to the
CGC, and in the three months following the CGC‟s grand
opening, there were more than 71 million visitors to the
CGC (Noh 2009). These visitors provide increased
business to the CGC merchants who operate in the area as
they shop and eat and make use of the robust commercial
district surrounding the greenway. The CGC has indeed
become the “vibrant cultural attraction” that it was
promised to be (Young 2010, p. 4).

Figure 7.5: Marginal Effects of the Elevated Highway and
Urban Greenway on Commercial Properties, by distance
interval.
Source: Chang and Cervero (2009), page 2786.

2003 (Noh 2009), demanding that the city either cease the
CGC Restoration Project or provide shop owners and
vendors with restitution for loss of business due to noise
and dust from demolition and traffic congestion caused by
the decrease in available road space (Noh 2009; Lee 2006).

Aside from boosting revenues for local merchants, transit
providers, and tourist industries, the CGC Restoration
Project has been economically beneficial to land owners
and developers as well. For commercial landowners along
the CGC corridor, the deconstruction of the elevated
highway and covering road was a risky undertaking; since
proximity to the highway increased commercial land
values, and it was not conclusively known whether the
conversion to an urban greenway would confer equal or
greater benefits (Kang and Cervero 2009). The commercial
landowners could have been economically hurt by the
CGC Restoration Project. However, research shows that at
each distance interval for up to five hundred meters around
the CGC, the non-residential land values had higher
premiums with the urban greenway than they had with the
elevated highway (Kang and Cervero 2009). This means
that compared to commercial land located more than five
hundred meters from the CGC, commercial land located
within five hundred meters of the CGC enjoyed greater

While the store owners and street vendors were adamant
that the CGC Restoration Project would cause them
economic harm, the Seoul Metropolitan Government
(SMG) did not believe this to be case (Noh 2009). As a
result, the city government did not compensate store
owners directly. The city instead took actions to encourage
commerce along the CGC corridor for store owners who
wished to remain there during the roadwork. Some of the
efforts included lowering parking fees in the area, creating
a nearby parking lot with free shuttle buses, providing
grants for remodeling of CGC markets, providing loans to
renew buildings throughout the CGC, and purchasing
goods needed by the city from stores in the corridor (Noh
2009, Lee 2006). Importantly, the SMG also provided a
500,000 square meter logistic complex as a new business
site for any storeowners who wished to move (Noh 2009).
This new business site has been noted as a key factor that
appeased storeowners along the CGC corridor (Noh 2009).
The SMG refused to negotiate with street vendors because
“...sidewalk peddling is illegal and measures had to be
taken to get rid of them [the vendors]” (Noh 2009, p. 37).
Such disdain for street vendors was physically evidenced
by the forced removal of their equipment by the City of
Seoul (Noh 2009). This removal prompted “strong
resistance” by the CSVRPC on November 30, 2003 (Noh
2009, p. 34). Street vendor resistance eventually caused the
A-46

Figure 7.6: Urban Greenway

Appendix A: Seoul: Cheonggyecheon Highway
been built (Young 2010; Kang and Cervero 2009).
property value benefits (marginal effects) with the urban
Furthermore, even in existing buildings, the high land
greenway than with the elevated highway. These results
values have led to high rents for offices, retail shops, and
are shown below in Figure 7.5.
apartments (Kang and Cervero 2009; Noh 2009).
Overall, the CGC highway/road deconstruction and
subsequent transformation into an urban greenway appears
to have been of great economic benefit to the City of
Seoul. There have been increases in the construction, real
estate, tourism, retail, and transportation industries (Noh
2009). However, while there may have been a net
economic gain, the effects of the CGC Restoration Project
do not appear to have been distributed equitably (Noh
2009). As mentioned earlier, the street vendors were not
officially recognized by the City of Seoul as legitimate
participants in the economy, so their equipment was
forcibly removed from the CGC area.

Figure 7.7: Marginal Effects of the Elevated Highway and
Urban Greenway on Residential Properties, by distance
interval.
Source: Chang and Cervero (2009), page 2789.

After being relocated to Dongdaemun Stadium, the
vendors had to move again. Many still operate near the
CGC, constantly on the lookout for the SMG or police
trying to shut them down (Noh 2009). Since the
individuals working in the informal economy as street
vendors are primarily in the lower economic classes, the
CGC Restoration Project has disrupted the economic
livelihoods of these people more than that of the wealthier
storeowners who were provided for by the city
government.

For residential landowners near the CGC corridor, the
highway removal and CGC restoration presented a much
lower risk than for commercial landowners. The original
elevated highway over the CGC provided some mobility
advantages to residential landowners, but these benefits
were reduced since most residents live more than half a
kilometer away from the highway (Kang and Cervero
2009).

Additionally, the greatest benefits on land values from the
CGC project are being experienced by the commercial
landowners who own property in the closest proximity to
the CGC as opposed to the residential landowners who
own land further away, and who may be assumed to be
less wealthy than business owners. Even worse off are the
poorer residents who might have lived in or near the CGC
but may now be experiencing gentrification as rents rise to
reflect the increasing land values, and the lower class
residents are priced out of their homes. For other cities
hoping to reap similar economic benefits by removing
highways and turning them into public amenities, special
care should be taken to ensure that no particular population
segment is overly disadvantaged by the project.

Moreover, the highway and the traffic it induced created
visual blight, noise, and air quality detriments for nearby
residences that overwhelmed any mobility advantages
from the highway (Kang and Cervero 2009). These
highway drawbacks led to a generally inverse relationship
between residential proximity to the highway and effects
on property values. The closer people lived to the highway,
the lower their property values in comparison to residents
living more than three kilometers away (Kang and Cervero
2009).
Conversely, the restoration of the CGC and its
transformation into an urban greenway led to a positive
relationship between distance to the park and residential
property values (Kang and Cervero 2009). The closer one
lived to an entrance to the greenway, the higher one‟s
property value when compared to residents living more
than three kilometers away. These results are shown in
Figure 7.7. The highway removal and CGC Restoration
Project, therefore, not only reversed the negative impacts
of the highway but conferred beneficial economic impacts
on residential land owners.

7.4 Environmental and Travel
Behavior Impacts
Environmental Impacts
The expressway built over the Cheonggyecheon river was
itself a response to a serious environmental problem, as the
river had become a highly contaminated open sewer and
public health hazard. Covering the river and constructing a
highway over it was partly intended to mitigate the
negative effects of its pollution (Hwang 2006; Kang and
Cervero 2009).

As a corollary to the increase in land values around the
CGC corridor, land use changes and new development
began to take place in the area in anticipation of and after
the highway removal and CGC restoration (Kang and
Cervero 2009). New high-rise apartment buildings have
been developed, new restaurants and shops have appeared,
and new retail complexes like the one constructed by the
SMG for the original storeowners along the CGC have

However, environmental degradation of the area was
exacerbated by the highway development. The underlying
riverbed was polluted with lead, chromium, and other
heavy metals from highway run-off, and underground
A-47

Appendix A: Seoul: Cheonggyecheon Highway
however, most dissent has been quelled by the
gasses (e.g. carbon monoxide and methane gas) caused
overwhelming popularity of the project. Eventually, Seoul
corrosion to the expressway‟s infrastructure, exacerbating
plans to supplement the river‟s stream with the output of
safety concerns surrounding the aging highway (Kil-Dong
the Jungnang Sewage Treatment Plan, which is currently
2007). In addition, the corridor‟s heavy daily traffic
undergoing expansion and technological upgrades (Kilcontributed to a serious air pollution problem in the
Dong 2007; Hwang 2006).
surrounding area. Pollution levels for various emissions
and particulates (including highly carcinogenic Volatile
Positive environmental impacts have begun to be
Organic Compounds (VOCs) like benzene) exceeded
quantified by researchers. Soil and groundwater
Seoul‟s environmental air quality standards and were
contamination have been largely eliminated (Kil-Dong
significantly higher than other areas in the city (Hwang
2007). As anticipated, the river‟s ecosystem has been
2006; Young 2010). Seoul residents who lived or worked
greatly restored: fish, bird, and insect species have
near Cheonggyecheon were more than twice as likely to
multiplied (Revkin 2009; see Table 7.1).
suffer from respiratory illness (Hwang 2006). Quality of
life for nearby residents and employees was further
Air quality has also improved substantially. Due to
impacted by the very high levels of noise pollution
reduced motor vehicle traffic, small-particle air pollution
generated by the corridor‟s traffic (Hwang 2006).
has dropped from 74 micrograms per cubic meter to 48
(Revkin 2009). Kee-Yeon Hwang (2006) cites the
Finally, the Cheonggyecheon corridor had become a major
economic value of this reduction in air pollution as up to
flood hazard. The riverbed had always served as a seasonal
40 billion won per year. In addition, other unplanned
flood zone, but due to climatic changes, serious floods
benefits have emerged from the CGC restoration project.
resulting from summer downpours had become more and
For example, the restored river has been found to reduce
more frequent, creating a serious risk to lives and property
the urban heat island effect and increase wind speeds,
(Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; Revkin 2009).
reducing summer temperatures in the corridor by more
than 3 degrees Celsius compared to other points in the city
The environmental impacts of the CGC restoration project
only 400 meters away (Revkin 2009; Hwang 2006; Vidal
have been significant. Over the last few decades, South
2006). Overall, the Cheonggyecheon restoration has been
Korea has become increasingly concerned with
an unqualified environmental success. It has reduced
environmental and ecological protection, as well as with
summer temperatures, improved air, soil, and water
enhancing its international image (Kil-Dong 2007). A
quality, mitigated flood risks, and restored a long-dormant
survey conducted by Hongik University Professor Kee
ecosystem to health and diversity.
Yeon Hwang prior to the CGC project revealed that the
majority of Seoul residents believed that the environment
Table 7.1: Wildlife Species Before and After
and water were the most important concerns for the city
Cheonggyecheon River Restoration
(Vidal 2006). The deconstruction of the highway and
Before CGC
After CGC
resurrection of the Cheonggyecheon river were completed
Restoration
Restoration
with the goals of ecological restoration and hazard
4
25
Fish Species
mitigation in mind.
6
36
Bird Species
The restored riverbed was designed to maximize flood
15
192
Insect Species
capacity and safely accommodate 200-year flood levels
Source: Revkin 2009
(Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007; Revkin 2009). New sewage
lines were installed to segregate rainwater and wastewater
Travel Behavior Impacts
and prevent wastewater intrusion during flood events (KilDong 2007). In order to promote safety, as well as
Beginning in the 1980s, Seoul began to develop new towns
maximize the new river-park‟s accessibility, the stream is
on the fringe of the city in an effort to relieve inner-city
accessible at 17 points, including seven handicapped
traffic congestion by dispersing the population (Kang and
access locations, and sixteen emergency-escape ladders
Cervero 2009). In fact, the resulting increase in automobile
have been constructed along the riverbank (Kil-Dong
travel from suburban commuters made congestion
2007). In addition, the stream has been engineered to serve
problems much worse, despite concurrent increases in
a variety of fish and wildlife: marshland has been
highway capacity. This may be explained as a prime
constructed, and channels have been constructed to allow
example of the Braess Paradox: “in a network in which all
fish to pass through the river unobstructed (Kil-Dong
the moving entities rationally seek the most efficient route,
2007).
adding extra capacity can actually reduce the network‟s
overall efficiency” (Baker 2009). The CGC Restoration
project is an example of the solution to this paradoxical
problem: by reducing capacity, efficiency and
effectiveness are improved.

Historically, the Cheonggyecheon is a seasonal river with
an intermittent stream: part of the year, the riverbed is
naturally dry. The CGC restoration project, however,
requires a constant flow of water which is currently
pumped in from the nearby Han River. The fact that most
of the Cheonggyecheon‟s water must be pumped in
artificially (and at significant cost) has been a point of
political contention throughout the project (Revkin 2009);

Before the Cheonggye Road and Cheonggye Elevated
Highway were deconstructed, they carried 65,810 and
102,747 vehicles daily, respectively, for a total of more
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(Baker 2009; Cervero 2006). In urban areas in particular,
than 168,000 vehicles per day on the corridor (Kil-Dong
traffic can be easily redistributed through other routes with
2007). At the outset of the project, there was, predictably,
very little disruption. Large modal shifts are not required
a public and political outcry against the perceived negative
to alleviate traffic conditions, although if transit
impact that deconstructing the highway would have on
enhancements are implemented concurrent with highway
traffic congestion throughout the city (Kil-Dong 2007).
removal, transit is likely to absorb a greater share of road
The planned CGC restoration project would mean
users. “The tearing down of the motorway has had both
narrowing the corridor to only two, 13.5 meter-wide (twointended and unexpected effects,” says Hwang. “As soon
lane) surface roads on either side of the river (Hwang
as we destroyed the road, the cars just disappeared and
2006). Traffic models developed in advance of the project
drivers changed their habits. A lot of people just gave up
indicated that impacts would be positive overall (Vidal
their cars... In some cases, they kept using their cars but
2006), and a pilot simulation test which involved
changed their routes” (quoted in Vidal 2006, p.1).
temporarily cutting off access to the highway and
narrowing the Cheonggye surface road with roadblocks
Only 1.3 percent of downtown residents believed that the
was conducted. These tests were paired with an aggressive
project had worsened traffic conditions, and the subway
advertising campaign publicizing the project and
system experienced a 3.6 percent overall growth rate
encouraging drivers to seek alternate routes or modes
following the project (Hwang 2006). Pedestrian activity
helped to dispel this fear by making residents aware of
has been observed to have increased substantially, due to
alternative options (Kil-Dong 2007).
infrastructure and crossing improvements on the formerly
auto-centric roadway (Hwang 2006). Increases in bike,
This publicity campaign was employed leading up to and
pedestrian, and public transit mode shares due to public
throughout the duration of the CGC reconstruction. Traffic
infrastructure investment and education campaigns
information was disseminated and staff was deployed to
compound and multiply the environmental benefits of the
sites of severe congestion to provide guidance to drivers
river reconstruction, while promoting transportation equity
(Kil-Dong 2007). This public education program was
for low-income commuters who save time and money due
critical in ensuring the project‟s success (Vidal 2006).
to these improvements (Young 2010).
Even more importantly, public transportation investments
and enhancements were made which facilitated modal
shifts and minimized traffic disturbances. The entire bus
7.5 Community Impacts
system was reconfigured into a trunk-and-feeder system, to
facilitate transfers between local buses and the city‟s
Several million people turned out to celebrate the opening
subway system. Payment systems were simplified to make
of the new, five-mile, 1,000-acre linear park that now
public transit more convenient. Sixty-eight kilometers of
occupies the site of the removed overpass (Vidal 2006).
bus-rapid-transit-only median lanes were opened along
An average of 100,000 pedestrians visits the restored
arterial streets (including a new BRT route along the
Cheonggyecheon daily, according to a Seoul government
Cheonggyecheon corridor), new downtown shuttle buses
estimate (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2009a). The
were established, and certain streets were designated as
site has gone from “a dark tunnel of crumbling concrete”
one-way or left-turn limited (Hwang 2006; Kil-Dong 2007;
(Revkin 2009, A4) to an inviting epicenter of leisure
Kang and Cervero 2009; Young 2010).
activity and exercise, a tranquil oasis at the center of this
bustling megalopolis. At 10.4 million people, Seoul is one
As a result, the traffic disaster feared by residents never
of the world‟s largest, and also one of its most denselymaterialized. Instead, a significant modal shift occurred,
populated, cities. Roughly 17,219 people live on each
diverting motorists to buses and subways, and overall
square kilometer in the city proper, putting Seoul‟s
traffic flow and speeds downtown have improved (Revkin
population
density at roughly eight times that of New York
2009). In the process of making all of the public transit
City
(“Seoul
ranks highest” 2009).
enhancements to cope with the reduced roadway capacity,
the City of Seoul captured one of its first long term
benefits: subway ridership has increased 13.7% since the
restoration project began (Lee 2006). These positive
impacts on traffic flow are consistent with evidence from
highway deconstruction projects in the United States

Along the Cheonggyecheon stream today, there are new
running and pedestrian paths, waterfalls where children
play, and a museum. The park now serves as the backdrop
to a variety of arts and entertainment events. Property
values and interest in the downtown area have taken off in
light of the freeway‟s removal (Hwang 2006). The Web
site for the Korea Tourism Organization includes the
following idyllic description of daily life along the
Cheonggyecheon‟s banks:
[A] surging waterfall provides a lively acoustic
start to the river‟s flow and to delight the children,
stepping stones are placed so that even the most
cautious of them can venture into the middle of the
stream. At lunchtime and in the early evenings the
paths on either side become a strolling route for

Figure 7.8: Cheonggyecheon restored.
Source: pleasetakemeto.com
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Even some generally pleased with the outcome fault
office workers to exercise their lungs outside their
project architects for ramming the plans through with little
air-conditioned work stations or even to jog for a
public input and scrutiny. “There was limited
few kilometers to work off the excesses of the
consideration of certain user groups, for example older
night before. [The streets on either side of the
people, people with visual impairments and people with
stream] have also become invigorated, with
mobility problems,” advises the Commission for
restaurants and pavement cafes permitting dining al
Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE). In
fresco during the warm summer months. With the
response to a 2005 protest march by a group demanding
rushing water constantly replenishing the area with
handicapped access along the stream, the group notes that
oxygen, average temperatures in the summertime
new elevators were installed and free wheelchairs provided
have dropped a few degrees, so that the benefits are
along the Cheonggyecheon (Commission for Architecture
not just confined to the immediate water‟s edge
and the Built Environment, n.d.). CABE declares the end
(Korea Tourism Organization 2010).
result of the ambitious project an “inspirational space
Seoul Metropolitan Government, on its official
which is family-friendly and welcoming for a wide range
Cheonggyecheon Web site, references a survey designed
of groups,” but it faults designers‟ failure to facilitate
to gauge residents‟ attitudes about the restoration project.
“inclusive planning” that would have better accounted for
It reports that roughly 67 percent of respondents “made
a full range of community concerns and interests
some positive remarks” about the endeavor and that close
(Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment,
to 78 percent expected positive results to come from it in
n.d.).
the future (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2009b).
Still, few would doubt the substantial psychological effect
Journalists and bloggers who have covered the restoration
the overpass removal and stream restoration has had. The
generally reinforce the government‟s contention that Seoul
project has helped inspire city leaders to adopt other
residents are overwhelmingly happy with the project.
sustainability and pedestrian-oriented initiatives (Vidal
"The city centre is so much cleaner," Rhoda Chung, a
2006). As Hwang told The Guardian newspaper in 2006,
pharmaceutical worker, told The Guardian a year after the
the project was “above all, a symbolic act” (Vidal 2006).
restoration‟s completion (Vidal 2006). "The shopkeepers
“We‟ve made people realize that quality of life is
were arguing against the restoration, but now that they can
important,” then-Mayor Lee Myung-bak told Time
see the difference they all like it" (Vidal 2006).
Magazine in 2006 (Walsh 2006). Myung-bak, who staked
Hwang, primary author of the master plan for the overpass
his successful mayoral candidacy in part on tearing down
removal and stream restoration, points to air quality
the Cheonggyecheon Freeway, and became president of
problems that plagued the traffic-clogged Cheonggyecheon
South Korea in 2008, declared of the project: “We‟ve set a
corridor before the freeway‟s removal as a community
new standard not just for Seoul, but for Korea” (Walsh
benefit of the project. Pollution levels, he writes, were
2006). It‟s an example that an increasing number of cities
notably higher than in other parts of the city, and people
internationally are looking to as they consider tearing
living and working in the highway‟s vicinity were found to
down freeways of their own.
be more than twice as likely to suffer from respiratory
problems (Hwang 2006). He doesn‟t point to any empirical
data showing that the health of area residents has improved
since the freeway‟s removal, however.
Property values are also on the rise, and the city is working
to reinvigorate once-decaying downtown neighborhoods in
the vicinity of the Cheonggyecheon in light of the project
(Hwang 2006). “Because of a massive inflow of visitors,
the CBD area has been resurrecting [sic] as the center of
Seoul again,” Hwang writes. “The businesses are booming
and real estate price is skyrocketing and redevelopment
projects are now going on in many sites (Hwang 2006).”
He cites a study showing a 30 percent average increase in
downtown land values, while commercial rents were up an
average 5 percent (Hwang 2006).
Of course, not everyone sees the transformation as
flawless. While many laud the effects the Cheonggyecheon
restoration project has had on its surroundings, there are,
as observed above, concerns about former residents and
merchants being forced out of the area by rising property
values, and about the estimated $2 million spent annually
pumping water in to keep the stream flowing where it
would otherwise flow only intermittently (Walsh 2006).

Figure 7.9: Former Seoul Mayor and current South Korea
President Lee Myung-bak dips his feet in the
Cheonggyecheon stream.
Source: Streetsblog.net
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Appendix B: Existing Land Use Maps
New Orleans Existing Land Use Maps (Source: https://sites.google.com/site/nolaczo/)
1. Upper N. Claiborne
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Appendix B: Existing Land Use Maps
2.

Upper N. Claiborne Continued
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Appendix B: Existing Land Use Maps
3.

Upper N. Claiborne (Upper Left Corner tangent to Claiborne)
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Appendix B: Existing Land Use Maps
4.

Lower N. Claiborne (Tremé)
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Appendix B: Existing Land Use Maps
5.

Lower N. Claiborne (7th Ward)
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Appendix C: Future Land Use Maps
FUTURE LAND USE MAP: NOLA MASTER PLAN (Source:
https://www.communicationsmgr.com/projects/1371/docs/District%207_062210_adopted_11x17.pdf)
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Appendix D: Zoning Maps
1.

Upper N. Claiborne (Source: http://www.nola.gov/RESIDENTS/City-Planning/Zoning-Base-Maps/)
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Appendix D: Zoning Maps
1.

Lower N. Claiborne
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Appendix E: Employment Tables and Map
Table: 1
Tremé/Lafit
te
Total population 16 years and
over

Division of labor force (2000)
7th
Tulane/
Ibervill
Ward
Gravier
e
3,287

1,287

Orleans
Parish
370,138

Louisia
na
3,394,54
6

US
217,168,0
77

6,115

12,335

Not in labor force

52.4%

49.4%

56.6%

59.2%

42.2%

40.6%

36.1%

In Armed Forces

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.5%

0.5%

0.5%

Employed

37.4%

43.6%

36.5%

22.5%

51.8%

54.6%

59.7%

Unemployed
10.2%
7.0%
6.9%
18.3%
5.5%
4.3%
3.7%
Source Citation: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org>

Table: 2
Employment by industry (2000)
Seventh
Tulane/
Tremé/Lafitte Ward
Gravier
Total employed civilian population 16 years and over

Iberville

Orleans
Parish

Louisiana

US

2,287

5,382

1,199

290

191,739

1,851,777

129,721,512

Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining

0.6%

0.5%

0.8%

0.0%

1.0%

4.2%

1.9%

Construction

3.6%

7.3%

4.1%

0.7%

4.9%

7.9%

6.8%

Manufacturing

5.6%

5.3%

4.3%

4.5%

5.2%

10.1%

13.8%

Wholesale trade

2.2%

2.3%

2.1%

7.6%

2.5%

3.5%

3.6%

Retail trade

9.5%

11.1%

10.3%

10.0%

9.8%

11.9%

11.7%

Transportation and warehousing, and utilities

2.8%

7.0%

7.2%

2.8%

5.9%

5.3%

5.2%

Information

2.5%

1.2%

0.0%

0.0%

2.4%

2.0%

3.1%

Finance, insurance, real estate and rental and leasing

3.9%

3.1%

0.6%

1.7%

5.6%

5.7%

6.9%

Professional, scientific, and technical

2.3%

1.8%

2.7%

1.0%

5.8%

4.6%

5.9%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.1%

5.7%

4.4%

3.9%

6.2%

4.0%

3.0%

3.4%

Educational services

9.7%

8.3%

15.3%

5.2%

11.8%

9.6%

8.8%

Health care and social assistance

14.4%

13.7%

16.7%

11.0%

14.1%

12.1%

11.2%

Arts, entertainment, and recreation

3.6%

3.7%

0.3%

0.0%

3.2%

2.4%

1.8%

Accommodation and food services

19.7%

17.0%

20.1%

45.5%

12.1%

6.7%

6.1%

Other services (except public administration)

7.7%

7.8%

5.1%

3.8%

5.3%

5.2%

4.9%

Public administration

6.2%

5.5%

6.5%

0.0%

6.4%

5.8%

4.8%

Management of companies and enterprises
Administrative and support and waste management
services

Source Citation: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org>
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Appendix E: Employment Tables and Map
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Appendix E: Employment Tables and Map
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Appendix F: Interview Questions
1.

How would you describe your role in the community and your interest in the Claiborne corridor? (address
biographical aspect of the question)
Part of a neighborhood organization?
A business owner?
A renter/homeowner in the area?
A planner or policy maker?
Other roles?

2.

What are your thoughts regarding the possible removal and redevelopment of the Claiborne highway?
Do you support or opposed the removal?
Please explain the major reasons behind your opinion.
Do you think most of your neighbors/colleagues share your opinion?
Do you think the majority of the community supports or opposes the removal of the highway?

3.

Assuming the highway was removed and replaced with an attractive boulevard, how would the removal of the
highway impact you or your community?
From a travel perspective?
From an economic vitality perspective?
From a social equity perspective?
From an environmental perspective?

4.

Who are the major champions of the highway’s removal?

5.

Who do you envision are the major opponents of the highway’s removal?

6.

Do you feel there are viable alternate routes to take other than the highway?
If so, what?

7.

Would you consider public transit, bicycling or walking as real alternatives to driving along the Claiborne
corridor?

8.

If the proposal went through, what redevelopment efforts would you expect?

9.

Do you or your community feel that the redevelopment project would accomplish those expectations?
Why or why not?
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Appendix G: List of Stakeholders Interviewed
Cheryl Austin
William Borah
Adriane Brown
Jim Coningsby
Emily Danielson
Patty Gay
Cynthia Hedge-Morrell
Charlie Ho
Leo Jackson
Nick Malcovich
James McNamara
Lauren
Medhi Qalbani
Keith Scarmuzza
Jeff Schwartz
Maggie Tishman
Kurt Wiegle
Name Withheld
Name Withheld
Name Withheld
Name Withheld
Name Withheld
Name Withheld
Name Withheld
Name Withheld

Greater Tremé Consortium, Executive Director
Author and Environmental Attorney
New Orleans East Resident
The Phoenix of New Orleans, Director
Preservation Resource Center, Executive Director
Elected Official
West Bank Commuter
Jackson Quality Used Cars, Tremé Business Owner
Uptown Resident
NOLA BioDistrict, CEO
New Orleans East Resident
Tremé Resident
Tremé Resident, Landscape Architect
Broad Community Connections, Executive Director
Providence Community Housing, Special Programs Development
Director
New Orleans Downtown Development District, President and CEO
Elected Official
Transportation Planner
New Orleans Resident
Tremé Resident
Tremé Resident
Tremé Resident
Tremé Employee
New Orleans East Employee
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Appendix H: Survey Distribution
Advertising:
Local newspaper’s online edition (Times-Picayune, Nola.com)
Facebook page
Craigslist posts
Twitter posts
UNO Planning Student Organization web pages
UNO’s website

Direct soliciting of organizations:
Tulane
Loyola
Dillard
SUNO
Delgado
Xavier
LSU Medical School and Dental School
UNO Planning Department
Catholic Charities
Faith based communities in adjacent neighborhoods
American Planning Association local chapter
Urban Land Institute local chapter
Neighborhoods Partnership Network

Direct soliciting of people:
Email blasts to authors’ local network of colleagues, friends and family
Interviewees previously providing input
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Appendix I: Survey Questions
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